Family Law http://old2.seylii.org/ en Suzette v Suzette (DC 120 of 2021) [2022] SCSC 173 (04 March 2022); http://old2.seylii.org/sc/judgment/supreme-court/2022/173 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">Suzette v Suzette (DC 120 of 2021) [2022] SCSC 173 (04 March 2022);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/159" hreflang="x-default">Family Law</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Franzisca Mitterer</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Tue, 07/12/2022 - 05:58</span> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-field-search-summary field--type-text-with-summary field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Search summary</div> <div class="field__item"><p><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Divorce Petition to dissolve the marriage.</span></span></span></p> </div> </div> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.seylii.org/files/judgments/scsc/2022/173/2022-scsc-173.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=22839">2022-scsc-173.docx</a></span> </div> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-pdf file--application-pdf"> <a href="https://media.seylii.org/files/judgments/scsc/2022/173/2022-scsc-173.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=1280833">2022-scsc-173.pdf</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><p class="JudgmentText" style="text-indent:-.5in; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:48px"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="tab-stops:.5in"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><b>ESPARON J</b></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">[1]          <span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">This is the Humble Petition of Joula Marie Suzette seeking an Order from this Court that her marriage with the Respondent Sandy Saunders Suzette be dissolved in accordance with Article 230 (1) (b) of the Civil Code of Seychelles Act, 2020.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[2]        On the 26<sup>th</sup> October 2021 when the matter was called before the Court as first time mention, the Respondent Sandy Saunders Suzette stated in open Court that he has no objections in the Court granting divorce to the Petitioner and as such the Court granted leave to the Petitioner for the matter to proceed Ex-parte and the Court fixed the matter to be heard Ex-parte on the 20<sup>th</sup> January 2022.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[3]        The Petitioner avers in her Petition that the Parties were married at the Central Civil Status Office on the 24<sup>th</sup> day of July 2007 and that the Petitioner and the Respondent are Seychellois Nationals, domiciled and residents of Seychelles.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[4]        The Petitioner further avers that the parties have two children born of the said marriage namely, Dean Keven Leon Suzette born on the 18<sup>th</sup> day of April 2008 and Lana Grace Suzette born on the 12<sup>th</sup> day of May 2014.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[5]        The Petitioner further avers in the Petition that there have been no previous proceedings in any Court in Seychelles or in other jurisdictions in respect of the marriage.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[6]        The Petitioner has averred in paragraphs 8 and 9 of her Petition that the relationship of the parties to the marriage have irretrievably broken down because the Respondent has behaved in such a way that the Petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the Respondent and that all attempts at reconciliation with the Respondent have proved futile. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[7]        The Petitioner testified on Oath that she was married to the Respondent on the 24<sup>th</sup> July 2007 and produced the said marriage certificate as exhibit in Court corroborating her evidence and the Court admitted the said document as exhibit and marked it as Exhibit P1.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[8]        The Petitioner gave evidence in Court that both parties are Seychellois Nationals and Citizens of Seychelles and domiciled in Seychelles.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[9]        The Petitioner gave evidence to the fact that there are 2 children born of the said marriage namely, Dean Keven Leon Suzette born on the 18<sup>th</sup> day of April 2008 and Lana Grace Suzette born on the 12<sup>th</sup> day of May 2014 and the Petitioner produced their respective Birth Certificates as exhibit to the Court and the Court admitted the two documents as exhibit and marked the said documents as Exhibit P2 and exhibit P3 respectively.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[10]      The Petitioner gave evidence to the fact that the said minors would be living with her and that she will be maintaining the children and that the Respondent has agreed to this.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[11]      The Petitioner further testified to the Court that there are no previous matrimonial proceedings that have been filed before a Court in Seychelles or elsewhere.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[12]      The Petitioner gave evidence to the fact that it has been 3 years since everything is finished in the sense that they are no longer in a relationship since everyday he comes to the house and swears and wants to fight due to the fact that he is a heroin addict and he does so in front of the children which is a bad influence on them. She also gave evidence to the Court that it has been 7 years since he has been a heroin addict but it has been only 3 years since she has had knowledge of this fact.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[13]      The Petitioner gave evidence to the fact that with a view to help the Respondent in order to try some form of reconciliation, she has encouraged the Respondent to work on an island and to go on a methadone program but this has not worked out and he still continues to smoke drugs.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[14]      The Petitioner also testified to the fact that he also steals from her in the house.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[15]      That as a result of the uncontroverted evidence led in Court by the Petitioner, this Court is satisfied that the Petitioner has proven on a balance of probabilities that the marriage between the Petitioner and the Respondent has irretrievably broken down since the Respondent has behaved in such a way that the Petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the Respondent since the Petitioner gave evidence in Court that he is a heroin addict and he always comes to the house and swears and wants to fight of which is a bad influence on the children and he also steals from the Petitioner.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-31.5pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[16]    This Court is equally satisfied that the Petitioner has proven on a balance of probabilities that all attempts made to reconcile by the Petitioner and the Respondent has failed and after enquiring into the uncontroverted evidence presented by the Petitioner in this matter, this Court is satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility of reconciliation since the Petitioner in view to try to reconcile with the Respondent had tried to help him to go to work on an island and encouraged him to go on a methadone program but he still smoke drugs.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px"> </p> <p class="JudgmentText" style="text-indent:-.5in; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:48px"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="tab-stops:.5in"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[17]      The Court is also satisfied that arrangement relating to the welfare of the minor children have been made in terms of Article 370 of the Civil Code of Seychelles Act, 2020 since the Petitioner gave evidence to the fact that both minors will be living with her and maintained by her and this is agreeable by the Respondent.</span></span></span></span></p> <p class="JudgmentText" style="text-indent:-.5in; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:48px"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="tab-stops:.5in"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[18]      Therefore, for the reasons stated above, I accordingly allow the Petition and grant a conditional Order of divorce to dissolve the marriage between the Petitioner and the Respondent, to be made absolute 6 weeks from the date of this Judgment in accordance with Article 232 (1) of the Civil Code of Seychelles Act, 2020, read with Article 232 (3) of the same Act.</span></span></span></span></p> <p class="JudgmentText" style="text-indent:-.5in; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="page-break-after:avoid"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 4 March 2022</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px"> </p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px"> </p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="page-break-after:avoid"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">____________</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="page-break-after:avoid"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Esparon J</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-ccb23426afbe93c24061beb1c77510adb0f64f992e2996a809caea5f2ac5af06"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><p class="JudgmentText" style="text-indent:-.5in; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:48px"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="tab-stops:.5in"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><b>ESPARON J</b></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">[1]          <span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">This is the Humble Petition of Joula Marie Suzette seeking an Order from this Court that her marriage with the Respondent Sandy Saunders Suzette be dissolved in accordance with Article 230 (1) (b) of the Civil Code of Seychelles Act, 2020.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[2]        On the 26<sup>th</sup> October 2021 when the matter was called before the Court as first time mention, the Respondent Sandy Saunders Suzette stated in open Court that he has no objections in the Court granting divorce to the Petitioner and as such the Court granted leave to the Petitioner for the matter to proceed Ex-parte and the Court fixed the matter to be heard Ex-parte on the 20<sup>th</sup> January 2022.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[3]        The Petitioner avers in her Petition that the Parties were married at the Central Civil Status Office on the 24<sup>th</sup> day of July 2007 and that the Petitioner and the Respondent are Seychellois Nationals, domiciled and residents of Seychelles.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[4]        The Petitioner further avers that the parties have two children born of the said marriage namely, Dean Keven Leon Suzette born on the 18<sup>th</sup> day of April 2008 and Lana Grace Suzette born on the 12<sup>th</sup> day of May 2014.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[5]        The Petitioner further avers in the Petition that there have been no previous proceedings in any Court in Seychelles or in other jurisdictions in respect of the marriage.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[6]        The Petitioner has averred in paragraphs 8 and 9 of her Petition that the relationship of the parties to the marriage have irretrievably broken down because the Respondent has behaved in such a way that the Petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the Respondent and that all attempts at reconciliation with the Respondent have proved futile. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[7]        The Petitioner testified on Oath that she was married to the Respondent on the 24<sup>th</sup> July 2007 and produced the said marriage certificate as exhibit in Court corroborating her evidence and the Court admitted the said document as exhibit and marked it as Exhibit P1.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[8]        The Petitioner gave evidence in Court that both parties are Seychellois Nationals and Citizens of Seychelles and domiciled in Seychelles.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[9]        The Petitioner gave evidence to the fact that there are 2 children born of the said marriage namely, Dean Keven Leon Suzette born on the 18<sup>th</sup> day of April 2008 and Lana Grace Suzette born on the 12<sup>th</sup> day of May 2014 and the Petitioner produced their respective Birth Certificates as exhibit to the Court and the Court admitted the two documents as exhibit and marked the said documents as Exhibit P2 and exhibit P3 respectively.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[10]      The Petitioner gave evidence to the fact that the said minors would be living with her and that she will be maintaining the children and that the Respondent has agreed to this.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[11]      The Petitioner further testified to the Court that there are no previous matrimonial proceedings that have been filed before a Court in Seychelles or elsewhere.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[12]      The Petitioner gave evidence to the fact that it has been 3 years since everything is finished in the sense that they are no longer in a relationship since everyday he comes to the house and swears and wants to fight due to the fact that he is a heroin addict and he does so in front of the children which is a bad influence on them. She also gave evidence to the Court that it has been 7 years since he has been a heroin addict but it has been only 3 years since she has had knowledge of this fact.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[13]      The Petitioner gave evidence to the fact that with a view to help the Respondent in order to try some form of reconciliation, she has encouraged the Respondent to work on an island and to go on a methadone program but this has not worked out and he still continues to smoke drugs.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[14]      The Petitioner also testified to the fact that he also steals from her in the house.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[15]      That as a result of the uncontroverted evidence led in Court by the Petitioner, this Court is satisfied that the Petitioner has proven on a balance of probabilities that the marriage between the Petitioner and the Respondent has irretrievably broken down since the Respondent has behaved in such a way that the Petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the Respondent since the Petitioner gave evidence in Court that he is a heroin addict and he always comes to the house and swears and wants to fight of which is a bad influence on the children and he also steals from the Petitioner.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-31.5pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[16]    This Court is equally satisfied that the Petitioner has proven on a balance of probabilities that all attempts made to reconcile by the Petitioner and the Respondent has failed and after enquiring into the uncontroverted evidence presented by the Petitioner in this matter, this Court is satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility of reconciliation since the Petitioner in view to try to reconcile with the Respondent had tried to help him to go to work on an island and encouraged him to go on a methadone program but he still smoke drugs.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px"> </p> <p class="JudgmentText" style="text-indent:-.5in; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:48px"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="tab-stops:.5in"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[17]      The Court is also satisfied that arrangement relating to the welfare of the minor children have been made in terms of Article 370 of the Civil Code of Seychelles Act, 2020 since the Petitioner gave evidence to the fact that both minors will be living with her and maintained by her and this is agreeable by the Respondent.</span></span></span></span></p> <p class="JudgmentText" style="text-indent:-.5in; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:48px"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="tab-stops:.5in"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[18]      Therefore, for the reasons stated above, I accordingly allow the Petition and grant a conditional Order of divorce to dissolve the marriage between the Petitioner and the Respondent, to be made absolute 6 weeks from the date of this Judgment in accordance with Article 232 (1) of the Civil Code of Seychelles Act, 2020, read with Article 232 (3) of the same Act.</span></span></span></span></p> <p class="JudgmentText" style="text-indent:-.5in; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="page-break-after:avoid"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 4 March 2022</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px"> </p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px"> </p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="page-break-after:avoid"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">____________</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="page-break-after:avoid"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Esparon J</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p></span></div></div> </div> </div> Tue, 12 Jul 2022 05:58:41 +0000 Franzisca Mitterer 5092 at http://old2.seylii.org Arissol v Pillay (SCA 31 of 2018) [2021] SCCA 6 (30 April 2021); http://old2.seylii.org/sc/judgment/court-appeal/2021/6 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">Arissol v Pillay (SCA 31 of 2018) [2021] SCCA 6 (30 April 2021);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/159" hreflang="x-default">Family Law</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Anonymous (not verified)</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Thu, 06/23/2022 - 08:07</span> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-field-search-summary field--type-text-with-summary field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Search summary</div> <div class="field__item"><p>Property and financial adjustments under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1992 [CAP 124] - Appeal partly allowed and partly dismissed. Each party shall pay her/his costs.</p> </div> </div> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-pdf file--application-pdf"> <a href="https://media.seylii.org/files/judgments/scca/2021/6/2021-scca-6_1.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=839387">2021-scca-6.pdf</a></span> </div> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.seylii.org/files/judgments/scca/2021/6/2021-scca-6_1.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=47681">2021-scca-6.docx</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><p>IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF SEYCHELLES<br /> _____________________________________________________________________________<br /> Reportable<br /> [2020] SCCA 16   30 April 2021<br /> SCA 31/2018<br /> (Appeal from MA322/2016<br /> arising in DV78/2015)<br />  <br /> In the matter between<br /> GRACY ARISSOL                                                            Appellant                     <br /> (rep. by Mrs. A. Amesbury)<br />  <br /> and<br />  <br /> DAVE PILLAY                                                                  Respondent<br /> (rep. by Mr. Serge Rouillon)<br />  <br /> ______________________________________________________________________________<br /> Neutral Citation: Gracy Arissol v Dave Pillay (SCA 31/2018) [2021] SCCA 16   30 April 2021<br /> Before:                   Fernando President, Robinson JA, Govinden CJ<br /> Summary:             Property and financial adjustments under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1992 [CAP 124] - Appeal partly allowed and partly dismissed. Each party shall pay her/his costs.<br /> Heard:                    23 August 2019, 14 July 2020 &amp; 7 April 2021</p> <p>Delivered:              30 April 2021<br />  </p> <p> <br /> ORDER<br />  <br /> 1.         Ground 1 of the grounds of appeal is allowed.<br />  <br /> 2.         The order awarding Gracy Arissol thirty (30) percent in the value of parcel J1606 and the four bedroom-house standing thereon (SCR1,200,000) is set aside and replaced by the following orders ―<br />  </p> <p>The share of Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay in parcel J1606 and the four bedroom-house standing thereon shall be fifty (50) per cent each;</p> <p> <br /> (ii)       The share of Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay in parcel J1606 and the four bedroom-house standing thereon shall be SCR2,000,000 each;<br /> (iii)      Order is made substituting for the sum of SCR1,200,000 for the share of Gracy Arissol in parcel J1606 and the four bedroom-house standing thereon, the sum of SCR2,000,000.<br />  <br /> 3.         Grounds 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the grounds of appeal are dismissed.<br />  <br /> 4.         Gracy Arissol is ordered to vacate the house standing on parcel V10596 within six (6) months of the date of the judgment of the Court of Appeal.<br />  <br /> 5.         Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay shall pay her/his costs of this appeal.<br /> ______________________________________________________________________________<br /> JUDGMENT<br /> ______________________________________________________________________________<br />  <br /> ROBINSON JA (FERNANDO PCA AND GOVINDEN CJ concurring)<br /> The Background<br />  </p> <p>Dave Pillay, the respondent (then the petitioner), and Gracy Arissol, the appellant (then the cross-petitioner), were husband and wife. They had met in 1998 before marrying on the 5 December 1999 at Bel Ombre, Mahe. The marriage between Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay lasted for about fifteen and a half years. They got divorced on the 31 July 2015. There is one minor child of the marriage. Dave Pillay and Gracy Arissol both applied for property and financial adjustments under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1992. </p> <p> </p> <p>Dave Pillay's amended petition neither asked for any specific amount nor a percentage of the value of the matrimonial property, but left the determination of all amounts to the learned Judge. Gracy Arissol's cross-petition asked the Supreme Court to make the following orders ―</p> <p> <br /> ″(a)      […] an order of full lawful and beneficial ownership of land parcel in J1606 and the matrimonial home and accompanying structures thereon for and in the entire interest of the Cross-Petitioner in accordance with rule 4 (1) (j)<br />  </p> <p>[…] an order of half of the lawful and beneficial ownership of the land parcels S6399 and V10596 and accompanying structures for and in the interest of the Cross-Petitioner in accordance with rule 4 (1)(j)</p> <p> </p> <p> […] an order that the Cross-Petitioner be granted, forthwith, sole occupancy of land parcel J1606 and the matrimonial home and accompanying structures thereon, forthwith, in accordance with rule 4 (1)(j)</p> <p> </p> <p>[…] an order restraining the Cross-Respondent from entering and remaining on land parcel J1606 and the matrimonial home and accompanying structures thereon forthwith, in accordance with rule 4(1)(h)(j)</p> <p> </p> <p>[…] an order that the Cross-Petitioner is awarded the sum of 4,000,000 (four million Seychelles Rupees), in respect of her shares in the business owned by the Parties</p> <p> </p> <p>[…] an order in respect of maintenance of a relevant child in accordance with Rule 4 (1)(i)</p> <p> </p> <p>[...] an order in respect of the education of a relevant child in accordance with Rule 4 (1)(i).″</p> <p> </p> <p>The learned Judge set out the matters at issue, in this case, following amendments made to the cross-petition by Gracy Arissol ―</p> <p> <br /> ″Court: So the only matter at issue therefore is that you have full ownership and occupancy of the Le Niole property which is V10596 and a share in parcel J1606. Do I understand you correctly?<br />  <br /> A: That is correct my lady and if I may ask the court V10596 is charge free.<br />  <br /> Court: And you are also asking the court under (e) for an order of R6 million in respect of your shares in the business. Is that still going ahead?<br />  <br /> A: May I make an amendment too?<br />  <br /> Court: You can indeed yes through your lawyer.<br />  <br /> Mrs Amesbury: It has been amended from 6 million to 4 million.<br />  <br /> A: R4 million as the shares of the two companies.<br />  <br /> Court: Both Sterling and Impact Logistics. The amendment is granted without any objection from Mr Rouillon for Mr Pillay<br />  <br /> Mrs Amesbury: That is all my Lady.″<br />  </p> <p>Gracy Arissol testified to the effect that she was not asking to be awarded any share in parcel S6399.  </p> <p> </p> <p>After reviewing the evidence, the learned Judge delivered a judgment on the 27 June 2017, hereinafter referred to as the ″Judgment″. The Judgment decided as follows ―</p> <p> <br /> ″[62] Parcel J1606 has been valued at SR 4 million by the petitioner. The respondent has not challenged this valuation nor offered an alternative valuation. Her share in that property is therefore SR 1.2 million and I so Order.<br />  <br /> [63] I shall make further orders in respect of how her share in Parcel J1606 is to be realised on receiving the valuations of her shares in the other two companies, namely Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd and Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd and by inference in Parcels V10596 and V10450.<br />  <br /> [64] In respect of the appointment of an Auditor to audit the companies' accounts and provide the court with a valuation of the shares of the parties in Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd and Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd, after consultation with the parties it is agreed that Jean-Marie Moutia, of ACM Associates, English River, is appointed for the work. A copy of this Judgment is to be forwarded to the Auditor, whose fees shall be met by the parties' jointly on or before the 15 July 2017. The Auditor is to report to the Court on or before the 14 October 2017. The Parties are ordered to fully cooperate with the Auditor and to surrender all relevant documents to him so that he may carry out his work.<br />  <br /> [65] This case is adjourned for the consideration of the report and further Orders of the Court to 18 October 2017.″<br />  </p> <p>During the hearing of this case, on the 8 November 2017, Mr Spencer gave the learned Judge a report, titled ″VALUATION OF SHARES Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd″, dated 8 November 2017, prepared by ACM Associates, hereinafter referred to as the ″Expert Report″. </p> <p> </p> <p>The learned Judge delivered an order on the 5 February 2018, based on the Expert Report, which ordered as follows  ―</p> <p> <br /> ″[7] I have already ordered that the Petitioner pay the Respondent the sum of SR1.2 million for her share in the matrimonial home on Parcel J1606. In addition and in view of the circumstances outlined above, I make the following additional orders:<br />  <br /> 1. I order the Petitioner, Dave Herbert Pillay to pay SR 853,512.30 to the Respondent, Gracy Sybil Pillay for her one share in the company Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd with a deduction of SR 24,269 for her shares in Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd. This amounts to a total of SR829,243.30 to be paid by the Petitioner to the Respondent.<br />  <br /> 2. I make no order as to costs.″<br />  </p> <p>On the 5 April 2018, the learned Judge made the following ″final orders″, which read as follows ―</p> <p> <br /> ″1. The Respondent is to vacate the house on parcel V10596 at le Niole within 6 months of this order.<br />  <br /> 2. The Petitioner is to pay the Respondent the sum of 1.2 million for her share in J1606 and SR829,243.30 for her combined shares in Sterling Investment V10450 and Impact Logistics V10596 a total of 2,029,243.30.<br />  <br /> 3. Should the petitioner fail to make the payment in relation to Parcel J1606 as ordered within six months hereof, the respondent is entitled to pay the petitioner the sum of SR 2,700,000 corresponding to his share in the same and he shall vacate the property forthwith.<br />  <br /> 4. Should the Petitioner fail to make payment in relation to the Respondent's shares in Sterling Investment and Impact Logistics, the Companies are to be wind up pursuant to Section 95(c), (d) and (h) of the Insolvency Act 2013 with the extending debts to be paid in accordance with the parties respective shares in the Companies.<br />  <br /> 5. Each party shall bear his/her own costs.″<br />  <br /> The grounds of appeal<br />  </p> <p>The grounds of appeal are ―</p> <p> <br /> ″1)The Learned Judge erred by assessing the Appellant's (Gracy Arissol's) share as only 30 % or 1.2 million Rupees when the property is valued at 4 million.<br />  <br /> 2) On 5 April 2018 ordered that the Appellant and the minor child vacate parcel V 10596 within six months, failing to consider the housing and other needs of the Appellant and child.<br />  <br /> 3) The learned trial Judge failed to consider or to adequately consider that the Auditor was precluded from making a fair assessment of the assets of Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd. due to the production of incomplete accounts.<br />  <br /> 4) The learned Judge erred when neither the Appellant's submissions in regard to the Auditor's report nor the Respondent's (Dave Pillay's) testimony on this point was considered by the court in assessing the Appellant's share of the company's liability.<br />  </p> <p>The learned Judge acted in error when she failed to consider that personal funds cannot be deducted from the Appellant's award to pay for the Company's liability without first selling the company's Assets to pay the liabilities.</p> <p> <br /> 6) Despite the court being mindful of other factors brought into the evidence at the hearing when determining the Appellant's share in the businesses the court failed to consider the evidence of the Bank Officer and the fact that the auditor's report was based on ″incomplete records″ of the company's financial affairs.<br />  <br /> 7) In considering the division of matrimonial properties the learned Judge failed to consider the applicable law as stated in the MCA section 20(1)(g) and to attach sufficient weight to all relevant factors and attached weight to irrelevant facts.<br />  <br /> 8) Despite the court having made several orders in the present case in regards to division of matrimonial property both movables and immovable the court failed to make any orders in regards to the parties relevant minor child as per section 24(2) and section 25(2)(b) of the MCA.