IN THE  SUPREME  COURT  OF SEYCHELLES

Side: CS 8112008

[2016] SCSC 375

UNION VALE CAR HIRE (PROPRIETARY) LIMITED

Plaintiff

versus

BEAU VALLON PROPERTIES  LIMITED
Defendant

Heard:

Counsel:     Mrs. Alexia Amesbury for plaintiff

                   Mr. Melchior Vidot for defendant

Delivered:   25 May 2016

JUDGMENT

Robinson  J

[1]  Plaintiff  is Union Vale Car Hire Proprietary Limited. Plaintiff  is and was at all material times a car hire operator.

[2]  Defendant is Beau Vallon Properties   Limited.  Defendant  is and was at all material times the owner  and operator of the Coral Strand Hotel.

[3]   Plaintiff   brought this suit in the  Supreme Court on 26  March, 2008, against Defendant for (i) a declaration  that  it is a statutory tenant;  (ii) a declaration  that the termination of the  tenancy agreement  by  Defendant  is unlawful;  (iii)  an order  restraining  Defendant from evicting Plaintiff from the "business premises";  (iv) loss and damages  in the sum of €uro (€)7800.001-  and continuing  against  Defendant; and (v) costs.

[4]  Defence and counter-claim  is dated 9 October, 2012. Defence and counter-claim  has not been filed  in the  registry  of  the  Supreme  Court.  Defence  to counter-claim dated 15 November,  2012,  has also  not  been  f led  in the  registry of the  Supreme  Court.  The defence  and counterclaim  and defence to counter-claim do not form  part of the record. This suit proceeds on the plaint.

[5]  For Plaintiff  I heard oral  evidence  from its  Managing Director,  Mr.  Michel  Gilbert Camille.

[6]  The facts giving rise to Plaintiff's  claim are as follows.  On 28 April,  1983, Plaintiff  was permitted by the Coral Strand Hotel to use the facilities of the hotel in connection  with its car hire rental operations  in terms of the  "Contract between Union Vale Car Hire Ply Ltd and  Coral  Strand Hotel Re Desk"  (exhibit  PI).  Plaintiff  occupied  the  desk  nearest  the reception of the Coral Strand Hotel in conjunction  with one other car hire company.

[7]  The Coral Strand  Hotel came under the ownership  and management  of Defendant.  By a written  "Rental Agreement"  by and between Defendant  and Plaintiff dated  10 July,  1995, for a term of two (2) years commencing 1 July,  1995, and expiring on 30 June,  1997, the "Desk adjacent  to the Reception  Counter  in the Hotel Lobby"  continued  to be vested  in Plaintiff for and in consideration  of a monthly rent of Seychelles  rupees (SCR) 4000.00/­ (exhibit P2).  The  "Desk  adjacent   to  the  Reception   Counter  in  the  Hotel Lobby"  is hereinafter  referred to as the "Desk".  In terms of exhibit  P2 Plaintiff  "shall maintain  the desk  only 10 conduct its car hire business ... ".  The  "Rental Agreement" expired  on 30 June,  1997. The evidence  shows that on and since 30 June,  1997, Plaintiff was allowed  to remain in possession  of the Desk for the use of its car hire business.  Plaintiff continued  to pay Defendant a monthly rent of SCR4000.001-, which rent was accepted by Defendant.

[8]  The  evidence  for  Plaintiff  as to the ejectment  is to the following  effect:  On 28  March, 2008, just  after  10 a.m., three men in the employ  of Coral Strand  Hotel approached  the Desk and told Mr. John Toule,  the representative  of Plaintiff,  to get off the chair. Those men  told  Mr. John  Toule  that  Plaintiff  had  no  right  to  use  the  premises  of  the  Coral Strand  Hotel  for  its car  hire  business,  and Defendant  will  be removing the Desk. The Desk was removed.  Exhibit  PI 0 is a video of the incident.  Mr. Camille  related that  two and a  half  weeks  or  three  weeks  before  the  "counter" was  removed,  persons  in  the employ of the Coral  Strand  Hotel had  removed  Plaintiffs   front  "counter" sign and  all other marketing paraphernalia  of Plaintiff.

[9]  On  29 March,  2008,  the  representatives   of  Plaintiff  were  prevented,   by  two  security guards of Defendant,  from entering the Coral Strand Hotel premises. The representatives of Plaintiff were told that Plaintiff should not solicit clients of the Coral Strand Hotel; and that  Plaintiff  should  not  use the  car park  of the  Coral  Strand  Hotel  to park  any  of  its vehicles  for  hire.  The  evidence  of  Mr.  Camille was that  front  desk  receptionists of Defendant  were  told  not to collect any keys  from Defendant's clients  when  returning Plaintiffs   hired vehicles  late in the evening.