<br />  <br /> 9) The learned Judge erred in finding that the Totality of the Appellant's combined shares in Sterling Investment, V 10450, Impact Logistics and the matrimonial home totals SCR 2, 2029, 243/-.<br />  <br /> 10) The multiplicity of the orders and applications made by the Respondent and the total lack of consideration of the Appellant's substantial submissions at every stage of the case the Appellant was denied her right to have her case heard by an independent and impartial court as guaranteed to her under Article 19 (7) of the Constitution."<br />  </p> <p>By way of relief, Gracy Arissol sought the following orders ―</p> <p> <br /> "3.1 A judgment reversing the findings and decision of the learned trial Judge and awarding the Appellant her just and equitable shares in the properties and the jointly owned businesses, as per section 20(1)(g) of the MCA.<br />  <br /> 3.2 Ordering the Respondent to pay the Appellant's costs of this Appeal and in the court below.<br />  <br /> 3.3 Any other orders in regards to the minor child's housing and Educational needs pursuant to section 24 (2) and section 25 (2)(b) of the MCA."<br />  <br /> The evidence<br />  </p> <p>Before considering the grounds of appeal, and the written and oral submissions submitted on behalf of Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay, it is convenient to summarise the facts.</p> <p> <br /> The evidence of Dave Pillay (the petitioner then)</p> <p>Dave Pillay was a sole trader before he and Gracy Arissol were married to each other. Before he met Gracy Arissol, he purchased parcel J1606 situated at Beau Belle for SCR400,000 from one Herbert Hoareau, on the 11 November 1999, (exhibit P1), from the proceeds of his business activities. Gracy Arissol did not contribute to the purchase price of parcel J1606.</p> <p> </p> <p>On the 17 July 2001, Dave Pillay sold parcel J1606 for SCR670,000 to Georges Francois Gill (exhibit P2), his brother in law. As I understand it, regarding the sale and transfer of parcel J1606, Georges Gill gave him two cheques drawn in his [Dave Pillay's] favour, one for SCR600,000 and the other one for the same amount. Dave Pillay used the money to finance his tax debt for SCR1,200,000. He was going to the United States to train to be a pilot, at the time. </p> <p> </p> <p>On the 8 April 2010, Georges Gill transferred parcel J1606 and the house situated thereon, jointly and in an equal share, to Dave Pillay and Gracy Arissol for SCR1,200,000 (exhibit P4). </p> <p> </p> <p>Dave Pillay and Gracy Arissol have ninety shares and ten shares in Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd, respectively; a company incorporated in 2005. Gracy Arissol, a director and an employee (a sales representative) of Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd, never paid in cash for her ten shares. Dave Pillay and Gracy Arissol earned the same salary as employees of Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd. Gracy Arissol stopped working for Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd in October 2014.  </p> <p> </p> <p>On the 4 April 2013, Dave Pillay and Gracy Arissol transferred parcel J1606 and the house situated thereon to Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd for SCR1,200,000. Hubert Alton &amp; Co. valued parcel J1606 and the four-bedroom house situated thereon for SCR4,000,000. </p> <p> </p> <p>Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd represented by Dave Pillay, in his capacity as a director, bought parcel V10596 and the house situated thereon, at Le Niole, from Robenson Louis and Louis Hoareau, for SCR2,500,000, on the 4 April 2013 (exhibit P15). </p> <p> </p> <p>A printed copy of an interim statement, Barclays Bank (Seychelles) Ltd (″Barclays Bank″), dated 17 October 2016, for account number 2000986 for Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd, showed a current balance of minus SCR312,500.14 (exhibit P23). Dave Pillay claimed that the current balance, as mentioned, represented the amount of money outstanding for the repayment of the loan taken to finance the purchase of parcel V10596.</p> <p> </p> <p>Nadia Gray and Michel Felix and Dave Pillay and Gracy Arissol entered into an agreement dated 26 August 2014, in terms of which Nadia Gray and Michel Felix sold to Dave Pillay and Gracy Arissol the following shares in Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd (exhibit P20). Nadia Gray transferred her nine shares to Dave Pillay, and Michel Felix transferred his one share to Gracy Arissol. The said ten shares were sold for SCR6,500,000. That agreement also provided that Gracy Arissol was holding the said one share transferred to her on behalf of Dave Pillay.</p> <p> </p> <p>Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd is the owner of the leasehold interest over parcel V10450, under the lease agreement entered into by it with the Seychelles Industrial Development Corporation on 3 November 2007. Dave Pillay and Gracy Arissol took a loan from the Development Bank of Seychelles for SCR6,398,000 ″for the acquisition of an existing company including a building comprising of storage facilities used for rental services″ (exhibit P24). Dave Pillay repaid the said loan for Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd. Gracy Arissol neither helped finance the leasehold interest nor took part in the affairs of Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd.</p> <p> </p> <p>Hubert Alton &amp; Co. valued the leasehold interest for SCR6,500,000; its report is dated the 24 February 2014 (exhibit P12). Currently, the shareholders of Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd are Dave Pillay and Mrs Flory Gill, who hold nine shares and one share in the said company, respectively. Mrs Flory Gill, who is Dave Pillay's sister, is the wife of Georges Gill.</p> <p> </p> <p>He went on to testify that Gracy Arissol was an employee of Air Seychelles when they met. She worked for Air Seychelles from 1999 to 2010; after that, she took a sabbatical leave. She earned a monthly salary of about SCR6,000 to 7,000 and a monthly allowance of Euros (€)300 to 350. </p> <p> </p> <p>He denied that Gracy Arissol supported the family from her salary and foreign exchange allowance earned from Air Seychelles. He also explained that her ″meagre″ salary would not have been enough to finance business activities. He borrowed money from Georges Gill to finance some of his business activities. </p> <p> </p> <p>He denied that Gracy Arissol supported him in the United States. When his family moved to the United States, he sold his car and used the proceeds of the sale to fund his family's stay and studies.  </p> <p> </p> <p>Regarding a court judgment CA30/2015, an appeal from the Family Tribunal, dated 28 June 2016, Dave Pillay stated that Gracy Arissol owes him the sum of SCR83,644. That sum includes utility fees from Gracy Arissol's stay at Beau Belle. </p> <p> </p> <p>Gracy Arissol drives a Toyota Rav4, an asset paid for by and belonging to Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd, which is in her name. </p> <p> </p> <p>He produced a directors' report and financial statements for the year ending the 31 December 2015 for Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd. He also tendered financial statements for Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd for 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 (exhibit P28 collectively). </p> <p> </p> <p>He claimed that he is in debt and is living off family and friends. He had not seen his child, whom Gracy Arissol has full custody of, for over two years. </p> <p> </p> <p>When cross-examined, he stated that he returned from the United States in 2002. He was employed by ″IDC″ and worked there for about one and a half years or two years. He could not recall when he stopped working there. After leaving IDC, he incorporated a company in 2005 with money given to him by Georges Gill. Between 2001 and 2005, he was a sole trader and obtained money from Georges Gill to fund business activities. </p> <p> </p> <p>Gracy Arissol worked for Air Seychelles as a flight attendant. He denied that she supported him financially in 2001 to repay his tax debt to the sum of SCR1,200,000. </p> <p> </p> <p>Every year he receives SCR70,000 to 74,000 from Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd. He does not pay any rent for the use of the warehouse. He owes the bank about SCR5,000,000 for the warehouse.  </p> <p> <br /> The evidence of Georges Gill</p> <p>Georges Gill is a contractor doing pest control. He has known Dave Pillay for about forty years and Gracy Arissol for about thirteen to fourteen years.  He helps Dave Pillay with his business activities.</p> <p> </p> <p>Dave Pillay has repaid him the sum of SCR1,200,000 that he borrowed concerning parcel J1606. </p> <p> </p> <p>From October 2014 to July 2015, he [Georges Gill] and Gracy Arissol had a cordial relationship. Gracy Arissol stayed at his house because she had problems with Dave Pillay. Georges Gill assisted her with money, and in any way he could.</p> <p> </p> <p> When cross-examined, Georges Gill stated that he assisted Dave Pillay financially with respect to his business activities, and that Dave Pillay owes him SCR1,500,000. We note that there is no documentary evidence supporting this claim, except for Georges Gill's oral evidence.</p> <p> <br /> The evidence of Gracy Arissol (the cross-petitioner then)</p> <p>Gracy Arissol is currently employed as a supervisor in the legal department at the Seychelles Commercial Bank. She met Dave Pillay in 1998, and they got married in December 1999. She was then a flight attendant for Air Seychelles and Dave Pillay, a sole trader. </p> <p> </p> <p>She could not assist Dave Pillay with his tax debt. She confirmed his testimony to the effect that Georges Gill helped him in paying his debt. </p> <p> </p> <p>In July 2001, Gracy Arissol and her family moved to the United States. Dave Pillay wanted to train, in the United States, to become a commercial airline pilot. She sold a white tipper to Georges Gill for SCR120,000 (exhibit D1), and Dave Pillay sold his car. They used the money to pay for their move to the United States. Dave Pillay paid for his flight training. Gracy Arissol and her family returned to Seychelles in 2002. </p> <p> </p> <p>Upon his return to Seychelles, Dave Pillay started as a trainee pilot with ″IDC″. Dave Pillay left his employment to do mandatory military training at the military academy, which he did not complete. Thus, he stayed at home. He was also a sole trader at the time. As they had just returned to Seychelles, the business was not doing well. Since she was working as a flight attendant, she supported the family and the company financially. She earned a monthly salary of about 1000 pounds sterling(₤). She used her salary to purchase goods abroad, which she sold at a profit. She used the proceeds to pay for her family purchases and expenses. She also purchased goods abroad for the business, which Dave Pillay sold at a profit. Moreover, as there was a foreign exchange crisis in the country, her salary, paid partly in foreign exchange, greatly assisted the business. </p> <p> </p> <p>As an employee of Air Seychelles, she also obtained rebated tickets, which Dave Pillay and her family enjoyed. Dave Pillay travelled on rebated tickets and stayed at the same hotel where she stayed while working abroad, thus significantly reducing the family's and business' travelling and other expenses. </p> <p> </p> <p>She took a loan of SCR20,100 from the Youth Enterprise Scheme in 2003, which Dave Pillay used to purchase goods abroad to be sold by the company, (exhibit D2).  She repaid the loan.</p> <p> </p> <p>Dave Pillay and Gracy Arissol purchased shares in Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd (exhibit P20). In their capacity as the directors of that company, they borrowed SCR6,398,000 from the Development Bank of Seychelles for the said company. She is no longer a shareholder of the said company. She never received monetary benefits from Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd. She drives a car given to her by Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd.</p> <p> </p> <p>She is now occupying parcel V10596 at Le Niol, which was financed by Impacts Logistics (Pty) Ltd from the proceeds of a loan obtained by it.</p> <p> </p> <p>Gracy Arissol stopped working as a flight attendant in 2010. At the time, her marriage was rocky. She used all her work compensation to buy goods for Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd. Gracy Arissol stated that she had injected about SCR1,300,000 into Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd from 1998 to 2010.</p> <p> </p> <p>Gracy Arissol asked the Supreme Court for full lawful and beneficial ownership of parcel V10596 and the matrimonial home and accompanying structures thereon and a share in parcel J1606. She is not asking for any shares in S6399. She is also asking for SCR4,000,000 for her share value in both Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd and Impact Logistics Pty Ltd.</p> <p> <br /> The evidence of Frantina Bamboche</p> <p>Frantina Bamboche is the Relationship Manager at Barclays Bank. Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd holds a current rupee account and a loan rupee account with Barclays Bank. The loan account statements concerning Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd was tendered as exhibit D6, and the current account statements pertaining to Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd as exhibit D7. Concerning Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd, there exists only one loan. The outstanding amount of the loan is SCR52,083.49.  She tendered statements from 2010 to 2017. </p> <p> <br /> The evidence of Joeliff Yocette</p> <p>Joeliff Yocette is an Immigration Officer. He produced the immigration records for Dave Pillay (exhibit D8), which depicted the following ―</p> <p> <br />  </p> <p>Year </p> <p>Number of trips undertaken outside of Seychelles</p> <p>2005</p> <p>29</p> <p>2006</p> <p>34</p> <p>2007</p> <p>30</p> <p>2008</p> <p>26</p> <p>2009</p> <p>21</p> <p>2010</p> <p>10</p> <p>2011</p> <p>18</p> <p>2012</p> <p>14</p> <p>2013</p> <p>10</p> <p>2014</p> <p>13</p> <p>2015</p> <p>19</p> <p>2016</p> <p>12</p> <p> <br />  <br /> The evidence of Mr Danny Pierre</p> <p>Danny Pierre is the Head of Recovery and Collection at Barclays Bank. Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd had a business loan with Barclays Bank, dated 19 April 2010, for the sum of SCR1,600,000, to purchase a property for business activity. That loan has been repaid. </p> <p> </p> <p>Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd also took an overdraft facility from Barclays Bank for SCR400,000/- (exhibit D11) in January 2013, for working capital for the said company. </p> <p> </p> <p>On the 25 March 2013, Barclays Bank offered the directors of Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd a long term loan facility to the amount of SCR2,500,000 (exhibit D12). Repayment for that loan was SCR52,083/- per month. That loan has been repaid. Danny Pierre stated that there is no debt owing from Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd, in answer to a question from the learned Judge to that effect.</p> <p> <br />  <br />  <br /> The evidence of Cindy Blakemore</p> <p>Cindy Blakemore, the Acting Commissioner for Customs, testified that Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd imported about seventy-five containers of goods from 2008 to 2016. From 2015 to 2016, about twenty containers of goods were imported. When cross-examined, she stated that figure ″seventy-five″ referred to ″import consignments″.</p> <p> </p> <p>It is against this background that I consider the grounds or appeal. </p> <p> <br /> Analysis of the contentions of Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay<br />  </p> <p>I have considered the evidence on record, the Judgment, the order of 5 February 2018, the order of 5 April 2018, the grounds of appeal and the written and oral submissions submitted on behalf of Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay. </p> <p> <br /> Ground 1</p> <p>I consider ground 1, which challenged the quantum awarded to Gracy Arissol by the learned Judge concerning parcel J1606 and the four-bedroom house situated thereon. I pause to state that Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd has transferred parcel J1606 to one Sithra Lakshmi Chetty on the 21 June 2018, after the conclusion of the case at first instance. </p> <p> </p> <p>The learned Judge declared the sale of parcel J1606 to Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd null and treated parcel J1606 ″as still being in the joint names and in equal shares to the parties″.  There is no issue raised with respect to this finding. The learned Judge assessed the share of Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay in parcel J1606, based on the following factors ―</p> <p> <br /> ″that although the starting point for the Court's assessment of the parties share in this property is 50/50 as is evident on the transfer document of 2010, other factors need to be taken into consideration in arriving at a fair adjustment. In the circumstances given all the evidence adduced before the Court, bearing in mind the length of the marriage, the acrimonious and rocky state of the marriage from very early, the periods spent living apart, the financial contributions and other efforts towards the parties' business and other undertakings I find it reasonable to assess the share of the petitioner as 70 % and that of the Respondent as 30 % of this property.″.<br />  <br />  </p> <p>The learned Judge also stated: ″Courts do take into account the efforts of parties to a marriage to the caregiving and homemaking in assessing their share in a matrimonial home […]. She found that: ″both parties' efforts in this respect cancel each other out as both were away from home and their child for long periods, the Respondent as an air hostess and the Petitioner on his more than frequent business trips″. </p> <p> </p> <p>The heads of argument contended that the learned Judge erred in the circumstances of the case and on the state of the case law in not awarding Gracy Arissol a half share in the value of parcel J1606. The heads of argument submitted on behalf of Dave Pillay, concerning this ground of appeal, primarily argued that Gracy Arissol's contribution to the running of the household was negligible. </p> <p> </p> <p>Counsel for Gracy Arissol has referred us to the case of Lesperance v Lesperance Civil Appeal No. 3 of 2001 (delivered on 9 August 2001). In Lesperance, a fifty per cent share in the matrimonial home was awarded to the appellant-wife. The respondent had purchased parcel H720, on which stood the matrimonial home, in his name and with his money and the construction of the house was from his savings. I observe that the facts in Lesperance were materially different from the facts of this case. In Lesperance the appellant and the respondent had been married for twenty-eight years and all their children were of age. The appellant, for her part, raised the children and contributed in kind to the maintenance of the family. </p> <p> </p> <p>The Court of Appeal in Lesperance considered the cases of Florentine v Florentine [1990] SLR 141 and Ho Peng v Ho Peng No. 71 of 1993, in which, in identical circumstances, a half share was granted to the wife. In Florentine the marriage had lasted for 25 years, as opposed to twenty-eight years in Lesperance and the wife in Florentine had equally not been employed but had brought up the children and minded the home. </p> <p> </p> <p>I note that the facts in the above cases were materially different to the facts of this case. After giving this ground of appeal my best consideration, I conclude that there is merit in the submission of Gracy Arissol by Counsel that the learned Judge had attached too much weight to the financial contribution made by Dave Pillay to parcel J1606 in assessing her share in parcel J1606. The Judgment revealed that Dave Pillay's more significant share (seventy (70) per cent) in parcel J1606 reflected his financial contribution to it and was because he had bought parcel J1606 in the first place. The learned Judge stated at paragraph 55 of the Judgment: ″[55] I am not of the view that either party has been totally forthcoming in their evidence as to their shares in that property. However, given the fact that it is the Petitioner who bought the property in the first place, despite its subsequent transfer and retransfer I am prepared to give him a greater share in the property to reflect his financial contribution to it. I do not see much evidence of the Respondent's financial contribution to that property.″</p> <p> </p> <p>There are various matters on the evidence that would have a bearing on an award under section 20(1)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, which provides―</p> <p> <br /> ″20.(1)     Subject to section 24, on the granting of a conditional order of divorce or nullity or an order of separation, or at any time thereafter, the court may, after making such inquiries as the court thinks fit and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the ability and financial means of the parties to the marriage ―<br />  <br /> (g)     make such order, as the court thinks fit, in respect of any property of a party to a marriage or any interest or right of a party in any property for the benefit of the other party or a relevant child.″<br />  </p> <p>The evidence, as accepted by the learned Judge, revealed that Gracy Arissol worked during the marriage. She worked as a flight attendant from 2002 till 2010 and a sales representative for Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd later on during the marriage. </p> <p> </p> <p>She explained in detail how her salary paid partly in foreign exchange, at a time of acute foreign exchange crisis in Seychelles, greatly assisted the business and the family, which evidence the learned Judge accepted. Moreover, the learned Judge also accepted her evidence to the effect that, with her salary, she also bought goods abroad, which Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd sold at a profit.</p> <p> </p> <p>Also in Chetty v Emile SCA 11/2008 SCAR (1998 – 1999) 65, referred to the Court of Appeal by Counsel for Gracy Arissol, the Court of Appeal held: ″[30] Contributions towards matrimonial property cannot be measured in pure monetary terms, in hard cash. As stated earlier the love and sweat and the long hours of vigil to bring up a family by the spouses all have a role to play in the accumulation of matrimonial property. […]. We also find it difficult to accept that once a party makes a choice of his or her partner and decides to live together as husband and wife, one party cannot be heard to say that I had the better job or I am a person who brought in more money when the relationship goes sour as the respondent has done in this case. The position certainly would be different if there was evidence to the effect that one party squandered the wealth or deliberately omitted to do what is reasonably expected of that party as a spouse.″</p> <p> </p> <p>Although the learned Judge found that the efforts of Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay to the care-giving and home-making in assessing their respective share in the matrimonial home cancel each other out, there is no evidence to suggest that Gracy Arissol had neglected her responsibilities as a wife or mother. Moreover, it is worthy of note that nowhere does the record of proceedings reveal any specific mention of ″the acrimonious and rocky state of the marriage from very early″ as found by the learned Judge. Emphasis supplied. Thus, this finding by the learned Judge is unfortunate. </p> <p> </p> <p>It is not clear whether or not the learned Judge took into account that Dave Pillay travelled on rebated tickets and stayed at the same hotel where Gracy Arissol stayed while working abroad, thus reducing the family's and business' expenses. These are matters that cannot be valued in monetary terms, as stated in Chetty, supra.</p> <p> </p> <p>Given the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the considered opinion that the learned Judge was in error in awarding Gracy Arissol thirty (30) per cent as her share in J1606 and the four-bedroom house standing thereon, which the learned Judge calculated at  SCR1,200,000. I am of the considered opinion that Gracy Arissol is entitled to fifty (50) per cent as her share in parcel J1606 and the four bedroom-house standing thereon, which I calculate at SCR2,000,000. I reject the contention of Counsel for Dave Pillay with respect to this ground. </p> <p> </p> <p>For the reasons stated above, I allow ground 1 of the grounds, reverse the learned Judge's valuation of Gracy Arissol's share in parcel J1606 and the four-bedroom house situated thereon and award her a total sum of SCR2,000,000. </p> <p> <br /> Ground 2</p> <p>Ground 2 is untenable and stands dismissed. With respect to this ground, Counsel has invited the Court of Appeal to treat the transfer of parcel V10596 as ″suspect″. She claimed that the transfer had been done to frustrate any orders the Court of Appeal might deem fit to make on appeal to defeat Gracy Arissol's claims. As for parcel J1606, she questioned at length, in her heads of argument, whether or not its transfer was null. These are matters that we cannot entertain at this appeal.</p> <p> <br /> Grounds 3, 4, 5 and 6</p> <p>Counsel argued grounds 3, 4, 5 and 6 together. Given the tenor of these grounds, on the 14 July 2020, the Court made an order remitting the case to the Supreme Court for the single auditor, Mr Jean Marie Moutia, appointed by the Supreme Court, in terms of the Judgment, to provide it with a fair value of the companies.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Court of Appeal made such an order for the following reasons ―</p> <p> <br /> ″1.  We find that the audit report (valuation of Shares Sterling (Pty) Ltd Impact Logistics Pty Ltd) for the valuation of the shares relied upon by the trial Judge to base her decision with respect to the shares of Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd had inter alia not been properly produced before the court.<br />  </p> <p>The learned trial Judge, by her Order dated the 27 June 2017, in Civil Side: MA 322/2016 and MA43/2016 had ordered Mr Jean Marie Moutia to do a valuation of the shares of the appellant and the respondent in Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd and Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd.</p> <p> </p> <p>It is clear from the proceedings of 8 November 2017, that the said report had not been produced by Mr Jean Marie Moutia, who had been ordered to do so. It was handed over to court by one Mr Spencer. The said report does not bear either the name or signature of the person who prepared it. We only find the report on the letter head of ACM and Associates Certified Chartered Accountants.″</p> <p> </p> <p>Grounds 3, 4 and 6 concerned whether or not Mr Moutia had determined a fair market value of equity of Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd. Counsel for Gracy Arissol complained, in her heads of argument, that Mr Moutia could not have determined a fair market value of Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd as Dave Pillay did not provide all documents necessary for the conduct of the Supreme Court ordered ″financial audit″ of Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd. </p> <p> </p> <p>The Supreme Court heard the evidence of Mr Moutia on the 30 November 2020. I record the interactions between Counsel for Gracy Arissol and Mr Moutia (in chief) ―</p> <p> <br /> ″Q […] but you did state that we are unable to determine a fair market value.</p> <p>Under one method.</p> <p> <br /> Q. Which was the only method that you used.<br /> A. No we used two methods.<br />  <br /> Q. And under the other method were you able to get a fair market value?<br /> A. The other method was a negative method but it says.<br />  <br /> Q.  […]. How much credibility did ACM and Associates gives to the valuation report because it is clear that based on the fact that you did not receive enough information to value Impact Logistics in the same manner as Sterling would you say that the report to the court was incomplete and could not and should not have been the basis of an apportionment of my client's share in Impact's Logistics.<br /> A. I do not understand the question can you elaborate.<br />  <br /> Q. I am just asking that based on the lack of information the report that was produced –<br /> […].<br />  <br /> Q. [...] because it was incomplete, it should not have been used on the basis of the apportionment of my client's shares in Impact Logistics, I am putting that to you.<br /> A. How much credibity did the ACM give to the valuation report; what valuation report are you referring to?<br />  <br /> Q. The one you used.<br /> A. Yes but we used the valuation report so it has to be credible if we are doing it ourselves […].<br />  <br /> Q. Because you asked by the court to produce a valuation report and based on that the court was to make a determination on the apportionment of my client's share in Impact Logistics. Because it was incomplete should the court have used that report to apportion?<br /> A. No you are telling me it is incomplete. I am telling you it is incomplete. So the report was based on information that we had. If you are questioning the valuation it is up to you but I am telling you that we did the report based on the information that we had.<br />  <br /> Q. However you did say we are unable to determine a fair value.<br /> A. No I said unable to determine a fair value on the income method.<br />  <br /> Q. Question 33, […]. Was an attempt made by ACM to obtain the company's bank statement to ascertain the real liabilities of the company?<br /> A. No because we relied completely on the audited statement. We had no mandate to go looking for the bank statement anyway.<br />  <br /> Q. I thought it was to determine the real liability and the assets of the company.<br /> A. That is on the audited statement.<br />  <br /> […].<br />  <br /> Q. Therefore, so was a fair report of the value of the company's assets produced before the court?<br /> A. The report was produced based on the information available.<br />  <br /> Q. But there was lots of information that was not available.<br /> A. We don't know how relevant that would have been.″ Emphasis supplied<br />  </p> <p>I mention in passing that Mr Moutia, the single expert witness, did a valuation of Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd using two approaches: a net asset approach and an income approach. Gracy Arissol by Counsel did not dispute the valuation of "Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd". </p> <p> </p> <p>With respect to Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd, he did only one valuation for its shares based on the net asset approach. The learned Judge used that valuation to calculate the share of Gracy Arissol in Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd. The record of 30 November 2020, showed that Gracy Arissol by Counsel did not seriously challenge the valuation for the shares of Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd based on the net asset approach. It appears from the interactions reproduced above that Counsel for Gracy Arissol was unaware of the method of share valuation used by Mr Moutia in relation to Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd and, thus, could not seriously challenge the Expert Report.