[10]  Following  the removal of the Desk, Plaintiff  could not engage  in its car hire business  on the premises  of the Coral  Strand  Hotel as from 29  March, 2008,  until mid- May, 2008. Plaintiff  could also  not engage  in  its car  hire  business  during  the  time  that  the Coral Strand  Hotel was closed  down for minor work  between  mid-May,  2008,  and  mid-July, 2008. Mr. Camille  stated that representatives of Defendant  tried to physically  remove the representatives of  Plaintiff,  including  himself,  from the premises  of  the  Coral  Strand Hotel.  One  such  incident  took place  on  2  July,  2008, (police  statement  exhibit   P4). Plaintiff  refused  to vacate the premises  of the Coral  Strand  Hotel on account  of a letter written by  Attorney-at-Law Mr. Francis  Chang-Sam to Defendant to  the effect  that Plaintiff  was  a protected  tenant, and  proceedings brought by Plaintiff against Defendant before the  Supreme  Court of Seychelles  (exhibit   Pll).  Defendant  brought proceedings against  Plaintiff before the Rent  Board.

[11]  The  Rent  Board case  was  still  pending,  when Plaintiff  was served  with  a letter  emanating from learned  counsel  for   Defendant  dated  12  May,  2010,  informing  Plaintiff  that Defendant will withdraw the  case  against  Plaintiff   on  condition  that  Plaintiff  will  pay Defendant,  "all unpaid rent for the period  the case was  before  the Rent  Board  ... and Union  Vale Car Hire is invited to enter into a new lease  agreement  with my client.  My client proposes  a monthly rent of Euro Three Hundred  (£300) plus  a rent free  car for  the use of a demarcated  area in the hotel's  reception  area. 11  exhibit  P5. Plaintiff  prepared  a new agreement on or about 2010. Defendant did not sign the said agreement.  Draft of the agreement tendered as exhibit P6.

[12]   On  account of the cases  pending  before the courts, upon the re-opening of the Coral Strand Hotel in mid-July,  2008,  Plaintiff was allocated a new "counter".  From mid-July, 2008,  to January,  2011,  Plaintiff  conducted its car hire business  on the premises  of the Coral  Strand  Hotel  until  it closed  down  for  major renovation work.  The Coral  Strand Hotel re-opened about September or October, 2012.

[13]   Plaintiff  paid  Defendant   rent  for  the  month  of  March,  2008,  which  rent  Defendant accepted.  Plaintiff  paid Defendant  by cheque dated 30 July, 2008,  rent for the months of July and August,  2008  (exhibit  P8).  Plaintiff  received  a Coral  Strand  Hotel  receipt  for payment of the said rent (exhibit  P8). Plaintiff received  a letter from Defendant  dated  31 July,  2008,  enclosing  the cheque  exhibit  P8, stating  that  Defendant  had  "cancelled"  the said exhibit  P8.

[14]   Plaintiff claimed that its removal from the "business premises" is unlawful. The evidence of Mr. Camille sheds light on Plaintiffs  claim and the prayer for relief-

"Q    Mr Camille as a result  of  this  unlawful termination of  the contract  that  you  have,  what are you  claiming from this  court? How many years of  loss  and  damage  have you suffered?  1n your plaint  you  claimed 7800  Euros being  loss of earnings  and continuing   at 600  Euros per day and the time we brought the action it had  been only  for J 3 days and right now it is 4 years later from the date of the  breach and  continuing so we are claiming from defendant 600 Euros per day from the date of the breach till today?

A    My ladyship just  to rectify the claim  we are not claiming more than we have lost, what we are claiming  is since our counter was  taken away  in end  of  March,  2008  there  was  March  2008, April  2008,  half of May 2008  which  is 2 and a half months  then the hotel closed for minor renovations  between mid-May and mid­ July.  When  we came back  in mid-July  a counter  was  reinstated only  because the  injunction  in front  of  Justice  Karunakaran  had ordered  that Beau Vallon  Properties  maintains  the status quo until there is a ruling either from the Rent Board or the Supreme Court. So from July 2008 onwards to January,  20 II  when the hotel again closed  for major renovations  we were able to work, so we are not claiming  any  loss  of  income  for  that period. However,  from I believe it was  either  September  or October,  2012  when  the hotel re-opens till  today  and  continuing,  we have  not  been  able  to operate  at that hotel even though  we have written a letter to them to request our entrance  or permit our entrance  so we can continue on our business,  basically we are claiming  those 2 and half months back  in  2008 plus  the  September,  October  2012  till  now  and continuing." proceedings  of2  July, 2013, at 1:45 p.m ..

[15]   I have considered the oral  evidence of Plaintiff  in light of  the written submissions of counsel.