</p> <p> </p> <p>Hence, I conclude that the learned Judge cannot be faulted for accepting the valuation for the shares of Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd based on the net asset approach. </p> <p> </p> <p>For the reasons stated above, grounds 3, 4 and 6 stand dismissed. </p> <p> </p> <p>With respect to ground 5, I state that I cannot entertain this ground in the absence of adequate submissions from Gracy Arissol by Counsel. Ground 5 stands dismissed. </p> <p> <br /> Ground 7</p> <p>It appears that ground seven has already been particularised in the other grounds. Ground 7 cannot add anything to the grounds specifically given. I conclude that it is a mere surplusage, which would have been better left out. </p> <p> </p> <p>Ground 7 stands dismissed.</p> <p> <br /> Ground 8</p> <p>Under ground 8, Counsel contended in her heads of argument that the learned Judge did not consider the needs of the minor child, despite those needs having been pleaded in the cross-petition as follows: ″3. [a]n order in respect of the maintenance of a relevant child of the Matrimonial Causes Rule 3 (4) (b); 5. [a]n order in respect of the education of a relevant child of the Matrimonial Causes Rule 4 (1) (i).″ </p> <p> </p> <p>I mention that Counsel for Gracy Arissol, in her heads of argument, stated that she informed the learned Judge of ″matters still outstanding in the 2 cases″.  I have scrutinised the record of proceedings, which did not reveal what those two cases related to. According to the heads of argument of Counsel for Gracy Arissol, it appears that one of those cases concerned a motion filed concerning the education of the minor child, MA254/2016. Counsel for Gracy Arissol claimed that the learned Judge was not desirous to hear the application, but she was only concerned with hearing MA322/2016. </p> <p> </p> <p>I am at a loss to understand the submissions of Counsel for Gracy Arissol in relation to this ground. Suffice it to state that the record of proceedings revealed that no evidence at all was led with respect to the issues of the education and maintenance of the minor child.  </p> <p> </p> <p>I conclude that the learned Judge was correct to find at paragraph 16 of the Order (of 5 February 2018) concerning the issue of the education of the minor child, that ―</p> <p> <br /> ″[16] [s]imilarly, as concerns the Respondent's submission relating to the education of the child of the parties, this issue although canvassed in the pleadings was not raised at the hearing nor any evidence adduced about it. This Court therefore cannot at this eleventh hour entertain this matter.″<br />  </p> <p>I dismiss ground 8 of the grounds.</p> <p> <br /> Ground 9</p> <p>Ground 9, like ground 7, does not add anything to the grounds specifically given. I conclude that it is a mere surplusage, which would have been better left out. I give reasons for my conclusion.</p> <p> </p> <p>In the orders dated 5 February 2018 and 5 April 2018, the learned Judge ordered Dave Pillay to pay Gracy Arissol SCR853,512.30 for her shares in "Sterling Investment V10450". Gracy Arissol by Counsel did not dispute the valuation of "Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd". Thus, the learned Judge cannot be faulted for accepting the valuation for the shares of "Sterling Investment V10450". </p> <p> </p> <p>With respect to her shares in Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd, I have concluded under grounds 3, 4 and 6 that the learned Judge cannot be faulted for accepting the valuation for its shares based on the net asset approach. </p> <p> </p> <p>In relation to the quantum awarded by the learned Judge to Gracy Arissol concerning parcel J1606 and the four-bedroom house standing thereon, I have made a determination under ground 1 reversing the learned Judge's valuation of Gracy Arissol's share in the said property.</p> <p> </p> <p>Hence, I cannot entertain ground 9, which stands dismissed.</p> <p> <br /> Ground 10</p> <p>Ground 10 complained that Gracy Arissol was denied her right to have her case heard by an independent and impartial court as guaranteed to her under Article 19(7) of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles. Counsel for Gracy Arissol did not press this ground at the appeal, which stands dismissed.</p> <p> <br /> The Decision<br />  </p> <p>For the reasons stated above, the appeal partly succeeds and partly fails. </p> <p> </p> <p>I allow the appeal under ground 1. Thus, the learned Judge's order awarding Gracy Arissol thirty (30) per cent in the value of parcel J1606 and the four-bedroom house situated thereon (SCR1,200,000) is set aside and replaced by the following orders ― </p> <p> <br /> (i)       The share of Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay in parcel J1606 and the four bedroom-house standing thereon shall be fifty (50) per cent each;<br />  <br /> (ii)     The share of Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay in parcel J1606 and the four bedroom-house standing thereon shall be SCR2,000,000 each;<br />  <br /> (iii)    An order is made substituting for the sum of SCR1,200,000 for the share of Gracy Arissol in parcel J1606 and the four bedroom-house standing thereon, the sum of SCR2,000,000.<br />  </p> <p>Grounds 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the grounds of appeal stand dismissed.</p> <p> </p> <p>Gracy Arissol has been occupying the house situated on parcel V10596 since the order of 5 April 2018, which ordered her to vacate the house situated on parcel V10596 within six months of the date of that order. Gracy Arissol is ordered to vacate the house on parcel V10596 within six (6) months of the date of the Court of Appeal judgment.</p> <p> </p> <p>Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay shall pay her/his costs of this appeal.</p> <p> <br /> Robinson JA                                                                           ____________________<br />  <br /> I concur                                                                                   ____________________<br />                                                                                                 Fernando President<br />  <br />  <br />  <br />                                                                                                 ____________________<br /> I concur                                                                                   Govinden Chief Justice<br />  <br />  <br /> Dated at Ile du Port, Mahe Seychelles, this 30th April 2021.<br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  </p> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-aea65e7f352fca724eabafbdf06b59e81410d205a85109a12d91491903e6f631"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><p>IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF SEYCHELLES<br /> _____________________________________________________________________________<br /> Reportable<br /> [2020] SCCA 16   30 April 2021<br /> SCA 31/2018<br /> (Appeal from MA322/2016<br /> arising in DV78/2015)<br />  <br /> In the matter between<br /> GRACY ARISSOL                                                            Appellant                     <br /> (rep. by Mrs. A. Amesbury)<br />  <br /> and<br />  <br /> DAVE PILLAY                                                                  Respondent<br /> (rep. by Mr. Serge Rouillon)<br />  <br /> ______________________________________________________________________________<br /> Neutral Citation: Gracy Arissol v Dave Pillay (SCA 31/2018) [2021] SCCA 16   30 April 2021<br /> Before:                   Fernando President, Robinson JA, Govinden CJ<br /> Summary:             Property and financial adjustments under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1992 [CAP 124] - Appeal partly allowed and partly dismissed. Each party shall pay her/his costs.<br /> Heard:                    23 August 2019, 14 July 2020 &amp; 7 April 2021</p> <p>Delivered:              30 April 2021<br />  </p> <p> <br /> ORDER<br />  <br /> 1.         Ground 1 of the grounds of appeal is allowed.<br />  <br /> 2.         The order awarding Gracy Arissol thirty (30) percent in the value of parcel J1606 and the four bedroom-house standing thereon (SCR1,200,000) is set aside and replaced by the following orders ―<br />  </p> <p>The share of Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay in parcel J1606 and the four bedroom-house standing thereon shall be fifty (50) per cent each;</p> <p> <br /> (ii)       The share of Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay in parcel J1606 and the four bedroom-house standing thereon shall be SCR2,000,000 each;<br /> (iii)      Order is made substituting for the sum of SCR1,200,000 for the share of Gracy Arissol in parcel J1606 and the four bedroom-house standing thereon, the sum of SCR2,000,000.<br />  <br /> 3.         Grounds 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the grounds of appeal are dismissed.<br />  <br /> 4.         Gracy Arissol is ordered to vacate the house standing on parcel V10596 within six (6) months of the date of the judgment of the Court of Appeal.<br />  <br /> 5.         Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay shall pay her/his costs of this appeal.<br /> ______________________________________________________________________________<br /> JUDGMENT<br /> ______________________________________________________________________________<br />  <br /> ROBINSON JA (FERNANDO PCA AND GOVINDEN CJ concurring)<br /> The Background<br />  </p> <p>Dave Pillay, the respondent (then the petitioner), and Gracy Arissol, the appellant (then the cross-petitioner), were husband and wife. They had met in 1998 before marrying on the 5 December 1999 at Bel Ombre, Mahe. The marriage between Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay lasted for about fifteen and a half years. They got divorced on the 31 July 2015. There is one minor child of the marriage. Dave Pillay and Gracy Arissol both applied for property and financial adjustments under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1992. </p> <p> </p> <p>Dave Pillay's amended petition neither asked for any specific amount nor a percentage of the value of the matrimonial property, but left the determination of all amounts to the learned Judge. Gracy Arissol's cross-petition asked the Supreme Court to make the following orders ―</p> <p> <br /> ″(a)      […] an order of full lawful and beneficial ownership of land parcel in J1606 and the matrimonial home and accompanying structures thereon for and in the entire interest of the Cross-Petitioner in accordance with rule 4 (1) (j)<br />  </p> <p>[…] an order of half of the lawful and beneficial ownership of the land parcels S6399 and V10596 and accompanying structures for and in the interest of the Cross-Petitioner in accordance with rule 4 (1)(j)</p> <p> </p> <p> […] an order that the Cross-Petitioner be granted, forthwith, sole occupancy of land parcel J1606 and the matrimonial home and accompanying structures thereon, forthwith, in accordance with rule 4 (1)(j)</p> <p> </p> <p>[…] an order restraining the Cross-Respondent from entering and remaining on land parcel J1606 and the matrimonial home and accompanying structures thereon forthwith, in accordance with rule 4(1)(h)(j)</p> <p> </p> <p>[…] an order that the Cross-Petitioner is awarded the sum of 4,000,000 (four million Seychelles Rupees), in respect of her shares in the business owned by the Parties</p> <p> </p> <p>[…] an order in respect of maintenance of a relevant child in accordance with Rule 4 (1)(i)</p> <p> </p> <p>[...] an order in respect of the education of a relevant child in accordance with Rule 4 (1)(i).″</p> <p> </p> <p>The learned Judge set out the matters at issue, in this case, following amendments made to the cross-petition by Gracy Arissol ―</p> <p> <br /> ″Court: So the only matter at issue therefore is that you have full ownership and occupancy of the Le Niole property which is V10596 and a share in parcel J1606. Do I understand you correctly?<br />  <br /> A: That is correct my lady and if I may ask the court V10596 is charge free.<br />  <br /> Court: And you are also asking the court under (e) for an order of R6 million in respect of your shares in the business. Is that still going ahead?<br />  <br /> A: May I make an amendment too?<br />  <br /> Court: You can indeed yes through your lawyer.<br />  <br /> Mrs Amesbury: It has been amended from 6 million to 4 million.<br />  <br /> A: R4 million as the shares of the two companies.<br />  <br /> Court: Both Sterling and Impact Logistics. The amendment is granted without any objection from Mr Rouillon for Mr Pillay<br />  <br /> Mrs Amesbury: That is all my Lady.″<br />  </p> <p>Gracy Arissol testified to the effect that she was not asking to be awarded any share in parcel S6399.  </p> <p> </p> <p>After reviewing the evidence, the learned Judge delivered a judgment on the 27 June 2017, hereinafter referred to as the ″Judgment″. The Judgment decided as follows ―</p> <p> <br /> ″[62] Parcel J1606 has been valued at SR 4 million by the petitioner. The respondent has not challenged this valuation nor offered an alternative valuation. Her share in that property is therefore SR 1.2 million and I so Order.<br />  <br /> [63] I shall make further orders in respect of how her share in Parcel J1606 is to be realised on receiving the valuations of her shares in the other two companies, namely Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd and Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd and by inference in Parcels V10596 and V10450.<br />  <br /> [64] In respect of the appointment of an Auditor to audit the companies' accounts and provide the court with a valuation of the shares of the parties in Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd and Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd, after consultation with the parties it is agreed that Jean-Marie Moutia, of ACM Associates, English River, is appointed for the work. A copy of this Judgment is to be forwarded to the Auditor, whose fees shall be met by the parties' jointly on or before the 15 July 2017. The Auditor is to report to the Court on or before the 14 October 2017. The Parties are ordered to fully cooperate with the Auditor and to surrender all relevant documents to him so that he may carry out his work.<br />  <br /> [65] This case is adjourned for the consideration of the report and further Orders of the Court to 18 October 2017.″<br />  </p> <p>During the hearing of this case, on the 8 November 2017, Mr Spencer gave the learned Judge a report, titled ″VALUATION OF SHARES Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd″, dated 8 November 2017, prepared by ACM Associates, hereinafter referred to as the ″Expert Report″. </p> <p> </p> <p>The learned Judge delivered an order on the 5 February 2018, based on the Expert Report, which ordered as follows  ―</p> <p> <br /> ″[7] I have already ordered that the Petitioner pay the Respondent the sum of SR1.2 million for her share in the matrimonial home on Parcel J1606. In addition and in view of the circumstances outlined above, I make the following additional orders:<br />  <br /> 1. I order the Petitioner, Dave Herbert Pillay to pay SR 853,512.30 to the Respondent, Gracy Sybil Pillay for her one share in the company Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd with a deduction of SR 24,269 for her shares in Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd. This amounts to a total of SR829,243.30 to be paid by the Petitioner to the Respondent.<br />  <br /> 2. I make no order as to costs.″<br />  </p> <p>On the 5 April 2018, the learned Judge made the following ″final orders″, which read as follows ―</p> <p> <br /> ″1. The Respondent is to vacate the house on parcel V10596 at le Niole within 6 months of this order.<br />  <br /> 2. The Petitioner is to pay the Respondent the sum of 1.2 million for her share in J1606 and SR829,243.30 for her combined shares in Sterling Investment V10450 and Impact Logistics V10596 a total of 2,029,243.30.<br />  <br /> 3. Should the petitioner fail to make the payment in relation to Parcel J1606 as ordered within six months hereof, the respondent is entitled to pay the petitioner the sum of SR 2,700,000 corresponding to his share in the same and he shall vacate the property forthwith.<br />  <br /> 4. Should the Petitioner fail to make payment in relation to the Respondent's shares in Sterling Investment and Impact Logistics, the Companies are to be wind up pursuant to Section 95(c), (d) and (h) of the Insolvency Act 2013 with the extending debts to be paid in accordance with the parties respective shares in the Companies.<br />  <br /> 5. Each party shall bear his/her own costs.″<br />  <br /> The grounds of appeal<br />  </p> <p>The grounds of appeal are ―</p> <p> <br /> ″1)The Learned Judge erred by assessing the Appellant's (Gracy Arissol's) share as only 30 % or 1.2 million Rupees when the property is valued at 4 million.<br />  <br /> 2) On 5 April 2018 ordered that the Appellant and the minor child vacate parcel V 10596 within six months, failing to consider the housing and other needs of the Appellant and child.<br />  <br /> 3) The learned trial Judge failed to consider or to adequately consider that the Auditor was precluded from making a fair assessment of the assets of Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd. due to the production of incomplete accounts.<br />  <br /> 4) The learned Judge erred when neither the Appellant's submissions in regard to the Auditor's report nor the Respondent's (Dave Pillay's) testimony on this point was considered by the court in assessing the Appellant's share of the company's liability.<br />  </p> <p>The learned Judge acted in error when she failed to consider that personal funds cannot be deducted from the Appellant's award to pay for the Company's liability without first selling the company's Assets to pay the liabilities.</p> <p> <br /> 6) Despite the court being mindful of other factors brought into the evidence at the hearing when determining the Appellant's share in the businesses the court failed to consider the evidence of the Bank Officer and the fact that the auditor's report was based on ″incomplete records″ of the company's financial affairs.<br />  <br /> 7) In considering the division of matrimonial properties the learned Judge failed to consider the applicable law as stated in the MCA section 20(1)(g) and to attach sufficient weight to all relevant factors and attached weight to irrelevant facts.<br />  <br /> 8) Despite the court having made several orders in the present case in regards to division of matrimonial property both movables and immovable the court failed to make any orders in regards to the parties relevant minor child as per section 24(2) and section 25(2)(b) of the MCA.<br />  <br /> 9) The learned Judge erred in finding that the Totality of the Appellant's combined shares in Sterling Investment, V 10450, Impact Logistics and the matrimonial home totals SCR 2, 2029, 243/-.<br />  <br /> 10) The multiplicity of the orders and applications made by the Respondent and the total lack of consideration of the Appellant's substantial submissions at every stage of the case the Appellant was denied her right to have her case heard by an independent and impartial court as guaranteed to her under Article 19 (7) of the Constitution."<br />  </p> <p>By way of relief, Gracy Arissol sought the following orders ―</p> <p> <br /> "3.1 A judgment reversing the findings and decision of the learned trial Judge and awarding the Appellant her just and equitable shares in the properties and the jointly owned businesses, as per section 20(1)(g) of the MCA.<br />  <br /> 3.2 Ordering the Respondent to pay the Appellant's costs of this Appeal and in the court below.<br />  <br /> 3.3 Any other orders in regards to the minor child's housing and Educational needs pursuant to section 24 (2) and section 25 (2)(b) of the MCA."<br />  <br /> The evidence<br />  </p> <p>Before considering the grounds of appeal, and the written and oral submissions submitted on behalf of Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay, it is convenient to summarise the facts.</p> <p> <br /> The evidence of Dave Pillay (the petitioner then)</p> <p>Dave Pillay was a sole trader before he and Gracy Arissol were married to each other. Before he met Gracy Arissol, he purchased parcel J1606 situated at Beau Belle for SCR400,000 from one Herbert Hoareau, on the 11 November 1999, (exhibit P1), from the proceeds of his business activities. Gracy Arissol did not contribute to the purchase price of parcel J1606.</p> <p> </p> <p>On the 17 July 2001, Dave Pillay sold parcel J1606 for SCR670,000 to Georges Francois Gill (exhibit P2), his brother in law. As I understand it, regarding the sale and transfer of parcel J1606, Georges Gill gave him two cheques drawn in his [Dave Pillay's] favour, one for SCR600,000 and the other one for the same amount. Dave Pillay used the money to finance his tax debt for SCR1,200,000. He was going to the United States to train to be a pilot, at the time. </p> <p> </p> <p>On the 8 April 2010, Georges Gill transferred parcel J1606 and the house situated thereon, jointly and in an equal share, to Dave Pillay and Gracy Arissol for SCR1,200,000 (exhibit P4). </p> <p> </p> <p>Dave Pillay and Gracy Arissol have ninety shares and ten shares in Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd, respectively; a company incorporated in 2005. Gracy Arissol, a director and an employee (a sales representative) of Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd, never paid in cash for her ten shares. Dave Pillay and Gracy Arissol earned the same salary as employees of Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd. Gracy Arissol stopped working for Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd in October 2014.  </p> <p> </p> <p>On the 4 April 2013, Dave Pillay and Gracy Arissol transferred parcel J1606 and the house situated thereon to Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd for SCR1,200,000. Hubert Alton &amp; Co. valued parcel J1606 and the four-bedroom house situated thereon for SCR4,000,000. </p> <p> </p> <p>Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd represented by Dave Pillay, in his capacity as a director, bought parcel V10596 and the house situated thereon, at Le Niole, from Robenson Louis and Louis Hoareau, for SCR2,500,000, on the 4 April 2013 (exhibit P15). </p> <p> </p> <p>A printed copy of an interim statement, Barclays Bank (Seychelles) Ltd (″Barclays Bank″), dated 17 October 2016, for account number 2000986 for Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd, showed a current balance of minus SCR312,500.14 (exhibit P23). Dave Pillay claimed that the current balance, as mentioned, represented the amount of money outstanding for the repayment of the loan taken to finance the purchase of parcel V10596.</p> <p> </p> <p>Nadia Gray and Michel Felix and Dave Pillay and Gracy Arissol entered into an agreement dated 26 August 2014, in terms of which Nadia Gray and Michel Felix sold to Dave Pillay and Gracy Arissol the following shares in Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd (exhibit P20). Nadia Gray transferred her nine shares to Dave Pillay, and Michel Felix transferred his one share to Gracy Arissol. The said ten shares were sold for SCR6,500,000. That agreement also provided that Gracy Arissol was holding the said one share transferred to her on behalf of Dave Pillay.</p> <p> </p> <p>Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd is the owner of the leasehold interest over parcel V10450, under the lease agreement entered into by it with the Seychelles Industrial Development Corporation on 3 November 2007. Dave Pillay and Gracy Arissol took a loan from the Development Bank of Seychelles for SCR6,398,000 ″for the acquisition of an existing company including a building comprising of storage facilities used for rental services″ (exhibit P24). Dave Pillay repaid the said loan for Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd. Gracy Arissol neither helped finance the leasehold interest nor took part in the affairs of Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd.</p> <p> </p> <p>Hubert Alton &amp; Co. valued the leasehold interest for SCR6,500,000; its report is dated the 24 February 2014 (exhibit P12). Currently, the shareholders of Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd are Dave Pillay and Mrs Flory Gill, who hold nine shares and one share in the said company, respectively. Mrs Flory Gill, who is Dave Pillay's sister, is the wife of Georges Gill.</p> <p> </p> <p>He went on to testify that Gracy Arissol was an employee of Air Seychelles when they met. She worked for Air Seychelles from 1999 to 2010; after that, she took a sabbatical leave. She earned a monthly salary of about SCR6,000 to 7,000 and a monthly allowance of Euros (€)300 to 350. </p> <p> </p> <p>He denied that Gracy Arissol supported the family from her salary and foreign exchange allowance earned from Air Seychelles. He also explained that her ″meagre″ salary would not have been enough to finance business activities. He borrowed money from Georges Gill to finance some of his business activities. </p> <p> </p> <p>He denied that Gracy Arissol supported him in the United States. When his family moved to the United States, he sold his car and used the proceeds of the sale to fund his family's stay and studies.  </p> <p> </p> <p>Regarding a court judgment CA30/2015, an appeal from the Family Tribunal, dated 28 June 2016, Dave Pillay stated that Gracy Arissol owes him the sum of SCR83,644. That sum includes utility fees from Gracy Arissol's stay at Beau Belle. </p> <p> </p> <p>Gracy Arissol drives a Toyota Rav4, an asset paid for by and belonging to Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd, which is in her name. </p> <p> </p> <p>He produced a directors' report and financial statements for the year ending the 31 December 2015 for Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd. He also tendered financial statements for Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd for 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 (exhibit P28 collectively). </p> <p> </p> <p>He claimed that he is in debt and is living off family and friends. He had not seen his child, whom Gracy Arissol has full custody of, for over two years. </p> <p> </p> <p>When cross-examined, he stated that he returned from the United States in 2002. He was employed by ″IDC″ and worked there for about one and a half years or two years. He could not recall when he stopped working there. After leaving IDC, he incorporated a company in 2005 with money given to him by Georges Gill. Between 2001 and 2005, he was a sole trader and obtained money from Georges Gill to fund business activities. </p> <p> </p> <p>Gracy Arissol worked for Air Seychelles as a flight attendant. He denied that she supported him financially in 2001 to repay his tax debt to the sum of SCR1,200,000. </p> <p> </p> <p>Every year he receives SCR70,000 to 74,000 from Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd. He does not pay any rent for the use of the warehouse. He owes the bank about SCR5,000,000 for the warehouse.  </p> <p> <br /> The evidence of Georges Gill</p> <p>Georges Gill is a contractor doing pest control. He has known Dave Pillay for about forty years and Gracy Arissol for about thirteen to fourteen years.  He helps Dave Pillay with his business activities.</p> <p> </p> <p>Dave Pillay has repaid him the sum of SCR1,200,000 that he borrowed concerning parcel J1606. </p> <p> </p> <p>From October 2014 to July 2015, he [Georges Gill] and Gracy Arissol had a cordial relationship. Gracy Arissol stayed at his house because she had problems with Dave Pillay. Georges Gill assisted her with money, and in any way he could.</p> <p> </p> <p> When cross-examined, Georges Gill stated that he assisted Dave Pillay financially with respect to his business activities, and that Dave Pillay owes him SCR1,500,000. We note that there is no documentary evidence supporting this claim, except for Georges Gill's oral evidence.</p> <p> <br /> The evidence of Gracy Arissol (the cross-petitioner then)</p> <p>Gracy Arissol is currently employed as a supervisor in the legal department at the Seychelles Commercial Bank. She met Dave Pillay in 1998, and they got married in December 1999. She was then a flight attendant for Air Seychelles and Dave Pillay, a sole trader. </p> <p> </p> <p>She could not assist Dave Pillay with his tax debt. She confirmed his testimony to the effect that Georges Gill helped him in paying his debt. </p> <p> </p> <p>In July 2001, Gracy Arissol and her family moved to the United States. Dave Pillay wanted to train, in the United States, to become a commercial airline pilot. She sold a white tipper to Georges Gill for SCR120,000 (exhibit D1), and Dave Pillay sold his car. They used the money to pay for their move to the United States. Dave Pillay paid for his flight training. Gracy Arissol and her family returned to Seychelles in 2002. </p> <p> </p> <p>Upon his return to Seychelles, Dave Pillay started as a trainee pilot with ″IDC″. Dave Pillay left his employment to do mandatory military training at the military academy, which he did not complete. Thus, he stayed at home. He was also a sole trader at the time. As they had just returned to Seychelles, the business was not doing well. Since she was working as a flight attendant, she supported the family and the company financially. She earned a monthly salary of about 1000 pounds sterling(₤). She used her salary to purchase goods abroad, which she sold at a profit. She used the proceeds to pay for her family purchases and expenses. She also purchased goods abroad for the business, which Dave Pillay sold at a profit. Moreover, as there was a foreign exchange crisis in the country, her salary, paid partly in foreign exchange, greatly assisted the business. </p> <p> </p> <p>As an employee of Air Seychelles, she also obtained rebated tickets, which Dave Pillay and her family enjoyed. Dave Pillay travelled on rebated tickets and stayed at the same hotel where she stayed while working abroad, thus significantly reducing the family's and business' travelling and other expenses. </p> <p> </p> <p>She took a loan of SCR20,100 from the Youth Enterprise Scheme in 2003, which Dave Pillay used to purchase goods abroad to be sold by the company, (exhibit D2).  She repaid the loan.</p> <p> </p> <p>Dave Pillay and Gracy Arissol purchased shares in Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd (exhibit P20). In their capacity as the directors of that company, they borrowed SCR6,398,000 from the Development Bank of Seychelles for the said company. She is no longer a shareholder of the said company. She never received monetary benefits from Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd. She drives a car given to her by Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd.</p> <p> </p> <p>She is now occupying parcel V10596 at Le Niol, which was financed by Impacts Logistics (Pty) Ltd from the proceeds of a loan obtained by it.</p> <p> </p> <p>Gracy Arissol stopped working as a flight attendant in 2010. At the time, her marriage was rocky. She used all her work compensation to buy goods for Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd. Gracy Arissol stated that she had injected about SCR1,300,000 into Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd from 1998 to 2010.</p> <p> </p> <p>Gracy Arissol asked the Supreme Court for full lawful and beneficial ownership of parcel V10596 and the matrimonial home and accompanying structures thereon and a share in parcel J1606. She is not asking for any shares in S6399. She is also asking for SCR4,000,000 for her share value in both Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd and Impact Logistics Pty Ltd.</p> <p> <br /> The evidence of Frantina Bamboche</p> <p>Frantina Bamboche is the Relationship Manager at Barclays Bank. Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd holds a current rupee account and a loan rupee account with Barclays Bank. The loan account statements concerning Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd was tendered as exhibit D6, and the current account statements pertaining to Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd as exhibit D7. Concerning Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd, there exists only one loan. The outstanding amount of the loan is SCR52,083.49.  She tendered statements from 2010 to 2017. </p> <p> <br /> The evidence of Joeliff Yocette</p> <p>Joeliff Yocette is an Immigration Officer. He produced the immigration records for Dave Pillay (exhibit D8), which depicted the following ―</p> <p> <br />  </p> <p>Year </p> <p>Number of trips undertaken outside of Seychelles</p> <p>2005</p> <p>29</p> <p>2006</p> <p>34</p> <p>2007</p> <p>30</p> <p>2008</p> <p>26</p> <p>2009</p> <p>21</p> <p>2010</p> <p>10</p> <p>2011</p> <p>18</p> <p>2012</p> <p>14</p> <p>2013</p> <p>10</p> <p>2014</p> <p>13</p> <p>2015</p> <p>19</p> <p>2016</p> <p>12</p> <p> <br />  <br /> The evidence of Mr Danny Pierre</p> <p>Danny Pierre is the Head of Recovery and Collection at Barclays Bank. Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd had a business loan with Barclays Bank, dated 19 April 2010, for the sum of SCR1,600,000, to purchase a property for business activity. That loan has been repaid. </p> <p> </p> <p>Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd also took an overdraft facility from Barclays Bank for SCR400,000/- (exhibit D11) in January 2013, for working capital for the said company. </p> <p> </p> <p>On the 25 March 2013, Barclays Bank offered the directors of Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd a long term loan facility to the amount of SCR2,500,000 (exhibit D12). Repayment for that loan was SCR52,083/- per month. That loan has been repaid. Danny Pierre stated that there is no debt owing from Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd, in answer to a question from the learned Judge to that effect.</p> <p> <br />  <br />  <br /> The evidence of Cindy Blakemore</p> <p>Cindy Blakemore, the Acting Commissioner for Customs, testified that Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd imported about seventy-five containers of goods from 2008 to 2016. From 2015 to 2016, about twenty containers of goods were imported. When cross-examined, she stated that figure ″seventy-five″ referred to ″import consignments″.</p> <p> </p> <p>It is against this background that I consider the grounds or appeal. </p> <p> <br /> Analysis of the contentions of Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay<br />  </p> <p>I have considered the evidence on record, the Judgment, the order of 5 February 2018, the order of 5 April 2018, the grounds of appeal and the written and oral submissions submitted on behalf of Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay. </p> <p> <br /> Ground 1</p> <p>I consider ground 1, which challenged the quantum awarded to Gracy Arissol by the learned Judge concerning parcel J1606 and the four-bedroom house situated thereon. I pause to state that Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd has transferred parcel J1606 to one Sithra Lakshmi Chetty on the 21 June 2018, after the conclusion of the case at first instance. </p> <p> </p> <p>The learned Judge declared the sale of parcel J1606 to Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd null and treated parcel J1606 ″as still being in the joint names and in equal shares to the parties″.  There is no issue raised with respect to this finding. The learned Judge assessed the share of Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay in parcel J1606, based on the following factors ―</p> <p> <br /> ″that although the starting point for the Court's assessment of the parties share in this property is 50/50 as is evident on the transfer document of 2010, other factors need to be taken into consideration in arriving at a fair adjustment. In the circumstances given all the evidence adduced before the Court, bearing in mind the length of the marriage, the acrimonious and rocky state of the marriage from very early, the periods spent living apart, the financial contributions and other efforts towards the parties' business and other undertakings I find it reasonable to assess the share of the petitioner as 70 % and that of the Respondent as 30 % of this property.″.<br />  <br />  </p> <p>The learned Judge also stated: ″Courts do take into account the efforts of parties to a marriage to the caregiving and homemaking in assessing their share in a matrimonial home […]. She found that: ″both parties' efforts in this respect cancel each other out as both were away from home and their child for long periods, the Respondent as an air hostess and the Petitioner on his more than frequent business trips″. </p> <p> </p> <p>The heads of argument contended that the learned Judge erred in the circumstances of the case and on the state of the case law in not awarding Gracy Arissol a half share in the value of parcel J1606. The heads of argument submitted on behalf of Dave Pillay, concerning this ground of appeal, primarily argued that Gracy Arissol's contribution to the running of the household was negligible. </p> <p> </p> <p>Counsel for Gracy Arissol has referred us to the case of Lesperance v Lesperance Civil Appeal No. 3 of 2001 (delivered on 9 August 2001). In Lesperance, a fifty per cent share in the matrimonial home was awarded to the appellant-wife. The respondent had purchased parcel H720, on which stood the matrimonial home, in his name and with his money and the construction of the house was from his savings. I observe that the facts in Lesperance were materially different from the facts of this case. In Lesperance the appellant and the respondent had been married for twenty-eight years and all their children were of age. The appellant, for her part, raised the children and contributed in kind to the maintenance of the family. </p> <p> </p> <p>The Court of Appeal in Lesperance considered the cases of Florentine v Florentine [1990] SLR 141 and Ho Peng v Ho Peng No. 71 of 1993, in which, in identical circumstances, a half share was granted to the wife. In Florentine the marriage had lasted for 25 years, as opposed to twenty-eight years in Lesperance and the wife in Florentine had equally not been employed but had brought up the children and minded the home. </p> <p> </p> <p>I note that the facts in the above cases were materially different to the facts of this case. After giving this ground of appeal my best consideration, I conclude that there is merit in the submission of Gracy Arissol by Counsel that the learned Judge had attached too much weight to the financial contribution made by Dave Pillay to parcel J1606 in assessing her share in parcel J1606. The Judgment revealed that Dave Pillay's more significant share (seventy (70) per cent) in parcel J1606 reflected his financial contribution to it and was because he had bought parcel J1606 in the first place. The learned Judge stated at paragraph 55 of the Judgment: ″[55] I am not of the view that either party has been totally forthcoming in their evidence as to their shares in that property. However, given the fact that it is the Petitioner who bought the property in the first place, despite its subsequent transfer and retransfer I am prepared to give him a greater share in the property to reflect his financial contribution to it. I do not see much evidence of the Respondent's financial contribution to that property.″</p> <p> </p> <p>There are various matters on the evidence that would have a bearing on an award under section 20(1)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, which provides―</p> <p> <br /> ″20.(1)     Subject to section 24, on the granting of a conditional order of divorce or nullity or an order of separation, or at any time thereafter, the court may, after making such inquiries as the court thinks fit and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the ability and financial means of the parties to the marriage ―<br />  <br /> (g)     make such order, as the court thinks fit, in respect of any property of a party to a marriage or any interest or right of a party in any property for the benefit of the other party or a relevant child.″<br />  </p> <p>The evidence, as accepted by the learned Judge, revealed that Gracy Arissol worked during the marriage. She worked as a flight attendant from 2002 till 2010 and a sales representative for Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd later on during the marriage. </p> <p> </p> <p>She explained in detail how her salary paid partly in foreign exchange, at a time of acute foreign exchange crisis in Seychelles, greatly assisted the business and the family, which evidence the learned Judge accepted. Moreover, the learned Judge also accepted her evidence to the effect that, with her salary, she also bought goods abroad, which Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd sold at a profit.</p> <p> </p> <p>Also in Chetty v Emile SCA 11/2008 SCAR (1998 – 1999) 65, referred to the Court of Appeal by Counsel for Gracy Arissol, the Court of Appeal held: ″[30] Contributions towards matrimonial property cannot be measured in pure monetary terms, in hard cash. As stated earlier the love and sweat and the long hours of vigil to bring up a family by the spouses all have a role to play in the accumulation of matrimonial property. […]. We also find it difficult to accept that once a party makes a choice of his or her partner and decides to live together as husband and wife, one party cannot be heard to say that I had the better job or I am a person who brought in more money when the relationship goes sour as the respondent has done in this case. The position certainly would be different if there was evidence to the effect that one party squandered the wealth or deliberately omitted to do what is reasonably expected of that party as a spouse.″</p> <p> </p> <p>Although the learned Judge found that the efforts of Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay to the care-giving and home-making in assessing their respective share in the matrimonial home cancel each other out, there is no evidence to suggest that Gracy Arissol had neglected her responsibilities as a wife or mother. Moreover, it is worthy of note that nowhere does the record of proceedings reveal any specific mention of ″the acrimonious and rocky state of the marriage from very early″ as found by the learned Judge. Emphasis supplied. Thus, this finding by the learned Judge is unfortunate. </p> <p> </p> <p>It is not clear whether or not the learned Judge took into account that Dave Pillay travelled on rebated tickets and stayed at the same hotel where Gracy Arissol stayed while working abroad, thus reducing the family's and business' expenses. These are matters that cannot be valued in monetary terms, as stated in Chetty, supra.</p> <p> </p> <p>Given the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the considered opinion that the learned Judge was in error in awarding Gracy Arissol thirty (30) per cent as her share in J1606 and the four-bedroom house standing thereon, which the learned Judge calculated at  SCR1,200,000. I am of the considered opinion that Gracy Arissol is entitled to fifty (50) per cent as her share in parcel J1606 and the four bedroom-house standing thereon, which I calculate at SCR2,000,000. I reject the contention of Counsel for Dave Pillay with respect to this ground. </p> <p> </p> <p>For the reasons stated above, I allow ground 1 of the grounds, reverse the learned Judge's valuation of Gracy Arissol's share in parcel J1606 and the four-bedroom house situated thereon and award her a total sum of SCR2,000,000. </p> <p> <br /> Ground 2</p> <p>Ground 2 is untenable and stands dismissed. With respect to this ground, Counsel has invited the Court of Appeal to treat the transfer of parcel V10596 as ″suspect″. She claimed that the transfer had been done to frustrate any orders the Court of Appeal might deem fit to make on appeal to defeat Gracy Arissol's claims. As for parcel J1606, she questioned at length, in her heads of argument, whether or not its transfer was null. These are matters that we cannot entertain at this appeal.</p> <p> <br /> Grounds 3, 4, 5 and 6</p> <p>Counsel argued grounds 3, 4, 5 and 6 together. Given the tenor of these grounds, on the 14 July 2020, the Court made an order remitting the case to the Supreme Court for the single auditor, Mr Jean Marie Moutia, appointed by the Supreme Court, in terms of the Judgment, to provide it with a fair value of the companies.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Court of Appeal made such an order for the following reasons ―</p> <p> <br /> ″1.  We find that the audit report (valuation of Shares Sterling (Pty) Ltd Impact Logistics Pty Ltd) for the valuation of the shares relied upon by the trial Judge to base her decision with respect to the shares of Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd had inter alia not been properly produced before the court.<br />  </p> <p>The learned trial Judge, by her Order dated the 27 June 2017, in Civil Side: MA 322/2016 and MA43/2016 had ordered Mr Jean Marie Moutia to do a valuation of the shares of the appellant and the respondent in Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd and Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd.</p> <p> </p> <p>It is clear from the proceedings of 8 November 2017, that the said report had not been produced by Mr Jean Marie Moutia, who had been ordered to do so. It was handed over to court by one Mr Spencer. The said report does not bear either the name or signature of the person who prepared it. We only find the report on the letter head of ACM and Associates Certified Chartered Accountants.″</p> <p> </p> <p>Grounds 3, 4 and 6 concerned whether or not Mr Moutia had determined a fair market value of equity of Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd. Counsel for Gracy Arissol complained, in her heads of argument, that Mr Moutia could not have determined a fair market value of Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd as Dave Pillay did not provide all documents necessary for the conduct of the Supreme Court ordered ″financial audit″ of Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd. </p> <p> </p> <p>The Supreme Court heard the evidence of Mr Moutia on the 30 November 2020. I record the interactions between Counsel for Gracy Arissol and Mr Moutia (in chief) ―</p> <p> <br /> ″Q […] but you did state that we are unable to determine a fair market value.</p> <p>Under one method.</p> <p> <br /> Q. Which was the only method that you used.<br /> A. No we used two methods.<br />  <br /> Q. And under the other method were you able to get a fair market value?<br /> A. The other method was a negative method but it says.<br />  <br /> Q.  […]. How much credibility did ACM and Associates gives to the valuation report because it is clear that based on the fact that you did not receive enough information to value Impact Logistics in the same manner as Sterling would you say that the report to the court was incomplete and could not and should not have been the basis of an apportionment of my client's share in Impact's Logistics.<br /> A. I do not understand the question can you elaborate.<br />  <br /> Q. I am just asking that based on the lack of information the report that was produced –<br /> […].<br />  <br /> Q. [...] because it was incomplete, it should not have been used on the basis of the apportionment of my client's shares in Impact Logistics, I am putting that to you.<br /> A. How much credibity did the ACM give to the valuation report; what valuation report are you referring to?<br />  <br /> Q. The one you used.<br /> A. Yes but we used the valuation report so it has to be credible if we are doing it ourselves […].<br />  <br /> Q. Because you asked by the court to produce a valuation report and based on that the court was to make a determination on the apportionment of my client's share in Impact Logistics. Because it was incomplete should the court have used that report to apportion?<br /> A. No you are telling me it is incomplete. I am telling you it is incomplete. So the report was based on information that we had. If you are questioning the valuation it is up to you but I am telling you that we did the report based on the information that we had.<br />  <br /> Q. However you did say we are unable to determine a fair value.<br /> A. No I said unable to determine a fair value on the income method.<br />  <br /> Q. Question 33, […]. Was an attempt made by ACM to obtain the company's bank statement to ascertain the real liabilities of the company?<br /> A. No because we relied completely on the audited statement. We had no mandate to go looking for the bank statement anyway.<br />  <br /> Q. I thought it was to determine the real liability and the assets of the company.<br /> A. That is on the audited statement.<br />  <br /> […].<br />  <br /> Q. Therefore, so was a fair report of the value of the company's assets produced before the court?<br /> A. The report was produced based on the information available.<br />  <br /> Q. But there was lots of information that was not available.<br /> A. We don't know how relevant that would have been.″ Emphasis supplied<br />  </p> <p>I mention in passing that Mr Moutia, the single expert witness, did a valuation of Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd using two approaches: a net asset approach and an income approach. Gracy Arissol by Counsel did not dispute the valuation of "Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd". </p> <p> </p> <p>With respect to Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd, he did only one valuation for its shares based on the net asset approach. The learned Judge used that valuation to calculate the share of Gracy Arissol in Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd. The record of 30 November 2020, showed that Gracy Arissol by Counsel did not seriously challenge the valuation for the shares of Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd based on the net asset approach. It appears from the interactions reproduced above that Counsel for Gracy Arissol was unaware of the method of share valuation used by Mr Moutia in relation to Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd and, thus, could not seriously challenge the Expert Report.</p> <p> </p> <p>Hence, I conclude that the learned Judge cannot be faulted for accepting the valuation for the shares of Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd based on the net asset approach. </p> <p> </p> <p>For the reasons stated above, grounds 3, 4 and 6 stand dismissed. </p> <p> </p> <p>With respect to ground 5, I state that I cannot entertain this ground in the absence of adequate submissions from Gracy Arissol by Counsel. Ground 5 stands dismissed. </p> <p> <br /> Ground 7</p> <p>It appears that ground seven has already been particularised in the other grounds. Ground 7 cannot add anything to the grounds specifically given. I conclude that it is a mere surplusage, which would have been better left out. </p> <p> </p> <p>Ground 7 stands dismissed.</p> <p> <br /> Ground 8</p> <p>Under ground 8, Counsel contended in her heads of argument that the learned Judge did not consider the needs of the minor child, despite those needs having been pleaded in the cross-petition as follows: ″3. [a]n order in respect of the maintenance of a relevant child of the Matrimonial Causes Rule 3 (4) (b); 5. [a]n order in respect of the education of a relevant child of the Matrimonial Causes Rule 4 (1) (i).″ </p> <p> </p> <p>I mention that Counsel for Gracy Arissol, in her heads of argument, stated that she informed the learned Judge of ″matters still outstanding in the 2 cases″.  I have scrutinised the record of proceedings, which did not reveal what those two cases related to. According to the heads of argument of Counsel for Gracy Arissol, it appears that one of those cases concerned a motion filed concerning the education of the minor child, MA254/2016. Counsel for Gracy Arissol claimed that the learned Judge was not desirous to hear the application, but she was only concerned with hearing MA322/2016. </p> <p> </p> <p>I am at a loss to understand the submissions of Counsel for Gracy Arissol in relation to this ground. Suffice it to state that the record of proceedings revealed that no evidence at all was led with respect to the issues of the education and maintenance of the minor child.  </p> <p> </p> <p>I conclude that the learned Judge was correct to find at paragraph 16 of the Order (of 5 February 2018) concerning the issue of the education of the minor child, that ―</p> <p> <br /> ″[16] [s]imilarly, as concerns the Respondent's submission relating to the education of the child of the parties, this issue although canvassed in the pleadings was not raised at the hearing nor any evidence adduced about it. This Court therefore cannot at this eleventh hour entertain this matter.″<br />  </p> <p>I dismiss ground 8 of the grounds.</p> <p> <br /> Ground 9</p> <p>Ground 9, like ground 7, does not add anything to the grounds specifically given. I conclude that it is a mere surplusage, which would have been better left out. I give reasons for my conclusion.</p> <p> </p> <p>In the orders dated 5 February 2018 and 5 April 2018, the learned Judge ordered Dave Pillay to pay Gracy Arissol SCR853,512.30 for her shares in "Sterling Investment V10450". Gracy Arissol by Counsel did not dispute the valuation of "Sterling Investment (Pty) Ltd". Thus, the learned Judge cannot be faulted for accepting the valuation for the shares of "Sterling Investment V10450". </p> <p> </p> <p>With respect to her shares in Impact Logistics (Pty) Ltd, I have concluded under grounds 3, 4 and 6 that the learned Judge cannot be faulted for accepting the valuation for its shares based on the net asset approach. </p> <p> </p> <p>In relation to the quantum awarded by the learned Judge to Gracy Arissol concerning parcel J1606 and the four-bedroom house standing thereon, I have made a determination under ground 1 reversing the learned Judge's valuation of Gracy Arissol's share in the said property.</p> <p> </p> <p>Hence, I cannot entertain ground 9, which stands dismissed.</p> <p> <br /> Ground 10</p> <p>Ground 10 complained that Gracy Arissol was denied her right to have her case heard by an independent and impartial court as guaranteed to her under Article 19(7) of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles. Counsel for Gracy Arissol did not press this ground at the appeal, which stands dismissed.</p> <p> <br /> The Decision<br />  </p> <p>For the reasons stated above, the appeal partly succeeds and partly fails. </p> <p> </p> <p>I allow the appeal under ground 1. Thus, the learned Judge's order awarding Gracy Arissol thirty (30) per cent in the value of parcel J1606 and the four-bedroom house situated thereon (SCR1,200,000) is set aside and replaced by the following orders ― </p> <p> <br /> (i)       The share of Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay in parcel J1606 and the four bedroom-house standing thereon shall be fifty (50) per cent each;<br />  <br /> (ii)     The share of Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay in parcel J1606 and the four bedroom-house standing thereon shall be SCR2,000,000 each;<br />  <br /> (iii)    An order is made substituting for the sum of SCR1,200,000 for the share of Gracy Arissol in parcel J1606 and the four bedroom-house standing thereon, the sum of SCR2,000,000.<br />  </p> <p>Grounds 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the grounds of appeal stand dismissed.</p> <p> </p> <p>Gracy Arissol has been occupying the house situated on parcel V10596 since the order of 5 April 2018, which ordered her to vacate the house situated on parcel V10596 within six months of the date of that order. Gracy Arissol is ordered to vacate the house on parcel V10596 within six (6) months of the date of the Court of Appeal judgment.</p> <p> </p> <p>Gracy Arissol and Dave Pillay shall pay her/his costs of this appeal.</p> <p> <br /> Robinson JA                                                                           ____________________<br />  <br /> I concur                                                                                   ____________________<br />                                                                                                 Fernando President<br />  <br />  <br />  <br />                                                                                                 ____________________<br /> I concur                                                                                   Govinden Chief Justice<br />  <br />  <br /> Dated at Ile du Port, Mahe Seychelles, this 30th April 2021.<br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  </p></span></div></div> </div> </div> Thu, 23 Jun 2022 08:07:11 +0000 Anonymous 4303 at http://old2.seylii.org Monnaie v Choppy (SCA 42 of 2018) [2021] SCCA 22 (11 June 2021); http://old2.seylii.org/sc/judgment/court-appeal/2021/22 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">Monnaie v Choppy (SCA 42 of 2018) [2021] SCCA 22 (11 June 2021);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/159" hreflang="x-default">Family Law</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Anonymous (not verified)</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Thu, 06/23/2022 - 08:06</span> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-field-search-summary field--type-text-with-summary field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Search summary</div> <div class="field__item"><p>Matrimonial property- division of shares in a company held by a spouse.</p> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-field-headnote-and-holding field--type-text-long field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Headnote and holding</div> <div class="field__item"><p>The appeal fails on all grounds. It is therefore dismissed with costs to the respondent. The judgment and orders of the lower Court are upheld.</p> </div> </div> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.seylii.org/files/judgments/scca/2021/22/2021-scca-22_1.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=61087">2021-scca-22.docx</a></span> </div> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-pdf file--application-pdf"> <a href="https://media.seylii.org/files/judgments/scca/2021/22/2021-scca-22_1.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=743811">2021-scca-22.pdf</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><p> <br /> IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF SEYCHELLES</p> <p> </p> <p>Reportable<br /> [2021] SCCA 22<br /> SCA 42/2018<br /> (Appeal from Civil Side DC 31/2013)<br />  <br /> In the matter between<br />  <br /> LISE MARIE-ALINE MONNAIE                                                  Appellant<br /> (Rep. by Guy A Ferley)<br />  <br /> and<br />  <br /> AUGUSTIN OCTAVE CHOPPY                                                    Respondent<br /> (Rep. by Frank J. Elizabeth)</p> <p> <br />  </p> <p>Neutral Citation: Monnaie v Choppy (SCA 42/2018) [2021] SCCA 22 11 June 2021<br /> Before:                   Robinson, Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza and Dingake, JJA.           <br /> Summary:             Matrimonial property- division of shares in a company held by a spouse.<br /> Heard:                   26 May 2021.                  </p> <p>Delivered:              11 June 2021      <br />  </p> <p>ORDER<br /> The appeal fails on all grounds. It is therefore dismissed with costs to the respondent. The judgment and orders of the lower Court are upheld.<br />  </p> <p> <br /> JUDGMENT</p> <p> <br /> TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA, JA<br /> The Facts</p> <p>The appellant (Lise Marie-Aline Monnaie) and the respondent (Augustin Octave Choppy) got married on 2 April, 2003 at Anse Reunion, La Digue, Seychelles.</p> <p> </p> <p>In an amended petition dated 5 March, 2015, the respondent in line with Section 4 (1) (d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act petitioned for divorce on ground that the marriage had irretrievably broken down and the parties had lived separately for a continuous period of at least two years. Shortly before the presentation of the petition for divorce, the appellant granted her consent to annul the marriage and at the hearing, the Respondent produced a document of Consent of Divorce signed by the appellant.</p> <p> </p> <p>The trial judge, E. Carolus, Master of the Supreme Court, found that the marriage of the parties had irretrievably broken and granted a conditional order of divorce to be made absolute after six weeks. Thereafter, the marriage was dissolved by a decree absolute on 9 May, 2016.</p> <p> </p> <p>Consequently, the appellant petitioned the Supreme Court vide MC 2017/DV 31/2013, for payment out of the shares held by the respondent in the company known as Anse Reunion Villas (Proprietary) Limited (hereinafter ‘the Company’). The Appellant sought orders that:</p> <p>The shares held by the respondent in the Company be valued;<br /> She be awarded a half share of the market value of the shares held by the Respondent in the Company; and<br /> Any other order that the Court deemed fit and reasonable in the circumstances of the case.</p> <p> </p> <p>According to the appellant, in 2003, the respondent purchased a piece of land (Parcel LD1275) from his father in order to construct a tourism project for the benefit of himself and the Appellant. Furthermore, that the respondent enlisted the help of a business partner, Mr. Tony Wong, with whom he incorporated the Company and together became the shareholders as well as directors. The company then obtained a bank loan and constructed four chalets on the land which were used to operate a guesthouse business.