[16]   Plaintiff  claims  that  it is a protected  tenant  under  section 12 (I)  of the Control  of Rent and Tenancy  Agreements  Act as amended  [CAP 47]. The Control  of Rent  and Tenancy Agreements  Act as amended  [CAP 47] is hereinafter  referred to as the "Act". Section 12 (I)  of the Act provides -

"12 (I) -    A  lessee who  under  the  provisions  of this  Act retains possession of  any dwell ing  house  shall  so long as he  retains possession  observe  and  be entitled  to the benefit  of all the terms expressed  or implied in the original contract of letting so far as the same are consistent  with the provisions of th is Act".

According to Plaintiff it occupied the Desk for the purpose of a business carried on  by  it, but  is  the  Desk "premises"  within   the  meaning of  the  Act.  Counsel for Plaintiff has suggested  that the  tenancy which   Plaintiff has of  the  Desk   is within the Act.  I have to consider this  question which  turns on the  construction  of section 13 (I)  and  other  sections of the  Act.  Section  13 (I)  of the Act,  so far as relevant,  provides   -

"13  -    (I) This Act shall apply to any premises  used for business, trade or professional  purposes or for the public service as it applied to a dwelling house and as though references to a  "dwelling house", "house" and "dwelling" includes references to any such premises,  but this Act in its application to such premises shall have effect subject to the following  modifications:

The  following paragraphs shall be added after paragraph  U) of subsection  (2) of section  10:

(k)  the premises are reasonably required by the lessor for business,  trade or professional  purposes or  for  the  public service;

(I)   the premises  are  in whole  or  in part  licensed  for the  sale  of intoxicating  liquor and the lessee has committed an offence as holder of the licence or has not conducted  the business to the satisfaction of the licensing  authority,  or has carried it on in a manner detrimental  to the public interest, or the renewal of the licence has for any reason been refused.

(2)   The application of this Act to such premises as aforesaid shall not extend to a letting in any market ...".

The word  "premises"  is not defined  in the Act.  I am of the opinion  that  it is fair to say that  it is plain that  the  Legislature is considering  primarily physical  premises  such  as bui Idings. I find for instance,  in section  3 of the Act that the Act "shall apply to a house or part of a house let as a separate dwelling"  or, by extension  under section 13 of the Act, a  building. That argument is  fortified by  reference to  other  sections of  the  Act, particularly  section 10 (2)  0), where  it is said,  that  "the  dwelling-  house  is bona fide required for the  purpose of  being  demolished, reconstructed, moved or  improved". Moreover,   the  common  thread running through  the  jurisprudence of  the courts  of Seychelles is  that  the Legislature,  when   it  used   the  word  "premises,"  meant physical premises such as  buildings.  In  the Seychelles  Court   of  Appeal case  of   West  &  East Sisters Island A.G v. Bernard Sanders Civil Appeal No. 31 of 1999, delivered on  13 April 2000, the Justices of Appeal opined as follows -

"Secondly, the lease agreement  specified  in no uncertain terms that the subject matter of the lease was the two islands. Nowhere  in the lease agreement  or  in the affidavits  of either  party  was  reference made to the lease of buildings  used for business  purposes.  True  it is that the Control of Rent and Tenancy  Agreements  Act mentions dwelling  house  and  that section 13 extends the provisions of the Act to "premises used for business, trade or professional  purposes.

It is clear, however, from the general  language  and purport of the legislation that  it is meant  to  apply  to  rented  buildings, be they dwelling  houses or buildings used for business purposes. Moreover,  a close  look at section 13 itself shows  that the section was not designed to, and cannot, apply to bare land ".

See also the case of Kim Koon v The Roman Catholic Church (1996) SLR 135 on point.

[17]   For these reasons in my opinion, 1 find that the tenancy which Plaintiff has of the Desk is not within the Act.   I, therefore,  hold that Plaintiff  is not a statutory  tenant  under section 12 (1) of the Act.  The result of that is that prayer (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) fail.

[18]   Before I leave this matter, Istate out of interest that the decisive question  when looking at the issue of "ultra petita"  is whether or not the prayer for relief - (iv) loss and damages  in the sum  of  £uro  (£)  7800.00/-  and  continuing  against  Defendant  -  is covered  by  the evidence.   It  is noted  that  the  plaint  was  filed  on  26  March,  2008.  According  to  the evidence  of Plaintiff  the cause of action  arose  on 28  March, 2008,  when the  "counter" was removed.  Plaintiff claimed  loss and damages  as from 28 March, 2008.   It is plain that the evidence does not cover the said prayer for relief.

[19]  DECISION

[20]   I dismiss the plaint. There is 110 counter-claim  on record.

[21]   Each party shall bear its own costs.

Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 25 May 2016.

F Robinson
Judge of the Supreme Court