</p> <p> </p> <p>The appellant testified that while she was running the business, the respondent informed her that his share in the business belonged to both of them and that for that matter, she put a lot of effort in running it as anybody with a proprietary interest would. She averred that she invested considerably in the business by way of labour, management and kind contributions. The appellant further stated that she solely ran the business until her marriage to the respondent began to fail and she was forced out of the business.</p> <p> </p> <p>In his reply, the respondent stated that there had been no intention that the land, which he received as a gift from his father, and the guesthouse business that he started thereon, would be investment for mutual benefit of himself and the appellant. He also stated that the fact that the appellant had not been given any shares in the Company was proof of the intention that she would not have an ownership stake in it.</p> <p> <br />  </p> <p>Furthermore, the respondent stated that:</p> <p>While working for the Company, the Appellant received a monthly salary;<br /> After the Appellant left the Company, she filed a case against the Company and was paid SCR 68,000 as compensation;<br /> It had been agreed between the Appellant and the Respondent that at the time of the divorce, he would not claim a share of their matrimonial properties and the Appellant would equally not claim a share of his guesthouse business.</p> <p> <br />  </p> <p>The Supreme Court rejected the appellant’s claim and noted that:</p> <p>The appellant had failed to prove that she had done additional work in respect of running the company;<br /> The appellant had not adduced evidence of her salary to show that it was in fact too low and that she was participating in the venture in consideration of the promise that shares would be allotted to her in return;<br /> The appellant admitted that the respondent had contributed SCR 50,000 toward the construction of their matrimonial home, although the Respondent had contributed nearly SCR 1,000,000 and that it had been agreed that the Appellant would keep both matrimonial houses and not claim any share in the company;<br /> The appellant had been paid SCR 68,000 as compensation when her employment with the Company was terminated.</p> <p> </p> <p>Dismissing the appellant’s petition with costs, the Supreme Court noted that it had found no basis for ordering a valuation of the shares in the Company or granting the Appellant any shares in the Respondent’s stake in the Company.</p> <p> </p> <p>Dissatisfied with the judgment of the Supreme Court, the appellant appealed to this Court on the following grounds:</p> <p>The Learned Judge erred in law in [that] he failed completely to apply the law, practice and principle of partition of matrimonial property in that he failed to take into consideration the provision of section 20 (1) (g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act in that:</p> <p>He erred in finding that the Appellant is not entitled to shares from the Petitioner, when the question before him was to order a valuation of the shares the Respondent held in the Company Anse Reunion Villas Company Limited, so that the Petitioner could be awarded the monetary value of a share thereof;<br /> He failed to appreciate nor to take into consideration all the circumstances of the case as borne out in the evidence before the court. He rested his finding on a misinterpretation of the law namely whether the Respondent had promised the Appellant shares in the Company rather than to determine whether the said shares constitute matrimonial property.</p> <p>The Learned Judge erred in his assessment of the evidence before the court in regards to the contribution the Respondent purportedly made towards the house belonging to the Petitioner.</p> <p> <br /> Prayers</p> <p>The Appellant sought the following reliefs from the Court:</p> <p>An order allowing the appeal on all the grounds,<br /> An order of valuation of the shares that the Respondent held in the company, Anse Reunion Villas (Pty) Limited; or, in the alternative<br /> An order referring the matter back to the Supreme Court for a re-hearing on assessment and partition of the matrimonial property which consists of the shares of the respondent in the Company.</p> <p> <br /> Appellant’s submissions</p> <p>Although the appellant’s Memorandum of Appeal contained two grounds, the appellant’s counsel advanced arguments in respect to ground 1 only. The Court’s decision will therefore be premised on the arguments made on this ground.</p> <p>Ground 1</p> <p>The Appellant’s counsel submitted that the shares held by the Respondent in the company were matrimonial property within the meaning of Section 20 (1) (g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, Cap. 124 and that they are intangible assets which appreciated in value due to the contribution of the Appellant. That the appellant worked at the company 24/7 and never took any leave for four years which showed she was not a conventional employee of the Company.</p> <p> </p> <p>Regarding ground 1 (ii), counsel argued that it was never submitted nor pleaded that the appellant expected to be allotted shares in the Company. That what was pleaded and supported by evidence was the fact that the appellant gave her labour freely in expectation that the prosperity of the business would benefit her husband and herself as a family unit as far as her husband’s share in the business was concerned. That had the trial Judge properly examined this evidence in light of Section 20 (1) (g) (supra), he would have come to a different conclusion. That the correct analysis of the said Section was rightly demonstrated in the cases of Hoareau vs. Hoareau[1] and Anthony Herbert Dave Pillay vs. Gracy Sybil Pillay[2].</p> <p> <br /> Respondent’s reply</p> <p>In reply, the respondent’s counsel supported the findings of the lower Court and submitted that the Appellant had failed to discharge her burden of proving that she made any contribution to or was entitled to any share within the Respondent’s business.</p> <p> </p> <p>Counsel also argued that having found that the Appellant had failed to prove any entitlement to the Respondent’s shares in the Company, the Court could not make a futile order for valuation of the same shares.</p> <p> <br />  </p> <p>The Respondent further submitted that the Appellant had only been an employee of the Company and had received a monthly salary in addition to compensation of SCR 68,000 following the termination of her employment.</p> <p> </p> <p>Furthermore, the respondent’s counsel submitted that the Appellant had admitted that the Respondent had contributed toward their two matrimonial houses and yet had not claimed any share in them.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Respondent also argued that the Appellant’s affidavit was defective in the following aspects:</p> <p>The Appellant had failed to expressly plead the existence of the company and attaching documents such as its certificate of incorporation, memorandum of association, and documents evidencing the shareholding; and<br /> The Appellant failed to plead the number of shares held by the Respondent in the Company and those held by Mr. Tony Wong;</p> <p> </p> <p>Counsel argued that the failure to plead the above matters was fatal to the Appellant’s application before the Supreme Court. To buttress this argument, counsel relied on the case of Monthy vs. Seychelles Licensing Authority and another.[3]</p> <p> <br /> Court’s consideration<br /> Ground 1</p> <p>The appeal before Court raises two central arguments.</p> <p>That the appellant was promised or that it was understood between her and the Respondent that the shares he held in the Company were held by him for their mutual benefit. She was merely realising what was a pre-existing rightful share in the Company; and </p> <p> </p> <p>In any case, the shares held by the Respondent in the Company are matrimonial property and therefore ipso facto liable to distribution upon the dissolution of the marriage. It would therefore be irrelevant whether or not the Respondent promised her a share of his Company shares once it was established that they qualify as matrimonial property.</p> <p> <br />  </p> <p>The appellant’s arguments call for determination of the question: whether the shares held by the respondent in the company qualify as matrimonial property and thus liable for distribution between the parties. </p> <p> </p> <p>The law and principle governing the division of matrimonial property is provided for in Section 20 (1) (g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, Cap. 124 as follows:</p> <p>Subject to section 24, on the granting of a conditional order of divorce or nullity or an order of separation, or at any time thereafter, the court may, after making such inquiries as the court thinks fit and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the ability and financial means of the parties to the marriage-<br /> g)      make such order, as the court thinks fit, in respect of any property of a party to a marriage or any interest or right of a party in any property for the benefit of the other party or a relevant child. (Emphasis of Court)<br />  </p> <p>The above provision generally provides for the criteria to be followed by courts in distribution of property upon dissolution of a marriage.</p> <p> </p> <p>The court is empowered under Section 20 (1) (g) (supra) to make inquiries as it thinks fit and have regard to all circumstances of the case, including the ability and financial means of the parties.</p> <p> <br />  </p> <p>In the present case, the respondent claimed that the appellant did not adduce evidence to show that she contributed financially to the acquisition of shares in the company. Where a party has legal ownership of property, a spouse who seeks to have a share in it must adduce evidence to the effect that they contributed to the property. The appellant in this case presented evidence of her labour given to the company as indirect contribution to her husband’s shares. Indeed, this Court in Samori vs. Charles, held that a marriage is not only about financial contributions; it is also about love, friendship, security, commitment, moral and emotional support, which combine together to make a success of the lives of the two people to the marriage. These are matters that cannot easily be measured in monetary terms and also cannot be ignored when a court is called upon to make a determination on matrimonial property.[4]</p> <p> </p> <p>Be that as it may, I note that the appellant was employed by the company and not by the husband. In law, a company is an independent entity from its shareholders. The company used to pay the appellant a monthly salary for her labour and hard work. It is the same company that paid compensation of SR 68,000 when the appellant’s employment was terminated. Therefore, whatever contribution the appellant made was to the company and cannot be considered as indirect contribution to the property in which legal ownership is with the respondent- the shares held by the respondent. It follows that the appellant’s argument that she worked hard at the company cannot prima facie be taken as contribution to matrimonial property.</p> <p> <br />  </p> <p>Furthermore, courts in exercising their discretion in division of matrimonial property are to be guided by the goal of ensuring that one party is not to be put at an unfair advantage in relation to the other. In my view, this is the principle of fairness and equity. In Hoareau vs. Hoareau[5], this Court emphasized the principle as follows:</p> <p>“It is important not to forget to ensure that a party is not put at an unfair advantage. In the process, the court should try, as far as possible, to come up with an award that will enable the other party to maintain a fair reasonable living which is “commensurate or near the standard” the parties were maintaining before the dissolution of the marriage. We know and appreciate that this is not an easy task but courts should keep on trying so that the wider goal of ensuring that one party is not put at an unfair advantage in relation to the other is achieved.” (See also: Renaud vs. Gaetan SCA 48/1998). </p> <p>The respondent in his affidavit in reply at paragraph 6 averred that the appellant had walked away with two of the residential houses. This evidence was not disputed by the appellant.<br /> In such circumstances, it would be inequitable to grant the appellant a 50% share of the respondent’s stake in the Company while he obtained no share at all in their matrimonial properties. Such a decision would leave the respondent in a financially disadvantaged position compared to that of the appellant who has two of matrimonial properties already given to her.</p> <p> </p> <p>I therefore hold that the appellant is not entitled to share in the respondent’s stake in the Company.</p> <p> </p> <p>The appellant also faulted the lower court’s finding that the she was not entitled to a share of the respondent’s stake in the company, when the question before him was to order a valuation of that stake so that the appellant could be awarded the monetary value of a part thereof.</p> <p> </p> <p>I agree with the respondent’s reply to the above submission which was to the effect that the lower court could not order a valuation of those shares without first determining whether or not the appellant was entitled to a share in the property.</p> <p> <br />  </p> <p>The Court was bound to first determine whether the Appellant was entitled to the said shares before making a valuation order because a court should not act in vain. Having found that the appellant was not entitled to the shares sought, the prayer for an order of valuation had to fail.</p> <p> </p> <p>With regard to the respondent’s submission that the appellant’s affidavit had been defective due to failure to expressly plead the existence of the Company and to attach its certificate of incorporation, memorandum of association and documents evidencing the shareholding structure, I find the argument irrelevant. The respondent did not dispute the existence of the company nor the fact that he and Mr. Tony Wong were shareholders in the said company. I also do not see any prejudice that the Respondent has suffered merely because the appellant did not attach documents that prove something the respondent does not dispute.</p> <p> <br />  </p> <p>Furthermore, the case of Monthy vs. Seychelles Licensing Authority and Another[6] cited by the respondent is itself clear. The case is to the effect that a pleading must state facts and not the evidence by which they are to be proved. </p> <p> </p> <p>I therefore find that the respondent’s argument above does not have merit.</p> <p> <br /> Conclusion and Orders</p> <p>Arising from the analysis above, I hold that the appeal fails on all grounds and order that:</p> <p>The appeal be dismissed with costs to the respondent.<br /> The judgment and orders of the lower Court are upheld.</p> <p> <br /> Dated and signed on this 11th  day of June, 2021.<br />  <br />  </p> <p> <br /> Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza, JA.<br />  <br /> ________________________<br /> Dingake JA<br />  <br /> I agree with the conclusion that the appeal should be dismissed with costs to the respondent and that the judgment and orders of the lower court are upheld.<br />  <br /> __________________________<br /> Robinson JA                                                    <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  </p> <p>[1] (2015) SLR 155.</p> <p>[2] [2018] SCSC 98.   </p> <p>[3] SCA 37/2016 [2018] SCCA (14 December 2018).</p> <p>[4] SCA No: 38/2009 [2012] SCCA 35.<br />  </p> <p>[5] SCA 37 of 2011.</p> <p>[6] SCA 37/2016 [2018] SCCA (14 December 2018).</p> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-2c002ecd8b08aaa8e148d5b706a0c222cc50114fb2da9d79fb23dce8ed4caf0e"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><p> <br /> IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF SEYCHELLES</p> <p> </p> <p>Reportable<br /> [2021] SCCA 22<br /> SCA 42/2018<br /> (Appeal from Civil Side DC 31/2013)<br />  <br /> In the matter between<br />  <br /> LISE MARIE-ALINE MONNAIE                                                  Appellant<br /> (Rep. by Guy A Ferley)<br />  <br /> and<br />  <br /> AUGUSTIN OCTAVE CHOPPY                                                    Respondent<br /> (Rep. by Frank J. Elizabeth)</p> <p> <br />  </p> <p>Neutral Citation: Monnaie v Choppy (SCA 42/2018) [2021] SCCA 22 11 June 2021<br /> Before:                   Robinson, Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza and Dingake, JJA.           <br /> Summary:             Matrimonial property- division of shares in a company held by a spouse.<br /> Heard:                   26 May 2021.                  </p> <p>Delivered:              11 June 2021      <br />  </p> <p>ORDER<br /> The appeal fails on all grounds. It is therefore dismissed with costs to the respondent. The judgment and orders of the lower Court are upheld.<br />  </p> <p> <br /> JUDGMENT</p> <p> <br /> TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA, JA<br /> The Facts</p> <p>The appellant (Lise Marie-Aline Monnaie) and the respondent (Augustin Octave Choppy) got married on 2 April, 2003 at Anse Reunion, La Digue, Seychelles.</p> <p> </p> <p>In an amended petition dated 5 March, 2015, the respondent in line with Section 4 (1) (d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act petitioned for divorce on ground that the marriage had irretrievably broken down and the parties had lived separately for a continuous period of at least two years. Shortly before the presentation of the petition for divorce, the appellant granted her consent to annul the marriage and at the hearing, the Respondent produced a document of Consent of Divorce signed by the appellant.</p> <p> </p> <p>The trial judge, E. Carolus, Master of the Supreme Court, found that the marriage of the parties had irretrievably broken and granted a conditional order of divorce to be made absolute after six weeks. Thereafter, the marriage was dissolved by a decree absolute on 9 May, 2016.</p> <p> </p> <p>Consequently, the appellant petitioned the Supreme Court vide MC 2017/DV 31/2013, for payment out of the shares held by the respondent in the company known as Anse Reunion Villas (Proprietary) Limited (hereinafter ‘the Company’). The Appellant sought orders that:</p> <p>The shares held by the respondent in the Company be valued;<br /> She be awarded a half share of the market value of the shares held by the Respondent in the Company; and<br /> Any other order that the Court deemed fit and reasonable in the circumstances of the case.</p> <p> </p> <p>According to the appellant, in 2003, the respondent purchased a piece of land (Parcel LD1275) from his father in order to construct a tourism project for the benefit of himself and the Appellant. Furthermore, that the respondent enlisted the help of a business partner, Mr. Tony Wong, with whom he incorporated the Company and together became the shareholders as well as directors. The company then obtained a bank loan and constructed four chalets on the land which were used to operate a guesthouse business.</p> <p> </p> <p>The appellant testified that while she was running the business, the respondent informed her that his share in the business belonged to both of them and that for that matter, she put a lot of effort in running it as anybody with a proprietary interest would. She averred that she invested considerably in the business by way of labour, management and kind contributions. The appellant further stated that she solely ran the business until her marriage to the respondent began to fail and she was forced out of the business.</p> <p> </p> <p>In his reply, the respondent stated that there had been no intention that the land, which he received as a gift from his father, and the guesthouse business that he started thereon, would be investment for mutual benefit of himself and the appellant. He also stated that the fact that the appellant had not been given any shares in the Company was proof of the intention that she would not have an ownership stake in it.</p> <p> <br />  </p> <p>Furthermore, the respondent stated that:</p> <p>While working for the Company, the Appellant received a monthly salary;<br /> After the Appellant left the Company, she filed a case against the Company and was paid SCR 68,000 as compensation;<br /> It had been agreed between the Appellant and the Respondent that at the time of the divorce, he would not claim a share of their matrimonial properties and the Appellant would equally not claim a share of his guesthouse business.</p> <p> <br />  </p> <p>The Supreme Court rejected the appellant’s claim and noted that:</p> <p>The appellant had failed to prove that she had done additional work in respect of running the company;<br /> The appellant had not adduced evidence of her salary to show that it was in fact too low and that she was participating in the venture in consideration of the promise that shares would be allotted to her in return;<br /> The appellant admitted that the respondent had contributed SCR 50,000 toward the construction of their matrimonial home, although the Respondent had contributed nearly SCR 1,000,000 and that it had been agreed that the Appellant would keep both matrimonial houses and not claim any share in the company;<br /> The appellant had been paid SCR 68,000 as compensation when her employment with the Company was terminated.</p> <p> </p> <p>Dismissing the appellant’s petition with costs, the Supreme Court noted that it had found no basis for ordering a valuation of the shares in the Company or granting the Appellant any shares in the Respondent’s stake in the Company.</p> <p> </p> <p>Dissatisfied with the judgment of the Supreme Court, the appellant appealed to this Court on the following grounds:</p> <p>The Learned Judge erred in law in [that] he failed completely to apply the law, practice and principle of partition of matrimonial property in that he failed to take into consideration the provision of section 20 (1) (g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act in that:</p> <p>He erred in finding that the Appellant is not entitled to shares from the Petitioner, when the question before him was to order a valuation of the shares the Respondent held in the Company Anse Reunion Villas Company Limited, so that the Petitioner could be awarded the monetary value of a share thereof;<br /> He failed to appreciate nor to take into consideration all the circumstances of the case as borne out in the evidence before the court. He rested his finding on a misinterpretation of the law namely whether the Respondent had promised the Appellant shares in the Company rather than to determine whether the said shares constitute matrimonial property.</p> <p>The Learned Judge erred in his assessment of the evidence before the court in regards to the contribution the Respondent purportedly made towards the house belonging to the Petitioner.</p> <p> <br /> Prayers</p> <p>The Appellant sought the following reliefs from the Court:</p> <p>An order allowing the appeal on all the grounds,<br /> An order of valuation of the shares that the Respondent held in the company, Anse Reunion Villas (Pty) Limited; or, in the alternative<br /> An order referring the matter back to the Supreme Court for a re-hearing on assessment and partition of the matrimonial property which consists of the shares of the respondent in the Company.</p> <p> <br /> Appellant’s submissions</p> <p>Although the appellant’s Memorandum of Appeal contained two grounds, the appellant’s counsel advanced arguments in respect to ground 1 only. The Court’s decision will therefore be premised on the arguments made on this ground.</p> <p>Ground 1</p> <p>The Appellant’s counsel submitted that the shares held by the Respondent in the company were matrimonial property within the meaning of Section 20 (1) (g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, Cap. 124 and that they are intangible assets which appreciated in value due to the contribution of the Appellant. That the appellant worked at the company 24/7 and never took any leave for four years which showed she was not a conventional employee of the Company.</p> <p> </p> <p>Regarding ground 1 (ii), counsel argued that it was never submitted nor pleaded that the appellant expected to be allotted shares in the Company. That what was pleaded and supported by evidence was the fact that the appellant gave her labour freely in expectation that the prosperity of the business would benefit her husband and herself as a family unit as far as her husband’s share in the business was concerned. That had the trial Judge properly examined this evidence in light of Section 20 (1) (g) (supra), he would have come to a different conclusion. That the correct analysis of the said Section was rightly demonstrated in the cases of Hoareau vs. Hoareau[1] and Anthony Herbert Dave Pillay vs. Gracy Sybil Pillay[2].</p> <p> <br /> Respondent’s reply</p> <p>In reply, the respondent’s counsel supported the findings of the lower Court and submitted that the Appellant had failed to discharge her burden of proving that she made any contribution to or was entitled to any share within the Respondent’s business.</p> <p> </p> <p>Counsel also argued that having found that the Appellant had failed to prove any entitlement to the Respondent’s shares in the Company, the Court could not make a futile order for valuation of the same shares.</p> <p> <br />  </p> <p>The Respondent further submitted that the Appellant had only been an employee of the Company and had received a monthly salary in addition to compensation of SCR 68,000 following the termination of her employment.</p> <p> </p> <p>Furthermore, the respondent’s counsel submitted that the Appellant had admitted that the Respondent had contributed toward their two matrimonial houses and yet had not claimed any share in them.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Respondent also argued that the Appellant’s affidavit was defective in the following aspects:</p> <p>The Appellant had failed to expressly plead the existence of the company and attaching documents such as its certificate of incorporation, memorandum of association, and documents evidencing the shareholding; and<br /> The Appellant failed to plead the number of shares held by the Respondent in the Company and those held by Mr. Tony Wong;</p> <p> </p> <p>Counsel argued that the failure to plead the above matters was fatal to the Appellant’s application before the Supreme Court. To buttress this argument, counsel relied on the case of Monthy vs. Seychelles Licensing Authority and another.[3]</p> <p> <br /> Court’s consideration<br /> Ground 1</p> <p>The appeal before Court raises two central arguments.</p> <p>That the appellant was promised or that it was understood between her and the Respondent that the shares he held in the Company were held by him for their mutual benefit. She was merely realising what was a pre-existing rightful share in the Company; and </p> <p> </p> <p>In any case, the shares held by the Respondent in the Company are matrimonial property and therefore ipso facto liable to distribution upon the dissolution of the marriage. It would therefore be irrelevant whether or not the Respondent promised her a share of his Company shares once it was established that they qualify as matrimonial property.</p> <p> <br />  </p> <p>The appellant’s arguments call for determination of the question: whether the shares held by the respondent in the company qualify as matrimonial property and thus liable for distribution between the parties. </p> <p> </p> <p>The law and principle governing the division of matrimonial property is provided for in Section 20 (1) (g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, Cap. 124 as follows:</p> <p>Subject to section 24, on the granting of a conditional order of divorce or nullity or an order of separation, or at any time thereafter, the court may, after making such inquiries as the court thinks fit and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the ability and financial means of the parties to the marriage-<br /> g)      make such order, as the court thinks fit, in respect of any property of a party to a marriage or any interest or right of a party in any property for the benefit of the other party or a relevant child. (Emphasis of Court)<br />  </p> <p>The above provision generally provides for the criteria to be followed by courts in distribution of property upon dissolution of a marriage.</p> <p> </p> <p>The court is empowered under Section 20 (1) (g) (supra) to make inquiries as it thinks fit and have regard to all circumstances of the case, including the ability and financial means of the parties.</p> <p> <br />  </p> <p>In the present case, the respondent claimed that the appellant did not adduce evidence to show that she contributed financially to the acquisition of shares in the company. Where a party has legal ownership of property, a spouse who seeks to have a share in it must adduce evidence to the effect that they contributed to the property. The appellant in this case presented evidence of her labour given to the company as indirect contribution to her husband’s shares. Indeed, this Court in Samori vs. Charles, held that a marriage is not only about financial contributions; it is also about love, friendship, security, commitment, moral and emotional support, which combine together to make a success of the lives of the two people to the marriage. These are matters that cannot easily be measured in monetary terms and also cannot be ignored when a court is called upon to make a determination on matrimonial property.[4]</p> <p> </p> <p>Be that as it may, I note that the appellant was employed by the company and not by the husband. In law, a company is an independent entity from its shareholders. The company used to pay the appellant a monthly salary for her labour and hard work. It is the same company that paid compensation of SR 68,000 when the appellant’s employment was terminated. Therefore, whatever contribution the appellant made was to the company and cannot be considered as indirect contribution to the property in which legal ownership is with the respondent- the shares held by the respondent. It follows that the appellant’s argument that she worked hard at the company cannot prima facie be taken as contribution to matrimonial property.</p> <p> <br />  </p> <p>Furthermore, courts in exercising their discretion in division of matrimonial property are to be guided by the goal of ensuring that one party is not to be put at an unfair advantage in relation to the other. In my view, this is the principle of fairness and equity. In Hoareau vs. Hoareau[5], this Court emphasized the principle as follows:</p> <p>“It is important not to forget to ensure that a party is not put at an unfair advantage. In the process, the court should try, as far as possible, to come up with an award that will enable the other party to maintain a fair reasonable living which is “commensurate or near the standard” the parties were maintaining before the dissolution of the marriage. We know and appreciate that this is not an easy task but courts should keep on trying so that the wider goal of ensuring that one party is not put at an unfair advantage in relation to the other is achieved.” (See also: Renaud vs. Gaetan SCA 48/1998). </p> <p>The respondent in his affidavit in reply at paragraph 6 averred that the appellant had walked away with two of the residential houses. This evidence was not disputed by the appellant.<br /> In such circumstances, it would be inequitable to grant the appellant a 50% share of the respondent’s stake in the Company while he obtained no share at all in their matrimonial properties. Such a decision would leave the respondent in a financially disadvantaged position compared to that of the appellant who has two of matrimonial properties already given to her.</p> <p> </p> <p>I therefore hold that the appellant is not entitled to share in the respondent’s stake in the Company.</p> <p> </p> <p>The appellant also faulted the lower court’s finding that the she was not entitled to a share of the respondent’s stake in the company, when the question before him was to order a valuation of that stake so that the appellant could be awarded the monetary value of a part thereof.</p> <p> </p> <p>I agree with the respondent’s reply to the above submission which was to the effect that the lower court could not order a valuation of those shares without first determining whether or not the appellant was entitled to a share in the property.</p> <p> <br />  </p> <p>The Court was bound to first determine whether the Appellant was entitled to the said shares before making a valuation order because a court should not act in vain. Having found that the appellant was not entitled to the shares sought, the prayer for an order of valuation had to fail.</p> <p> </p> <p>With regard to the respondent’s submission that the appellant’s affidavit had been defective due to failure to expressly plead the existence of the Company and to attach its certificate of incorporation, memorandum of association and documents evidencing the shareholding structure, I find the argument irrelevant. The respondent did not dispute the existence of the company nor the fact that he and Mr. Tony Wong were shareholders in the said company. I also do not see any prejudice that the Respondent has suffered merely because the appellant did not attach documents that prove something the respondent does not dispute.</p> <p> <br />  </p> <p>Furthermore, the case of Monthy vs. Seychelles Licensing Authority and Another[6] cited by the respondent is itself clear. The case is to the effect that a pleading must state facts and not the evidence by which they are to be proved. </p> <p> </p> <p>I therefore find that the respondent’s argument above does not have merit.</p> <p> <br /> Conclusion and Orders</p> <p>Arising from the analysis above, I hold that the appeal fails on all grounds and order that:</p> <p>The appeal be dismissed with costs to the respondent.<br /> The judgment and orders of the lower Court are upheld.</p> <p> <br /> Dated and signed on this 11th  day of June, 2021.<br />  <br />  </p> <p> <br /> Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza, JA.<br />  <br /> ________________________<br /> Dingake JA<br />  <br /> I agree with the conclusion that the appeal should be dismissed with costs to the respondent and that the judgment and orders of the lower court are upheld.<br />  <br /> __________________________<br /> Robinson JA                                                    <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  </p> <p>[1] (2015) SLR 155.</p> <p>[2] [2018] SCSC 98.   </p> <p>[3] SCA 37/2016 [2018] SCCA (14 December 2018).</p> <p>[4] SCA No: 38/2009 [2012] SCCA 35.<br />  </p> <p>[5] SCA 37 of 2011.</p> <p>[6] SCA 37/2016 [2018] SCCA (14 December 2018).</p></span></div></div> </div> </div> Thu, 23 Jun 2022 08:06:01 +0000 Anonymous 4294 at http://old2.seylii.org Bacco & Anor v Bacco (SCA 46 of 2018, CS 72 of 2018) [2021] SCCA 25 (09 July 2021); http://old2.seylii.org/sc/judgment/court-appeal/2021/25 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">Bacco &amp; Anor v Bacco (SCA 46 of 2018, CS 72 of 2018) [2021] SCCA 25 (09 July 2021);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/120" hreflang="x-default">Constitutional Law</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/159" hreflang="x-default">Family Law</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Anonymous (not verified)</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Thu, 06/23/2022 - 08:05</span> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-field-search-summary field--type-text-with-summary field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Search summary</div> <div class="field__item"><p>Appeal against the decision of Supreme Court ordering First Appellant from using the name of Respondent - jurisdiction of Supreme Court of Seychelles to disavow paternity and rectify registration of the name in the Civil Register of Madagascar - rights of minor under the Constitution of Seychelles</p> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-field-headnote-and-holding field--type-text-long field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Headnote and holding</div> <div class="field__item"><p>The appeal is partly granted insofar as the Court declares that Jaccques Patrick Bacco is not the father of A.B.</p> </div> </div> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.seylii.org/files/judgments/scca/2021/25/2021-scca-25_1.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=37547">2021-scca-25.docx</a></span> </div> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-pdf file--application-pdf"> <a href="https://media.seylii.org/files/judgments/scca/2021/25/2021-scca-25_1.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=977881">2021-scca-25.pdf</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><p>IN THE SEYCHELLES COURT OF APPEAL</p> <p> </p> <p>Reportable<br /> [2021] SCCA 25       9 July 2021<br /> SCA 46/2018<br /> Arising in CS 72/2018) SCSC 700<br />  <br /> In the matter between<br /> 1. A. B.<br /> (a minor represented by his legal guardian Albertine Bacco)<br /> 2. ALBERTINE BACCO                                                                  Appellants<br /> (rep. by Lucie Pool)<br />  <br /> and<br />  <br /> JACQUES PATRICK BACCO                                                       Respondent<br /> (rep. by Manuella Parmentier)<br /> MINISTERE PUBLIC                                                       </p> <p>(rep. by Neesha Monthy)</p> <p>Neutral Citation:  Bacco v Bacco ([2021] SCCA 25       9 July 2021 SCA 46/2018<br /> Arising in CS 72/2018) SCSC 700<br /> Before:                   President, Twomey, JA, Robinson, JA<br /> Summary:             Appeal against the decision of Supreme Court ordering First Appellant from using the name of Respondent - jurisdiction of Supreme Court of Seychelles to disavow paternity and rectify registration of the name in the Civil Register of Madagascar - rights of minor under the Constitution of Seychelles<br /> Heard:                    7 April 2021</p> <p>Delivered:              9 July 2021</p> <p>ORDER<br /> The appeal is partly granted insofar as the Court declares that Jaccques Patrick Bacco is not the father of A.B. ______________________________________________________________________________<br /> TWOMEY JA<br /> Introduction</p> <p>This case illustrates an old conundrum: mater semper certa est but pater semper incertus est, in other words, while maternity results from childbirth and is certain, paternity is always uncertain. In Seychelles, the filiation of a child born of a married couple is automatic at the moment of his registration of birth. In contrast, the filiation of a child born outside marriage must be established in either of two ways: by voluntary formal acknowledgement by the father or by a court order. <br /> Rescinding a paternity acknowledgement (desaveu de paternité) is also provided for by the law and may be made by anyone having a lawful interest therein.</p> <p>The facts of the present case</p> <p>The Respondent, Jacques Bacco, married the Second Appellant, Albertine Bacco on 13 December 2014 in Madagascar. On 10 December 2014, previous to the marriage and (it would appear from the evidence in the court below) in contemplation of the marriage, he acknowledged the First Appellant, Albertine’s Bacco’s child, A.B. as his son despite the latter not being his biological child. The parties travelled back and lived in Seychelles, first together as a family and then separately. Jacques Bacco divorced Albertine Bacco on 6 April 2017 with a decree absolute of the same pronounced on 6 June 2017.<br /> Jacques Bacco filed a plaint on 14 July 2017 in which he prayed the court to disavow his paternity of A.B. and to order A.B. to stop bearing his name “Bacco”.<br /> In her statement of defence in the court below, Albertine Bacco admitted that Jacques Bacco was not the father of A.B. but that he had nevertheless voluntarily acknowledged the child as his own under the laws of Madagascar. She further averred that A.B. subsequent to the acknowledgement of paternity by Jacques Bacco, a Seychellois citizen, automatically secured Seychellois nationality and was issued with a Seychellois passport and identity card and that the present action would result in him losing his nationality and becoming stateless. She further averred that A.B.’s rights were protected under Article 31 of the Constitution of Seychelles and that the Chief Civil Officer of the Civil Status Office of Seychelles had no power to rectify an Act of Birth drawn up and registered in Madagascar.<br /> In a seven paragraph judgment delivered on 20 July 2018, Govinden J, as he then was, stated, inter alia:</p> <p>“[3] Article 339 of the Civil Code of Seychelles Act provides that the recognition by a father or mother and all claims on the part of the child may be contested by all those having a lawful interest therein. The Author of the recognition (which in this case is the Plaintiff) is allowed to contest his own recognition even though that recognition has been effected by an authentic document. The reason for this rule is that the recognition has value only in so far as it corresponds to the truth. Vide Jurrisclasseur Civil Articles 335 and 339 verbo Filiation Naturelle paragraphs 143 and 155 D.A. 1913. 1.83 DH I 932.540. However, the child who has been recognised has a right of action as against the author of the untruthful recognition for the prejudice that he may have suffered therefrom. Vide A. Sauzier in Cosimo Centaro v/s Jones Dorothy Anne Centaro and Jeanine Vel (1981) SCR P209.<br />  <br /> [4] It is abundantly evident from the averments in the Plaint and Statement of Defence and the evidence of the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant that the Plaintiff was not the father of the 1st Defendant and that the recognition of the 1st Defendant by the Plaintiff does not represent the truth.<br />  <br /> [5] Accordingly, I therefore order that the Plaintiff is not the father of the 1st Defendant and that the 1st Defendant should stop bearing the surname "Bacco".<br />  <br /> [6] I am aware of the consequence of this order on the 1st Defendant. That it may lead to him losing the Seychellois nationality or even possibly render him stateless. However, to my mind these are only consequential to the matter at hand. The right of the Plaintiff under Article 339 cannot be denied because of its effect that it may have on the 1st Defendant (sic). In balancing the interest of the parties in this case the Court has to ensure that at the end of the day the truth prevails above possible fraud in official transaction which has to be averted at all cost (sic). The 1st Defendant may or may not lose his Seychellois nationality and hence be rendered stateless, however is a separate legal procedure that is not the subject matter of this case before the Court.”<br />  <br /> The appeal</p> <p>It is against this decision that the mother and child in the suit below have appealed and filed the following four grounds to this court: </p> <p>1. The learned judge had no power to order that the 1st Appellant should stop bearing the name “Bacco” since the said name was registered under the civil laws of Madagascar and not the Civil Status Act of Seychelles.<br />  <br /> 2. In ordering the 1st Appellant to stop bearing the name “Bacco” the learned judge failed to take into consideration the seriousness of the consequences resulting from the Respondent’s untruthful recognition of the 1st Appellant.<br />  <br /> 3. The learned judge failed to further take into consideration the provisions of the Children Act and the right of minors under the constitution in coming to his decision.<br />  <br /> 4. The learned judge ought to have awarded costs to the Appellants.<br />  <br />             I deal with the grounds of appeal together.<br />  <br /> The Appellants’ submissions</p> <p>With regard to the grounds of appeal, the mother and child have submitted that the act of recognising the child, A. B., by Jacques Bacco in the jurisdiction of Madagascar precludes an application for the disavowal of paternity of A.B. in the jurisdiction of Seychelles. They submit that judicial proceedings for the same would have to be instituted in Madagascar according to its laws. <br /> They have also submitted that if the best interests of the child were taken into account according to the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution (the right to the special protection of minors) and section 3 of the Children Act (consideration to be given to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child throughout childhood), this would trump Article 339 of the Civil Code (the contestation of recognition by the father) which the Respondent has relied on. </p> <p>The Respondent’s Submissions</p> <p>Counsel for Jacques Bacco, on the other hand, has in the court below and in this court submitted that this was a marriage of convenience. Mr and Mrs Bacco had communicated on the phone and physically met only 2 weeks before they were married. Proceedings for recognition of the child had started before the marriage. After their return to Seychelles, they lived for a short time together (4 months) together and then Mrs Bacco went to work at Silhouette after which Mr Bacco only saw the boy intermittently.  </p> <p>The Law</p> <p>Our laws provide for the claim of status, for the revocation of status and for rights of standing for both. In particular, the Civil Code provides:</p> <p>Article 334<br /> “The recognition of an illegitimate child shall be made by an authentic document, if it has not been made in the act of birth.<br />  It may also be made by a declaration signed or marked before a Judge, a Magistrate, a civil status officer or the Registrar of the Supreme Court.<br /> …<br />  Article 339.<br /> “The recognition by a father or mother and all claims on the part of the child may be contested by all those having a lawful interest therein.”<br />  </p> <p>The provisions of the Civil Status Act also provide for the amendment of acts of status, specifically in this regard, section 100 states: </p> <p>“A judge may, upon the written application of the Chief Officer of the Civil Status or any party, order the amendment without any fee, stamp or registration due of any act whenever such judge shall be satisfied that any error has been committed in any such act or in the registration thereof. Nothing herein contained shall prevent any interested person from asking by action before the Supreme Court for the rectification or cancellation of any act.”<br />  </p> <p>It must also be noted that the Civil Status Act also provides that: </p> <p>10. (1) The Chief Officer of the Civil Status shall register or cause to be registered all births, marriages and deaths and all other acts connected with the civil status in the Republic of Seychelles. (emphasis added)<br />  <br /> Discussion</p> <p>Although not directly relevant to the issues, in this case, Mr Bacco alleges that this was a marriage of convenience. However, this is not borne out by his evidence: He testified that they returned together as a family to Seychelles in December 2014. The following is an informative extract of the transcript of proceedings (P. 26) proceedings:</p> <p>Q…when did Ms Albertine or yourself leave the marital home<br /> A.  She left home on the 10 of August.<br />  <br /> Q. Which year?<br /> A. 2015<br />  <br /> Q. And where did she live after she left home?<br /> A. She said she was going to work on Silhouette and I told her “I did not send you to Silhouette.”<br />  <br /> Q. Had the relationship ended at that point?<br /> A. It was not completely over.<br />  <br /> Q. So how long after your marriage did your relationship end completely with Ms Albertine<br /> A. On the 30 October 2016 … she would get off on Saturdays for us to go to the mass ceremony at the church. I went to meet her at her eldest sister’s place but her sister was not there. The little boy was with me by the time I went to meet up with her, she took the child and put him inside the house and I told her we would go home to my place and this is how it usually works. But that day she closed the door in my face and for my years of living, I can say this disturbed me quite a lot…<br />  <br /> Q. Why do you wish to have [the child] disavowed?<br /> A. Today I got separated with this lady and I want to move forward and start over…”<br />  </p> <p>To all intents and purposes, this was a marital relationship with a focus on a family unit. The conflict and breakdown of the marital relationship arose from Mrs Bacco obtaining employment on a different island to where the family was living.<br /> The fact remains however that both Mr and Mrs Bacco agree that A.B. was not Mr Bacco’s son and that the recognition of A.B. by him was a sham. That would ordinarily suffice to set aside the declaration of recognition. <br /> However, the grounds of appeal as I understand them do not dispute the fact that according to the above-stated provisions of the Civil Code, and the specific facts of this case even a father can disavow a child he has voluntarily acknowledged as his own. The most important submissions of Mrs Bacco and A.B. are to the effect that the courts of this land have no jurisdiction over acts drawn up and registered in Madagascar. <br /> In other words, this is a conflict of laws issue - whether courts of this land are competent to hear a case concerning the status of an individual registered in another country.<br /> Acts of status of this nature have formed the subject matter of two relevant and specific cases in this jurisdiction and although not on all fours with the present case are informative on the issue this court is concerned with.<br /> In the case of Ex-Parte D. B. A Minor (1989) SLR 144, a Seychellois mother of a child born to her in Beirut on 14 June 1987 applied in 1988 in Seychelles for an order of the court to have the birth of the child registered in the Civil Status Office ofSeychelles. She had sought to do so under the provisions of section 32 (2) of the Civil Status Act relating to the registration of births outside the stipulated 30-day delay after birth. The court ruled that the law provides that such declaration shall be made “before the officer of the district where the child is born.” Reference was made to section 30 (now section 29) of the Act which provides that:</p> <p> “Any act of civil status drawn up in any country out of Seychelles shall be deemed valid as an act of the civil status if it has been drawn up in accordance with the law in force in such country.”<br />  </p> <p>Seaton CJ stated that these provisions read with section 10 of the Act (see above at paragraph 13) acknowledged that apart from acts of birth in Seychelles, the duties of the Chief Officer of the Civil Status include extra-territorial jurisdiction with respect to vessels registered in Seychelles during any voyage when a ship is not in any harbour in Seychelles. He emphasised the application of the condition of what he termed ‘localisation’ with regard to the registration of acts of status.<br /> In my view, the localisation principle is subsumed within the larger concept of comity which would impose on Seychelles the duty to respect the laws of another country.<br /> In the event, the court in D. B. refused to register the birth despite its great sympathy for the situation in which the child was placed.<br /> In the case of Ex-Parte Cecile Bonne  Ch 100/1993 (unreported), a Seychellois grandmother of a child attempted to register the birth of her granddaughter who had been born in Lebanon and who had entered Seychelles on a laissez-passer and left in her care. The Honorary Consul for Seychelles in Lebanon in a letter informed the Department of External Affairs that all relevant records had been destroyed during the civil disturbances there and that there was no possibility of obtaining a birth certificate in respect of the little girl in any way. Perera J as he then was, reiterated the localisation principle as laid down by Seaton CJ in D. B. and stated that the registration of a foreign birth in Seychelles was impossible under the provisions of the Civil Status Act.<br /> It is my view, therefore, that by logical extension the same principle must apply to all acts of civil status registered in a foreign country. Seychelles is not alone in this respect.  A similar case arose recently in France in Cass. 1re civ., 15 mai 2019, no 18-12602, FS–PBI. A child born in Barcelona, Spain to a French father was recognised by him in the register of the civil status of Barcelona. Years later after the death of the father, his other children in France attempted to have the child’s paternity revoked through a DNA test. The Cour de Cassation overturned the decision of the Cour d’Appel de Montpelier which had granted the application, finding in conformity with the Code Civil (the provisions of which are similar to section 30 of our Civil Status Act) that: </p> <p>« La reconnaissance volontaire de paternité ou de maternité est valable si elle a été faite en conformité, soit de la loi personnelle de son auteur, soit de la loi personnelle de l’enfant ».<br />  </p> <p>At the time the recognition was made it was the laws of Spain that applied and would continue to apply until and unless the act was revoked in that jurisdiction.<br /> The remedy sought by Mr Bacco in Seychelles, namely the revocation of his acknowledgement of paternity of A. B., would have the consequence of making null and void the acknowledgement of paternity as if it had never been registered or that it existed in Madagascar. This court cannot assume universal jurisdiction on the issue of status registered in another country.<br /> However, given the fact that both Mr and Mrs Bacco admitted in court that A.B. is not Mr Bacco’s son the court takes notice of this judicial admission and an order to that effect can be made in this jurisdiction. Under Article 1356 Of the Civil Code, three consequences flow from such a judicial admission: it is good against the person making it, it is irrevocable and it is indivisible. Such an admission is therefore binding in this jurisdiction and may be relied on to negate any prospective inheritance claim against Mr Bacco’s estate on his death in Seychelles. However, I cannot say whether it would be binding in Madagascar as it must be emphasised that insofar as A. B.’s birth certificate or status based on his birth is concerned, this Court has no jurisdiction to order any amendment to it nor make any changes in respect of the child using the surname Bacco.<br /> For present purposes, it would be academic to consider ground 3 of the appeal but for completeness sake, I propose to deal with the issue in brief if only to commence a debate on the subject. The issue is an important one: would the rights of minors as protected by Article 31 of the Constitution and the provisions of the Children Act supersede the provisions of the Civil Status Act when it would result in the deprivation of the status and citizenship of a Seychellois child. In the present case, the most egregious consequences would occur - the deprivation of Seychellois citizenship of A.B. Until the 25 January 2017, Malagasy mothers were only permitted to confer nationality on children born in wedlock, in other words, Madagascar did not recognise a mothers’ independent right to confer nationality on children. However, in practice, discriminatory administrative practice persists and may Malagasy children born outside wedlock remain stateless (See on this issue The Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, The World’s Stateless Children <a href="https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r36668.pdf">https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r36668.pdf</a> and Focus Development Association, Global Campaign for Equal Nationality Rights and Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion: Joint Submission to the Human Rights Council at the 34th Session of the Universal Periodic Review (Third Cycle, November 2019) <a href="https://files.institutesi.org/UPR34_Madagascar.pdf">https://files.institutesi.org/UPR34_Madagascar.pdf</a>). In this respect, it must be noted that Madagascar is not a party to the 1954 or 1961 Statelessness Conventions.<br /> Article 31 of the Constitution of Seychelles recognises the right of children and young persons to special protection and to ensure the effective exercise of that right makes several undertakings including ensuring special protection against social, economic, physical and moral dangers to which they might be exposed. No restrictions are imposed on that right as opposed to other rights in the Charter. Article 32 of the Constitution also protects the family recognising it as the fundamental element of society.<br /> Further section 2A of the Children Act imposes a duty on courts in determining any question with respect to the upbringing of a child, to have as its primary consideration, the child’s wellbeing.<br /> Undoubtedly the paternity of the child, in this case, would have an impact on its well-being as it might result in the child losing his name, status and citizenship. These are draconian consequences. The Ministère Public was joined to the suit in the court below but its intervention was scant and neither addressed the rights of the child under the Constitution or the applicability of the provisions of the Children Act to the case. This is regrettable as it would have assisted the court on this important issue. We wish to note that in matters occasioning the deprivation of citizenship, child-specific submissions need to be made on the issue.   <br /> The European Court of Human Rights in both the cases of the case of Görgülü v. Germany, no. 74969/01, § 43, 26 February 2004) and Krisztián Barnabás Tóth v Hungary, n° 48494/06, February 12, 2013), stated that consideration of what lies in the best interest of the child concerned is of paramount importance in every case of this kind; depending on their nature and seriousness, the child’s best interests may override those of the parents.<br /> The French Court of Cassation in overturning the decision of the Court of Appeal of  Saint-Denis, Réunion of 28 August 2007 implicitly recognized that it may be in the interests of the child to maintain filiation which does not correspond to biological reality (Arrêt n° 630 du 16 juin 2011 (08-20.475)<br /> These cases recognise the discretionary power of the judge in determining the child’s best interests while ensuring a fair balance of conflicting interests. It is my opinion that this issue was live in the court below and was raised in the pleadings and addressed in the submissions of the Appellants. These competing interests ought to have been considered by the learned trial judge.<br /> However, as we have already ruled that the appeal partly succeeds on the first and second grounds of appeal, my consideration of ground 3 is now moot.<br /> Ground 4 was not pursued at the appeal and is therefore disregarded. </p> <p>Decision and Orders</p> <p>For all the above reasons, this appeal partly succeeds and the Order of the Supreme Court as contained in paragraph 5 of the judgment is substituted by the following Order of this Court: </p> <p>The Court declares that Jacques Patrick Bacco is not the father of A.B.</p> <p>I make no order as to costs in the appeal.</p> <p> <br />  <br />  <br /> ____________           <br /> Dr. Mathilda Twomey JA<br />  <br /> I concur                                                                                  A. Fernando PCA<br />  <br /> ROBINSON JA<br />  <br /> [40]    I agree with the conclusion reached by Twomey J.A that this appeal partly succeeds insofar as the Court of Appeal declares that the Respondent is not the father of the minor child Ali Maolana Bacco.  I make no order as to costs<br />  <br /> _____________<br /> Robinson JA<br /> Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 9 July 2021.<br />  </p> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-8145db5c97bc0b3e7954f7bc012960aafa4b7d095ab9ddd39e173826a2d60a8b"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><p>IN THE SEYCHELLES COURT OF APPEAL</p> <p> </p> <p>Reportable<br /> [2021] SCCA 25       9 July 2021<br /> SCA 46/2018<br /> Arising in CS 72/2018) SCSC 700<br />  <br /> In the matter between<br /> 1. A. B.<br /> (a minor represented by his legal guardian Albertine Bacco)<br /> 2. ALBERTINE BACCO                                                                  Appellants<br /> (rep. by Lucie Pool)<br />  <br /> and<br />  <br /> JACQUES PATRICK BACCO                                                       Respondent<br /> (rep. by Manuella Parmentier)<br /> MINISTERE PUBLIC                                                       </p> <p>(rep. by Neesha Monthy)</p> <p>Neutral Citation:  Bacco v Bacco ([2021] SCCA 25       9 July 2021 SCA 46/2018<br /> Arising in CS 72/2018) SCSC 700<br /> Before:                   President, Twomey, JA, Robinson, JA<br /> Summary:             Appeal against the decision of Supreme Court ordering First Appellant from using the name of Respondent - jurisdiction of Supreme Court of Seychelles to disavow paternity and rectify registration of the name in the Civil Register of Madagascar - rights of minor under the Constitution of Seychelles<br /> Heard:                    7 April 2021</p> <p>Delivered:              9 July 2021</p> <p>ORDER<br /> The appeal is partly granted insofar as the Court declares that Jaccques Patrick Bacco is not the father of A.B. ______________________________________________________________________________<br /> TWOMEY JA<br /> Introduction</p> <p>This case illustrates an old conundrum: mater semper certa est but pater semper incertus est, in other words, while maternity results from childbirth and is certain, paternity is always uncertain. In Seychelles, the filiation of a child born of a married couple is automatic at the moment of his registration of birth. In contrast, the filiation of a child born outside marriage must be established in either of two ways: by voluntary formal acknowledgement by the father or by a court order. <br /> Rescinding a paternity acknowledgement (desaveu de paternité) is also provided for by the law and may be made by anyone having a lawful interest therein.</p> <p>The facts of the present case</p> <p>The Respondent, Jacques Bacco, married the Second Appellant, Albertine Bacco on 13 December 2014 in Madagascar. On 10 December 2014, previous to the marriage and (it would appear from the evidence in the court below) in contemplation of the marriage, he acknowledged the First Appellant, Albertine’s Bacco’s child, A.B. as his son despite the latter not being his biological child. The parties travelled back and lived in Seychelles, first together as a family and then separately. Jacques Bacco divorced Albertine Bacco on 6 April 2017 with a decree absolute of the same pronounced on 6 June 2017.<br /> Jacques Bacco filed a plaint on 14 July 2017 in which he prayed the court to disavow his paternity of A.B. and to order A.B. to stop bearing his name “Bacco”.<br /> In her statement of defence in the court below, Albertine Bacco admitted that Jacques Bacco was not the father of A.B. but that he had nevertheless voluntarily acknowledged the child as his own under the laws of Madagascar. She further averred that A.B. subsequent to the acknowledgement of paternity by Jacques Bacco, a Seychellois citizen, automatically secured Seychellois nationality and was issued with a Seychellois passport and identity card and that the present action would result in him losing his nationality and becoming stateless. She further averred that A.B.’s rights were protected under Article 31 of the Constitution of Seychelles and that the Chief Civil Officer of the Civil Status Office of Seychelles had no power to rectify an Act of Birth drawn up and registered in Madagascar.<br /> In a seven paragraph judgment delivered on 20 July 2018, Govinden J, as he then was, stated, inter alia:</p> <p>“[3] Article 339 of the Civil Code of Seychelles Act provides that the recognition by a father or mother and all claims on the part of the child may be contested by all those having a lawful interest therein. The Author of the recognition (which in this case is the Plaintiff) is allowed to contest his own recognition even though that recognition has been effected by an authentic document. The reason for this rule is that the recognition has value only in so far as it corresponds to the truth. Vide Jurrisclasseur Civil Articles 335 and 339 verbo Filiation Naturelle paragraphs 143 and 155 D.A. 1913. 1.83 DH I 932.540. However, the child who has been recognised has a right of action as against the author of the untruthful recognition for the prejudice that he may have suffered therefrom. Vide A. Sauzier in Cosimo Centaro v/s Jones Dorothy Anne Centaro and Jeanine Vel (1981) SCR P209.<br />  <br /> [4] It is abundantly evident from the averments in the Plaint and Statement of Defence and the evidence of the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant that the Plaintiff was not the father of the 1st Defendant and that the recognition of the 1st Defendant by the Plaintiff does not represent the truth.<br />  <br /> [5] Accordingly, I therefore order that the Plaintiff is not the father of the 1st Defendant and that the 1st Defendant should stop bearing the surname "Bacco".<br />  <br /> [6] I am aware of the consequence of this order on the 1st Defendant. That it may lead to him losing the Seychellois nationality or even possibly render him stateless. However, to my mind these are only consequential to the matter at hand. The right of the Plaintiff under Article 339 cannot be denied because of its effect that it may have on the 1st Defendant (sic). In balancing the interest of the parties in this case the Court has to ensure that at the end of the day the truth prevails above possible fraud in official transaction which has to be averted at all cost (sic). The 1st Defendant may or may not lose his Seychellois nationality and hence be rendered stateless, however is a separate legal procedure that is not the subject matter of this case before the Court.”<br />  <br /> The appeal</p> <p>It is against this decision that the mother and child in the suit below have appealed and filed the following four grounds to this court: </p> <p>1. The learned judge had no power to order that the 1st Appellant should stop bearing the name “Bacco” since the said name was registered under the civil laws of Madagascar and not the Civil Status Act of Seychelles.<br />  <br /> 2. In ordering the 1st Appellant to stop bearing the name “Bacco” the learned judge failed to take into consideration the seriousness of the consequences resulting from the Respondent’s untruthful recognition of the 1st Appellant.<br />  <br /> 3. The learned judge failed to further take into consideration the provisions of the Children Act and the right of minors under the constitution in coming to his decision.<br />  <br /> 4. The learned judge ought to have awarded costs to the Appellants.<br />  <br />             I deal with the grounds of appeal together.<br />  <br /> The Appellants’ submissions</p> <p>With regard to the grounds of appeal, the mother and child have submitted that the act of recognising the child, A. B., by Jacques Bacco in the jurisdiction of Madagascar precludes an application for the disavowal of paternity of A.B. in the jurisdiction of Seychelles. They submit that judicial proceedings for the same would have to be instituted in Madagascar according to its laws. <br /> They have also submitted that if the best interests of the child were taken into account according to the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution (the right to the special protection of minors) and section 3 of the Children Act (consideration to be given to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child throughout childhood), this would trump Article 339 of the Civil Code (the contestation of recognition by the father) which the Respondent has relied on. </p> <p>The Respondent’s Submissions</p> <p>Counsel for Jacques Bacco, on the other hand, has in the court below and in this court submitted that this was a marriage of convenience. Mr and Mrs Bacco had communicated on the phone and physically met only 2 weeks before they were married. Proceedings for recognition of the child had started before the marriage. After their return to Seychelles, they lived for a short time together (4 months) together and then Mrs Bacco went to work at Silhouette after which Mr Bacco only saw the boy intermittently.  </p> <p>The Law</p> <p>Our laws provide for the claim of status, for the revocation of status and for rights of standing for both. In particular, the Civil Code provides:</p> <p>Article 334<br /> “The recognition of an illegitimate child shall be made by an authentic document, if it has not been made in the act of birth.<br />  It may also be made by a declaration signed or marked before a Judge, a Magistrate, a civil status officer or the Registrar of the Supreme Court.<br /> …<br />  Article 339.<br /> “The recognition by a father or mother and all claims on the part of the child may be contested by all those having a lawful interest therein.”<br />  </p> <p>The provisions of the Civil Status Act also provide for the amendment of acts of status, specifically in this regard, section 100 states: </p> <p>“A judge may, upon the written application of the Chief Officer of the Civil Status or any party, order the amendment without any fee, stamp or registration due of any act whenever such judge shall be satisfied that any error has been committed in any such act or in the registration thereof. Nothing herein contained shall prevent any interested person from asking by action before the Supreme Court for the rectification or cancellation of any act.”<br />  </p> <p>It must also be noted that the Civil Status Act also provides that: </p> <p>10. (1) The Chief Officer of the Civil Status shall register or cause to be registered all births, marriages and deaths and all other acts connected with the civil status in the Republic of Seychelles. (emphasis added)<br />  <br /> Discussion</p> <p>Although not directly relevant to the issues, in this case, Mr Bacco alleges that this was a marriage of convenience. However, this is not borne out by his evidence: He testified that they returned together as a family to Seychelles in December 2014. The following is an informative extract of the transcript of proceedings (P. 26) proceedings:</p> <p>Q…when did Ms Albertine or yourself leave the marital home<br /> A.  She left home on the 10 of August.<br />  <br /> Q. Which year?<br /> A. 2015<br />  <br /> Q. And where did she live after she left home?<br /> A. She said she was going to work on Silhouette and I told her “I did not send you to Silhouette.”<br />  <br /> Q. Had the relationship ended at that point?<br /> A. It was not completely over.<br />  <br /> Q. So how long after your marriage did your relationship end completely with Ms Albertine<br /> A. On the 30 October 2016 … she would get off on Saturdays for us to go to the mass ceremony at the church. I went to meet her at her eldest sister’s place but her sister was not there. The little boy was with me by the time I went to meet up with her, she took the child and put him inside the house and I told her we would go home to my place and this is how it usually works. But that day she closed the door in my face and for my years of living, I can say this disturbed me quite a lot…<br />  <br /> Q. Why do you wish to have [the child] disavowed?<br /> A. Today I got separated with this lady and I want to move forward and start over…”<br />  </p> <p>To all intents and purposes, this was a marital relationship with a focus on a family unit. The conflict and breakdown of the marital relationship arose from Mrs Bacco obtaining employment on a different island to where the family was living.<br /> The fact remains however that both Mr and Mrs Bacco agree that A.B. was not Mr Bacco’s son and that the recognition of A.B. by him was a sham. That would ordinarily suffice to set aside the declaration of recognition. <br /> However, the grounds of appeal as I understand them do not dispute the fact that according to the above-stated provisions of the Civil Code, and the specific facts of this case even a father can disavow a child he has voluntarily acknowledged as his own. The most important submissions of Mrs Bacco and A.B. are to the effect that the courts of this land have no jurisdiction over acts drawn up and registered in Madagascar. <br /> In other words, this is a conflict of laws issue - whether courts of this land are competent to hear a case concerning the status of an individual registered in another country.<br /> Acts of status of this nature have formed the subject matter of two relevant and specific cases in this jurisdiction and although not on all fours with the present case are informative on the issue this court is concerned with.<br /> In the case of Ex-Parte D. B. A Minor (1989) SLR 144, a Seychellois mother of a child born to her in Beirut on 14 June 1987 applied in 1988 in Seychelles for an order of the court to have the birth of the child registered in the Civil Status Office ofSeychelles. She had sought to do so under the provisions of section 32 (2) of the Civil Status Act relating to the registration of births outside the stipulated 30-day delay after birth. The court ruled that the law provides that such declaration shall be made “before the officer of the district where the child is born.” Reference was made to section 30 (now section 29) of the Act which provides that:</p> <p> “Any act of civil status drawn up in any country out of Seychelles shall be deemed valid as an act of the civil status if it has been drawn up in accordance with the law in force in such country.”<br />  </p> <p>Seaton CJ stated that these provisions read with section 10 of the Act (see above at paragraph 13) acknowledged that apart from acts of birth in Seychelles, the duties of the Chief Officer of the Civil Status include extra-territorial jurisdiction with respect to vessels registered in Seychelles during any voyage when a ship is not in any harbour in Seychelles. He emphasised the application of the condition of what he termed ‘localisation’ with regard to the registration of acts of status.<br /> In my view, the localisation principle is subsumed within the larger concept of comity which would impose on Seychelles the duty to respect the laws of another country.<br /> In the event, the court in D. B. refused to register the birth despite its great sympathy for the situation in which the child was placed.<br /> In the case of Ex-Parte Cecile Bonne  Ch 100/1993 (unreported), a Seychellois grandmother of a child attempted to register the birth of her granddaughter who had been born in Lebanon and who had entered Seychelles on a laissez-passer and left in her care. The Honorary Consul for Seychelles in Lebanon in a letter informed the Department of External Affairs that all relevant records had been destroyed during the civil disturbances there and that there was no possibility of obtaining a birth certificate in respect of the little girl in any way. Perera J as he then was, reiterated the localisation principle as laid down by Seaton CJ in D. B. and stated that the registration of a foreign birth in Seychelles was impossible under the provisions of the Civil Status Act.<br /> It is my view, therefore, that by logical extension the same principle must apply to all acts of civil status registered in a foreign country. Seychelles is not alone in this respect.  A similar case arose recently in France in Cass. 1re civ., 15 mai 2019, no 18-12602, FS–PBI. A child born in Barcelona, Spain to a French father was recognised by him in the register of the civil status of Barcelona. Years later after the death of the father, his other children in France attempted to have the child’s paternity revoked through a DNA test. The Cour de Cassation overturned the decision of the Cour d’Appel de Montpelier which had granted the application, finding in conformity with the Code Civil (the provisions of which are similar to section 30 of our Civil Status Act) that: </p> <p>« La reconnaissance volontaire de paternité ou de maternité est valable si elle a été faite en conformité, soit de la loi personnelle de son auteur, soit de la loi personnelle de l’enfant ».<br />  </p> <p>At the time the recognition was made it was the laws of Spain that applied and would continue to apply until and unless the act was revoked in that jurisdiction.<br /> The remedy sought by Mr Bacco in Seychelles, namely the revocation of his acknowledgement of paternity of A. B., would have the consequence of making null and void the acknowledgement of paternity as if it had never been registered or that it existed in Madagascar. This court cannot assume universal jurisdiction on the issue of status registered in another country.<br /> However, given the fact that both Mr and Mrs Bacco admitted in court that A.B. is not Mr Bacco’s son the court takes notice of this judicial admission and an order to that effect can be made in this jurisdiction. Under Article 1356 Of the Civil Code, three consequences flow from such a judicial admission: it is good against the person making it, it is irrevocable and it is indivisible. Such an admission is therefore binding in this jurisdiction and may be relied on to negate any prospective inheritance claim against Mr Bacco’s estate on his death in Seychelles. However, I cannot say whether it would be binding in Madagascar as it must be emphasised that insofar as A. B.’s birth certificate or status based on his birth is concerned, this Court has no jurisdiction to order any amendment to it nor make any changes in respect of the child using the surname Bacco.<br /> For present purposes, it would be academic to consider ground 3 of the appeal but for completeness sake, I propose to deal with the issue in brief if only to commence a debate on the subject. The issue is an important one: would the rights of minors as protected by Article 31 of the Constitution and the provisions of the Children Act supersede the provisions of the Civil Status Act when it would result in the deprivation of the status and citizenship of a Seychellois child. In the present case, the most egregious consequences would occur - the deprivation of Seychellois citizenship of A.B. Until the 25 January 2017, Malagasy mothers were only permitted to confer nationality on children born in wedlock, in other words, Madagascar did not recognise a mothers’ independent right to confer nationality on children. However, in practice, discriminatory administrative practice persists and may Malagasy children born outside wedlock remain stateless (See on this issue The Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, The World’s Stateless Children <a href="https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r36668.pdf">https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r36668.pdf</a> and Focus Development Association, Global Campaign for Equal Nationality Rights and Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion: Joint Submission to the Human Rights Council at the 34th Session of the Universal Periodic Review (Third Cycle, November 2019) <a href="https://files.institutesi.org/UPR34_Madagascar.pdf">https://files.institutesi.org/UPR34_Madagascar.pdf</a>). In this respect, it must be noted that Madagascar is not a party to the 1954 or 1961 Statelessness Conventions.<br /> Article 31 of the Constitution of Seychelles recognises the right of children and young persons to special protection and to ensure the effective exercise of that right makes several undertakings including ensuring special protection against social, economic, physical and moral dangers to which they might be exposed. No restrictions are imposed on that right as opposed to other rights in the Charter. Article 32 of the Constitution also protects the family recognising it as the fundamental element of society.<br /> Further section 2A of the Children Act imposes a duty on courts in determining any question with respect to the upbringing of a child, to have as its primary consideration, the child’s wellbeing.<br /> Undoubtedly the paternity of the child, in this case, would have an impact on its well-being as it might result in the child losing his name, status and citizenship. These are draconian consequences. The Ministère Public was joined to the suit in the court below but its intervention was scant and neither addressed the rights of the child under the Constitution or the applicability of the provisions of the Children Act to the case. This is regrettable as it would have assisted the court on this important issue. We wish to note that in matters occasioning the deprivation of citizenship, child-specific submissions need to be made on the issue.   <br /> The European Court of Human Rights in both the cases of the case of Görgülü v. Germany, no. 74969/01, § 43, 26 February 2004) and Krisztián Barnabás Tóth v Hungary, n° 48494/06, February 12, 2013), stated that consideration of what lies in the best interest of the child concerned is of paramount importance in every case of this kind; depending on their nature and seriousness, the child’s best interests may override those of the parents.<br /> The French Court of Cassation in overturning the decision of the Court of Appeal of  Saint-Denis, Réunion of 28 August 2007 implicitly recognized that it may be in the interests of the child to maintain filiation which does not correspond to biological reality (Arrêt n° 630 du 16 juin 2011 (08-20.475)<br /> These cases recognise the discretionary power of the judge in determining the child’s best interests while ensuring a fair balance of conflicting interests. It is my opinion that this issue was live in the court below and was raised in the pleadings and addressed in the submissions of the Appellants. These competing interests ought to have been considered by the learned trial judge.<br /> However, as we have already ruled that the appeal partly succeeds on the first and second grounds of appeal, my consideration of ground 3 is now moot.<br /> Ground 4 was not pursued at the appeal and is therefore disregarded. </p> <p>Decision and Orders</p> <p>For all the above reasons, this appeal partly succeeds and the Order of the Supreme Court as contained in paragraph 5 of the judgment is substituted by the following Order of this Court: </p> <p>The Court declares that Jacques Patrick Bacco is not the father of A.B.</p> <p>I make no order as to costs in the appeal.</p> <p> <br />  <br />  <br /> ____________           <br /> Dr. Mathilda Twomey JA<br />  <br /> I concur                                                                                  A. Fernando PCA<br />  <br /> ROBINSON JA<br />  <br /> [40]    I agree with the conclusion reached by Twomey J.A that this appeal partly succeeds insofar as the Court of Appeal declares that the Respondent is not the father of the minor child Ali Maolana Bacco.  I make no order as to costs<br />  <br /> _____________<br /> Robinson JA<br /> Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 9 July 2021.<br />  </p></span></div></div> </div> </div> Thu, 23 Jun 2022 08:05:38 +0000 Anonymous 4291 at http://old2.seylii.org Accouche v Hoareau (SCA 35 of 2019) [2021] SCCA 71 (17 December 2021); http://old2.seylii.org/sc/judgment/court-appeal/2021/71 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">Accouche v Hoareau (SCA 35 of 2019) [2021] SCCA 71 (17 December 2021);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/159" hreflang="x-default">Family Law</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Anonymous (not verified)</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Thu, 06/23/2022 - 08:02</span> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-field-search-summary field--type-text-with-summary field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Search summary</div> <div class="field__item"><p>Dingake JA - Adjustment property orders after divorce, section 20(1)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, abolishing of community in property, jointly owned matrimonial property, property owned solely by one of the spouses     Robinson JA – Rule 31 of the Seychelles Court of Appeal Rules, 2005, as amended – Case remitted to the Supreme Court for fresh hearing</p> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-field-headnote-and-holding field--type-text-long field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Headnote and holding</div> <div class="field__item"><p>The appeal succeeds.  The  order of  the  court  below granting the Respondent ownership of C 3992 is hereby quashed and set aside.We enter judgment in favour of the Appellant, namely that he is granted sole ownership of parcel C 3992.We further affirm  that  the  Respondent  is  entitled to 50% of the jointly owned C 3963 and C 7772.There is no order as to costs.</p> </div> </div> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-pdf file--application-pdf"> <a href="https://media.seylii.org/files/judgments/scca/2021/71/2021-scca-71_1.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=966686">2021-scca-71.pdf</a></span> </div> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.seylii.org/files/judgments/scca/2021/71/2021-scca-71_1.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=67148">2021-scca-71.docx</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><p>IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF SEYCHELLES</p> <p> </p> <p>Reportable<br /> [2021] SCCA 71  17 December 2021<br /> SCA 35/2019<br /> (Appeal from MA 198/2017)<br /> (Arising in DV 04/2016)<br />  <br />  <br />  <br /> Benet Duncan Accouche                                                      Appellant      <br /> (rep. by Mr. Joel Camille)<br />  <br />  <br /> and<br /> Audrey Hoareau                                                                   Respondent<br /> (rep. by Mr. Bryan Julie)</p> <p> </p> <p>Neutral Citation: Accouche v Hoareau (SCA 35/2019) [2021]  SCCA 71 (Appeal from MA 198/2017) (Arising in DV 04/2016)<br />   17 December 2021<br /> Before:                   Robinson JA, Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza JA, Dingake JA<br /> Summary:             Dingake JA - Adjustment property orders after divorce, section 20(1)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, abolishing of community in property, jointly owned matrimonial property, property owned solely by one of the spouses      <br />                                 Robinson JA – Rule 31 of the Seychelles Court of Appeal Rules, 2005, as amended – Case remitted to the Supreme Court for fresh hearing<br /> Heard:                    6 December 2021<br /> Delivered:              17 December 2021<br />  <br /> ______________________________________________________________________________<br /> ORDER</p> <p>The appeal succeeds.  The  order of  the  court  below granting the Respondent ownership of C 3992 is hereby quashed and set aside.<br /> We enter judgment in favour of the Appellant, namely that he is granted sole ownership of parcel C 3992.<br /> We further affirm  that  the  Respondent  is  entitled to 50% of the jointly owned C 3963 and C 7772.<br /> There is no order as to costs.</p> <p>___________________________________________________________________________<br /> JUDGMENT<br /> _____________________________________________________________________________<br /> DR. O. DINGAKE, JA<br /> INTRODUCTION </p> <p>This appeal concerns division of property following divorce.<br /> The Appellant (Respondent in the Supreme Court) is Benet Duncan Accouche and the Respondent (Petitioner in the Supreme Court) is Audrey Hoareau.<br /> The parties met in 1996 and were married from 2003 until 2016 when their divorce order was made absolute. The family has three properties: jointly owned parcels C3963 (where matrimonial home is built) and adjoining C7772; and parcel C3992, which is solely owned by Mr Accouche.<br /> The parties have two children who are residing with their mother, the Respondent, in an accommodation provided to her by the employer. The Appellant has been solely occupying the matrimonial home since the parties’ divorce.<br /> In 2017 Ms Hoareau applied to the Supreme Court for orders of transfer of land parcel C3992 to her with full lawful and beneficial ownership and sole occupancy. According to Ms Hoareau land parcel C3992 was part of the matrimonial property together with the other two land parcels C3963 and C7772.<br /> Mr Accouche disagrees and has filed a counter claim asking the Court to dismiss the Petitioner’s claim for ownership of C3992 and to make an order under section 20 (1) (g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act in his favour and that, among other prayers, the Court declare his share in C3963 and C7772 to be over and above 50% and that Ms Hoareau has no share in C3992.<br /> On the 29th of May 2019 the Court delivered Judgment in favour of the Petitioner, granting her ownership of C3992 subject to any compensation for the current market value to be paid to Mr Accouche after valuation of the properties.<br /> Mr Accouche, prays that the Court of Appeal makes an order reversing the learned Judge’s decision and enter judgment in favour of the Appellant on the basis of the Appellant’s Counter Application in the case.</p> <p>Background – Family Assets<br /> Parcels C3963 and C7772</p> <p>The Appellant and the Respondent aver that they both jointly own parcel of land C3963 (Exhibit P2) where their matrimonial home is located. The parties also jointly own land C7772 which is adjoining to C3963. The C7772 plot was still not formally transferred to the parties, although paid for (see pages D6, D7, D8 of the Court of Appeal Bundles). The said properties were bought during their marriage.<br /> The parties took a joint loan in 2006 for the purchase of C3963 (Exhibit P3) for SCR632,000. The price of land as per Exhibit P2 was SCR765,000 and the Appellant averred that he was the one who paid the difference. The parties took another loan in 2010 for the purchase of C7772 and refinancing the C3963 Purchase Loan (Exhibit P15). The security was the C3963 land.</p> <p>Parcel C3992</p> <p>The land parcel C3992 is owned solely by the Appellant (Exhibits P1 and D7) and was bought in 1997, just about one year after the parties met. Property was bought prior to their marriage, which was in 2003. The Appellant stated that he took a loan to buy the said property (Exhibit D9). The Loan was for SCR150,000 repayable at SCR5,348 per month together with “a negotiation fee of SCR1,500” charged to his account. Charge over the land was registered in 1997 (Exhibit D10).<br /> The Appellant stated during the Supreme Court proceedings that he solely discharged the said loan and the Respondent did not contribute anything toward the acquisition of the C3992 or loan repayments (page 168 of the Court of Appeal Bundle). The Official Discharge of Charge (Exhibit D11) is dated 27th October 2015 (stamped 20.11.2015), which was just about one year prior to the divorce. The Appellant, though, explained that the SCR150,000 loan was actually discharged earlier than 2015 and that he paid it off in about 5 years (pages 169-170). He stated that the discharge is not automatic and only later he realised that the property was still subject to the charge. If that is so, the Appellant could have discharged the charge in 2002-2003 (prior to or around the time the parties got married).<br /> The Discharge of Charge states that 2 charges were discharged – Entry No.3 for the sum of SCR150,000 and Entry No. 4 for the sum of SCR110,000. The sum of SCR150,000 most likely refers to the initial loan that the Appellant took to purchase the land. From the provided documents by the parties, land parcel C3992 was also collateral in the loan taken solely by the Respondent in 2006 (Exhibit P6). The loan was for SCR110,000 creating mortgage over C3992 plus “householder’s insurance with B.I.N.” The document which indicates that the Respondent has consented to his property being subject to the mortgage is not attached. Therefore, Entry 4 Charge is most likely the said loan, which was discharged in 2015 according to the Discharge of Charge document.<br /> The land was further subject to the joint loan taken by the parties for ‘Home Improvements’ in 2008 (Exhibit P5). The loan was for SCR269,200 and states that the assets to be charged is “C3992 RSC R260,000”.<br /> From the Discharge of Charge it appears that the initial loan taken by the Appellant and subsequent loan taken solely by the Respondent were discharged. The Respondent seemed to aver that since the loan was taken in her name against the property, somehow, she is entitled to the share in it. The issue of on which basis the bank permitted her to take loan using property belonging to another as collateral and whether the Appellant has consented to it was not elaborated upon further; and therefore there is no indication that simply because the land was put as collateral in the loan taken in her name, she somehow acquired the share in the property.<br /> Both parties stated that they intended to build a matrimonial home on C3992 but due to issues with access to road at that time, they did not proceed and instead jointly purchased C3963 where matrimonial home was built. The land parcel C3992 appears to be empty with no dwelling upon it.</p> <p> <br /> The Truck</p> <p>The Respondent stated during the Supreme Court proceedings that some of the money from joint ‘Home Improvement’ loan (Exhibit P5) abovementioned were used to buy a truck, which was owned solely by the Appellant and later sold by him for SCR170,000. According to the Respondent she has not received any portion of the proceeds of sale and the Appellant used it to finance a business loan (see pages 38-40 of the CA Bundle). During the course of proceedings, the Respondent abandoned arguments regarding portion from proceeds of sale for the truck in exchange that she only wants a property. The truck was mentioned in her Affidavit in support of the Petition, but was not included in the Petition itself.</p> <p>Evaluation of C3963, C7772 and C3992</p> <p>During the Supreme Court proceedings Ms Hoareau stated that some time back C3963 was evaluated for SCR2,000,000; C7772 – for SCR450,000; and C3992 – for SCR3,000,000 (page 40-44 of the Court of Appeal Bundle). The Valuation Report (P15, Item, Item 2) contains valuation of C3963 and C7772 only (Item 2, valuation in 2011 contains the same amount as per testimony). Valuation for C3992 is not enclosed. It should be noted that the Supreme Court has ordered for the Valuer to be appointed twice, in 2018 and 2019 (see Order at pages 78 and 221), however, there is no recent Valuation Report enclosed with the file. From the proceedings on the 29th May 2019, which was the date for the judgment (page 216) it appears that the Report was still not provided, therefore at paragraph [17] of the Judgment the Trial Judge further ordered that valuation be carried out and compensation be made if either of the party’s share exceeds the value of the properties granted to them.<br /> To sum up, the family assets are parcel C3963, where matrimonial home is built with adjoining land C7772 (subject to formal transfer of title). These properties are jointly owned by parties and bought during marriage (via loan). The land parcel C3992 was purchased by Mr Accouche in 1997, some nine years prior to the marriage. The property is in his sole name. Ms Hoareau was willing to let go of the claim over truck if she can get the property. Mr Accouche has indicated willingness to give Ms Hoareau C7772 plot of land, which is much less than half a share in jointly owned property.<br /> The Trial Judge has treated all three properties being part of matrimonial property and held that parties are entitled each one to 50% share each in the matrimonial property. As the Petitioner only asked for C3992 property, the Trial Judge has granted the full legal and beneficial ownership of the said land parcel to the Petitioner.</p> <p> <br /> GROUNDS OF APPEAL</p> <p>The Appellant submitted seven grounds of appeal in the Notice of Appeal. These grounds may be conveniently grouped and linked to the main issues in contention.<br /> Issue 1: Which property is considered to be matrimonial property and whether C3992 can be subject to property adjustment order, considering it is owned by the Appellant:</p> <p>Ground 1 – C3992 was purchased by the Appellant before marriage and could not have been considered as matrimonial property;<br /> Ground 2 – Failure to assess evidence in coming to the decision to award the Respondent 50% share in C3992;<br /> Ground 4 – Bias in ignoring Appellant’s case on his Counter Application in decision to award C3992 to the Respondent;</p> <p>Issue 2: What are the shares of the parties in the jointly owned properties and whether the Appellant’s share should be larger:</p> <p>Ground 3 – Appellant was sole person paying outstanding loan in relation to C7772 and C3963 since 2006 and accordingly had greater share in joint property;<br /> Ground 5 – Greater contribution in acquisition of jointly owned properties, C7772 and C3963;<br /> Ground 6 – Failure to consider Appellant’s willingness to compromise for the Respondent to be awarded C7772 along with the apportionments in monetary terms;<br /> Ground 7 – Emphasis on consideration of school fees being paid by the Respondent and that same would have relieved the burden on the Appellant.</p> <p>Prior to the analysis of the main issues it should be noted that the Petitioner (now Respondent) had applied to the Supreme Court to make orders under “rule 4”, which probably means Subsidiary Legislation: Section 27: Matrimonial Causes Rules (see B1 from the Court of Appeal Bundle), Rule 4: Claim for ancillary relief not included in the petition. The Petitioner appears to be referring to paragraphs (f), (j), (h) of Rule 4.<br /> In Freminot v Pauline (MA 169/2019 (arising in DS159/2016)) [2020] SCSC 190 (10 March 2020) the respondent moved for dismissal of the application on the basis that the applicant has failed to request leave of the Court as per Rule 34(1) of the Rules and the application was outside the prescribed time. Rule 34(1) states:</p> <p>“Payment for spouse and relief in respect of property<br /> 34.        (1) An application for a periodical payment or lump sum payment in accordance with rule 4(1) (b) or (c) or in relation to property in accordance with rule 4(1) (f), (h), (i) or (j) where a prayer for the same has not been included in the petition for divorce or nullity of marriage, may be made by the petitioner at any time after the expiration of the time for appearance to the petition, but no application shall be made later than two months after order absolute except by leave.”</p> <p>The Court in Freminot v Pauline dismissed the application with costs, however, reserved the right to consider any further application for ancillary relief under the Matrimonial Causes Act and Rules and cautioned the Counsel to ensure compliance with the provisions of the said Act and Rules.<br /> In  the case of Boniface v Malvina (SCA 41/2017) [2020] SCCA 11 (21 August 2020), the court noted the same irregularity in the proceedings in the Supreme Court (see paragraphs [8] and [13]) and stated that, “the correct course of action would have been for the plaint to be dismissed and for an action to be brought under the MCA for the division of the house pursuant to the MCA – seeking leave from the Court to do so out of time”.<br /> Similar issue appears to be in the present case, where the Divorce Order was made absolute on 3rd August 2016 (page F of the CA Bundle) and Petition (B1-B2) was brought almost year later, in June 2017. The Court of Appeal Bundle does not have application for leave of Court in order to proceed with application outside the prescribed time. This point, however, was not brought up by the parties, and need not concern us.</p> <p>Issue 1: Which property is considered to be matrimonial property and whether C3992 can be subject to property adjustment order, considering it is owned by the Appellant</p> <p>Community of property between spouses in Seychelles was abolished and unless spouses enter into a marriage settlement, property acquired by one spouse with their own money or resources remains personal property (Maurel v Maurel (1998-1999) SCAR 57, Etienne v Constance (1977) SLR 233 at 240; Albert v Albert (MA 39/2019 (arising in DV 97/2018)) [2020] SCSC 618 (01 September 2020) at paragraphs [91]-[93]).<br /> Section 20 of the Matrimonial Causes Act (the “MCA”) provides for ancillary relief upon divorce and gives the court the power to order a settlement as appears appropriate to remedy an unfairness upon divorce:</p> <p>Financial relief<br /> 20.        (1) Subject to section 24, on the granting of a conditional order of divorce or nullity or an order of separation, or at any time thereafter, the court may, after making such inquiries as the court thinks fit and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the ability and financial means of the parties to the marriage-<br /> . . .<br /> g) make such order, as the court thinks fit, in respect of any property of a party to a marriage or any interest or right of a party in any property for the benefit of the other party or a relevant child.</p> <p>Established case law indicates that the powers of the Court under section 20 are wide. In Renaud v. Gaetan SCA 48/1998 the Court of Appeal stated the following regarding the Court’s powers under section 20 (1) (g):</p> <p>“the powers of the Court pursuant to Section 20 (1) (g) of the Act must be read within the context of the totality of Section 20 of the Act which is designed for the grant of financial relief.  Such relief may consist of some periodical payments (Section 20 (1) (d) or lump sum payment (Section 21 (1) (e)) for the benefit of relevant child or property adjustment order (Section 21 (g).)<br /> The purpose of the provisions of the subsections is to ensure that upon dissolution of the marriage, a party to a marriage is not put at an unfair disadvantage in relation to the other, by reason of the breakdown of the marriage and or as far as possible, to enable the party applying to maintain a fair and reasonable standard of living, commensurate with or near the standard the parties have maintained before dissolution.”</p> <p>The case of Finesse v Banane (1981) SLR 103 established that under section 20 the Court can order either spouse to pay to the other a lump sum under or direct one party to transfer to the other party such property as may be specified under section 20. In making either of the orders the court may have regard to the contributions made by each party to the welfare of the family, including any contributions made by looking after the home or caring for the family. It was emphasised that the court should seek to place parties, so far as is practicable and just to do so, in the financial position in which they would have been if the marriage had not broken down and each had properly discharged the financial obligations and responsibilities towards each other (see also Florentine v Florentine (1990) SLR 141, which in addition held that it is desirable that the financial and proprietary interests of the parties should be determined with finality so  that the parties may make a “clean break”).<br /> In Boniface v Malvina (SCA 41/2017 ) [2020] SCCA 11 (21 August 2020) the Court of Appeal stated that the Supreme Court was wrong in relying on US, French and English law in order to define ‘matrimonial property’ and that it was not necessary to identify whether the property is ‘matrimonial property’. It was stated that under section 20 for the purposes of applying the MCA, the Court should not refer to ‘matrimonial property’, but simply ‘property of a party to a marriage’. It was held that the house in question was within the scope of the MCA and it did not matter whether the property was bought by the respondent before marriage.<br /> It was also held in Desaubin v Perriol (1996) SLR 90 that under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1992, the court has the power to vary and divide a property registered in the name of one party to a marriage if circumstances warrant such a division. The Court stated that the question is “what are the respective contributions of the parties”.<br /> The case of Pillay v Pillay and Pillay v Pillay (MA 322/2016 and MA 43/2016 (consolidated) (arising in CS78/2015)) [2017] SCSC 545 (27 June 2017) involved several properties in dispute, one of which was bought by the petitioner before the marriage (Parcel J1606). With regards to distinguishing between previously held property and matrimonial property, the Court cited Lord Nicholls’ comments in White v White [2001] 1 AC 596 (at paragraph [47]): </p> <p> “42. This distinction is a recognition of the view, widely but not universally held, that property owned by one spouse before the marriage, and inherited property whenever acquired, stand on a different footing from what may be loosely called matrimonial property. According to this view, on a breakdown of the marriage these two classes of property should not necessarily be treated in the same way. Property acquired before marriage and inherited property acquired during marriage come from a source wholly external to the marriage. In fairness, where this property still exists, the spouse to whom it was given should be allowed to keep it. Conversely, the other spouse has a weaker claim to such property than he or she may have regarding matrimonial property.<br /> 43. Plainly, when present, this factor is one of the circumstances of the case. It represents a contribution made to the welfare of the family by one of the parties to the marriage. The judge should take it into account. He should decide how important it is in the particular case. The nature and value of the property, and the time when and circumstances in which the property was acquired, are among the relevant matters to be considered. However, in the ordinary course, this factor can be expected to carry little weight, if any, in a case where the claimant's financial needs cannot be met without recourse to this property.”<br />  </p> <p>It is now established law that in assessing the parties’ share in the property the Court needs to consider not just the monetary contribution (see also Lesperance v Lesperance SCA 3 of 2001). In Samori v Charles (2012) SLR 371 the Court of Appeal stated:</p> <p>“We have no reason to interfere with any of the above findings of fact made by the learned Trial Judge as regards the financial contributions made by the two parties to the marriage.  But a marriage is not only about financial contributions, it is also about love, of friendship, of security, of commitment, of moral and emotional support; which combine together to make a success of the lives of the two people to the marriage.  These are matters that cannot easily be measured in monetary terms and also cannot be ignored when a court is called upon to make a determination on matrimonial property.”</p> <p>It follows from the above that although community of property was abolished, the property solely owned by one of the spouse can be taken into account by the Court in property adjustment orders under section 20 where it is just and necessary to ensure a party to a marriage is not put at an unfair advantage in relation to the other party. The Court therefore can order that some share in the property solely owned by one party be granted to the other spouse. The Court needs to consider various circumstance of the parties and in order to assess the share of each party, the Court needs to take into account the contributions of the parties, including monetary and non-monetary contributions.</p> <p>Analysis – C3992</p> <p>Since there is no community of property in Seychelles, arguably, the C3992 bought solely by the Appellant prior to marriage, should solely belong to the Appellant and not be included in the matrimonial property pot for division between the parties. On the other hand, given wide powers of the Court to make property adjustment order under section 20 and the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Boniface v Malvina (supra) and Arissol v Pillay (supra), the property which was bought prior to marriage and is solely owned may be subject to the order since the order can be made in respect of any property of a party to a marriage or any interest or right of a party in any property for the benefit of the other party. The above cited decisions also support the findings that share in a property bought solely by one party even prior to the marriage can be awarded to the other spouse.<br /> In many cases such property in dispute may also have a matrimonial home built upon it, which is not the case in the present suit. The matrimonial home of the parties in this case is built on the jointly owned land and since divorce has been occupied and solely enjoyed by the Appellant. There is no house built on C3992.<br /> In our opinion, if the Appellant has indeed discharged the loan taken to purchase the land within 5 years from the sale date, therefore, before the marriage to the Respondent, the land should not be included in the matrimonial pot for division as the Respondent has not contributed to the purchase of the land; the parties have not built anything on it together; and there are other two plots of land jointly owned by the parties.<br /> We are satisfied that granting half share in jointly owned property is sufficient to ensure fairness upon divorce, there should be no need to include C3992 for division.</p> <p>Issue 2: What are the shares of the parties in the jointly owned properties, namely C3963 and C7772, and whether the Appellant’s share should be larger </p> <p>As noted earlier both parties agree that C3963 and C7772 are jointly owned (subject to formal transfer of C7772). The parties did not provide a Title Deed, however, provided Transfer of Land document which states that land is transferred to “Bennet Duncun Accouche and Audrey Eline Accouche”. The document does not specify the nature of title that the parties hold.<br /> With regards to joint ownership of matrimonial property, it was held in Charles v Charles (2004-2005) SCAR 231 that where the parties own a house jointly, they are presumed to have intended to own the house in equal shares. The Court, however has a discretion to make orders to settle matrimonial property and such discretion is a judicial discretion that must be made in consideration of all relevant factors. It was further held that the starting-point is one of equal shares (also see Serret v Serret (2012) SLR 112). </p> <p>Analysis – C3963 and C7772</p> <p>As indicated by above case law, where matrimonial property is jointly owned the starting point is equal shares, however the court may vary the shares taking into account, among other factors, contribution by the parties, which includes non-monetary contribution.<br /> In the present case, the Appellant avers that he is entitled to larger share in the joint property than the Respondent as he has been the sole person paying the outstanding loan in relation to the properties and therefore had made greater contributions in acquisition of the matrimonial property.<br /> Both parties provided bank account statements which show some contributions into paying off the loan. The statements, however, are only for certain years during their marriage without exact indication for which exact loan payments were made. Testimony of the bank employee were also not helpful in determining which one of the parties paid exactly which sum towards the discharge of multiple loans.<br /> Furthermore, it was not denied by the Respondent that she contributed to the loan repayments only during certain years. She further stated that the spouses were in agreement to divide their expenses at certain points during their marriage, in that the Appellant would be making payments toward the loan and the Respondent would be paying for children’s school fees and household expenses. While the Respondent did not provide the invoices for the large sums of school fees, the Appellant also did not deny that the Respondent was paying the school fees. The Appellant has also provided certain receipts of payments for school and nursery fees.<br /> Taking documentary and oral evidence of financial contributions as a whole, in our opinion the Trial Judge did not err in finding that parties were entitled to equal shares of the matrimonial property, namely C3963 and C7772. This finding is further supported by the abovementioned case law which emphasises that it is not only monetary contributions that are taken into consideration by the Court in the matrimonial property adjustment orders. We are not of the opinion that the Appellant has shown that he is entitled to larger share in the jointly owned matrimonial property.</p> <p>CONCLUSION</p> <p>In all the circumstances of this case, it is our opinion that the Respondent should be entitled to 50% of the jointly owned C3963 and C7772.<br /> In the result the appeal succeeds. The order of the court below granting the Respondent ownership of C3992 is hereby quashed and set aside.<br /> We enter judgment in favour of the Appellant, namely that he is granted sole ownership of parcel C3992.<br /> We further affirm that the respondent is entitled to 50 % of the jointly owned C 3963 and C7772, and we so order. There is no order as to costs.</p> <p> </p> <p> <br /> ______________________<br /> Dr. O. Dingake, JA<br />  <br /> I concur                                                           ______________________<br />                                                                         Dr. Lillian Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza JA<br />  <br /> F. ROBINSON, JA<br />  </p> <p>The Respondent instituted these proceedings under the Matrimonial Causes Act. The Appellant resisted the Application and set up a Cross-Application.<br /> The learned Judge delivered a judgment on the 29 May 2019, which does not contain any assessment of the evidence and consideration of the Cross-Application. It is unclear on what basis the learned Judge had come to any finding in this case. It is to be observed that the learned Judge, in his judgment, sloppily ordered that a valuation be carried out.<br /> At the appeal hearing, both Counsel expressed their concerns regarding the approach of the learned Judge.<br /> After anxiously considering the proceedings in this case, including the judgment, I conclude that this is not a fit case for me to exercise powers under rule 31 of the Seychelles Court of Appeal Rules, 2005, as amended.<br /> For the reasons stated above, I set aside the orders of the learned Judge and remit the case for a fresh hearing in the Supreme Court.</p> <p> <br /> F. ROBINSON, JA<br /> Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 17 December 2021.</p> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-100f28dd4d583ce952e968c06742edc17bec6b83cd89e9daa5e69da01c06b91b"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><p>IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF SEYCHELLES</p> <p> </p> <p>Reportable<br /> [2021] SCCA 71  17 December 2021<br /> SCA 35/2019<br /> (Appeal from MA 198/2017)<br /> (Arising in DV 04/2016)<br />  <br />  <br />  <br /> Benet Duncan Accouche                                                      Appellant      <br /> (rep. by Mr. Joel Camille)<br />  <br />  <br /> and<br /> Audrey Hoareau                                                                   Respondent<br /> (rep. by Mr. Bryan Julie)</p> <p> </p> <p>Neutral Citation: Accouche v Hoareau (SCA 35/2019) [2021]  SCCA 71 (Appeal from MA 198/2017) (Arising in DV 04/2016)<br />   17 December 2021<br /> Before:                   Robinson JA, Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza JA, Dingake JA<br /> Summary:             Dingake JA - Adjustment property orders after divorce, section 20(1)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, abolishing of community in property, jointly owned matrimonial property, property owned solely by one of the spouses      <br />                                 Robinson JA – Rule 31 of the Seychelles Court of Appeal Rules, 2005, as amended – Case remitted to the Supreme Court for fresh hearing<br /> Heard:                    6 December 2021<br /> Delivered:              17 December 2021<br />  <br /> ______________________________________________________________________________<br /> ORDER</p> <p>The appeal succeeds.  The  order of  the  court  below granting the Respondent ownership of C 3992 is hereby quashed and set aside.<br /> We enter judgment in favour of the Appellant, namely that he is granted sole ownership of parcel C 3992.<br /> We further affirm  that  the  Respondent  is  entitled to 50% of the jointly owned C 3963 and C 7772.<br /> There is no order as to costs.</p> <p>___________________________________________________________________________<br /> JUDGMENT<br /> _____________________________________________________________________________<br /> DR. O. DINGAKE, JA<br /> INTRODUCTION </p> <p>This appeal concerns division of property following divorce.<br /> The Appellant (Respondent in the Supreme Court) is Benet Duncan Accouche and the Respondent (Petitioner in the Supreme Court) is Audrey Hoareau.<br /> The parties met in 1996 and were married from 2003 until 2016 when their divorce order was made absolute. The family has three properties: jointly owned parcels C3963 (where matrimonial home is built) and adjoining C7772; and parcel C3992, which is solely owned by Mr Accouche.<br /> The parties have two children who are residing with their mother, the Respondent, in an accommodation provided to her by the employer. The Appellant has been solely occupying the matrimonial home since the parties’ divorce.<br /> In 2017 Ms Hoareau applied to the Supreme Court for orders of transfer of land parcel C3992 to her with full lawful and beneficial ownership and sole occupancy. According to Ms Hoareau land parcel C3992 was part of the matrimonial property together with the other two land parcels C3963 and C7772.<br /> Mr Accouche disagrees and has filed a counter claim asking the Court to dismiss the Petitioner’s claim for ownership of C3992 and to make an order under section 20 (1) (g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act in his favour and that, among other prayers, the Court declare his share in C3963 and C7772 to be over and above 50% and that Ms Hoareau has no share in C3992.<br /> On the 29th of May 2019 the Court delivered Judgment in favour of the Petitioner, granting her ownership of C3992 subject to any compensation for the current market value to be paid to Mr Accouche after valuation of the properties.<br /> Mr Accouche, prays that the Court of Appeal makes an order reversing the learned Judge’s decision and enter judgment in favour of the Appellant on the basis of the Appellant’s Counter Application in the case.</p> <p>Background – Family Assets<br /> Parcels C3963 and C7772</p> <p>The Appellant and the Respondent aver that they both jointly own parcel of land C3963 (Exhibit P2) where their matrimonial home is located. The parties also jointly own land C7772 which is adjoining to C3963. The C7772 plot was still not formally transferred to the parties, although paid for (see pages D6, D7, D8 of the Court of Appeal Bundles). The said properties were bought during their marriage.<br /> The parties took a joint loan in 2006 for the purchase of C3963 (Exhibit P3) for SCR632,000. The price of land as per Exhibit P2 was SCR765,000 and the Appellant averred that he was the one who paid the difference. The parties took another loan in 2010 for the purchase of C7772 and refinancing the C3963 Purchase Loan (Exhibit P15). The security was the C3963 land.</p> <p>Parcel C3992</p> <p>The land parcel C3992 is owned solely by the Appellant (Exhibits P1 and D7) and was bought in 1997, just about one year after the parties met. Property was bought prior to their marriage, which was in 2003. The Appellant stated that he took a loan to buy the said property (Exhibit D9). The Loan was for SCR150,000 repayable at SCR5,348 per month together with “a negotiation fee of SCR1,500” charged to his account. Charge over the land was registered in 1997 (Exhibit D10).<br /> The Appellant stated during the Supreme Court proceedings that he solely discharged the said loan and the Respondent did not contribute anything toward the acquisition of the C3992 or loan repayments (page 168 of the Court of Appeal Bundle). The Official Discharge of Charge (Exhibit D11) is dated 27th October 2015 (stamped 20.11.2015), which was just about one year prior to the divorce. The Appellant, though, explained that the SCR150,000 loan was actually discharged earlier than 2015 and that he paid it off in about 5 years (pages 169-170). He stated that the discharge is not automatic and only later he realised that the property was still subject to the charge. If that is so, the Appellant could have discharged the charge in 2002-2003 (prior to or around the time the parties got married).<br /> The Discharge of Charge states that 2 charges were discharged – Entry No.3 for the sum of SCR150,000 and Entry No. 4 for the sum of SCR110,000. The sum of SCR150,000 most likely refers to the initial loan that the Appellant took to purchase the land. From the provided documents by the parties, land parcel C3992 was also collateral in the loan taken solely by the Respondent in 2006 (Exhibit P6). The loan was for SCR110,000 creating mortgage over C3992 plus “householder’s insurance with B.I.N.” The document which indicates that the Respondent has consented to his property being subject to the mortgage is not attached. Therefore, Entry 4 Charge is most likely the said loan, which was discharged in 2015 according to the Discharge of Charge document.<br /> The land was further subject to the joint loan taken by the parties for ‘Home Improvements’ in 2008 (Exhibit P5). The loan was for SCR269,200 and states that the assets to be charged is “C3992 RSC R260,000”.<br /> From the Discharge of Charge it appears that the initial loan taken by the Appellant and subsequent loan taken solely by the Respondent were discharged. The Respondent seemed to aver that since the loan was taken in her name against the property, somehow, she is entitled to the share in it. The issue of on which basis the bank permitted her to take loan using property belonging to another as collateral and whether the Appellant has consented to it was not elaborated upon further; and therefore there is no indication that simply because the land was put as collateral in the loan taken in her name, she somehow acquired the share in the property.<br /> Both parties stated that they intended to build a matrimonial home on C3992 but due to issues with access to road at that time, they did not proceed and instead jointly purchased C3963 where matrimonial home was built. The land parcel C3992 appears to be empty with no dwelling upon it.</p> <p> <br /> The Truck</p> <p>The Respondent stated during the Supreme Court proceedings that some of the money from joint ‘Home Improvement’ loan (Exhibit P5) abovementioned were used to buy a truck, which was owned solely by the Appellant and later sold by him for SCR170,000. According to the Respondent she has not received any portion of the proceeds of sale and the Appellant used it to finance a business loan (see pages 38-40 of the CA Bundle). During the course of proceedings, the Respondent abandoned arguments regarding portion from proceeds of sale for the truck in exchange that she only wants a property. The truck was mentioned in her Affidavit in support of the Petition, but was not included in the Petition itself.</p> <p>Evaluation of C3963, C7772 and C3992</p> <p>During the Supreme Court proceedings Ms Hoareau stated that some time back C3963 was evaluated for SCR2,000,000; C7772 – for SCR450,000; and C3992 – for SCR3,000,000 (page 40-44 of the Court of Appeal Bundle). The Valuation Report (P15, Item, Item 2) contains valuation of C3963 and C7772 only (Item 2, valuation in 2011 contains the same amount as per testimony). Valuation for C3992 is not enclosed. It should be noted that the Supreme Court has ordered for the Valuer to be appointed twice, in 2018 and 2019 (see Order at pages 78 and 221), however, there is no recent Valuation Report enclosed with the file. From the proceedings on the 29th May 2019, which was the date for the judgment (page 216) it appears that the Report was still not provided, therefore at paragraph [17] of the Judgment the Trial Judge further ordered that valuation be carried out and compensation be made if either of the party’s share exceeds the value of the properties granted to them.<br /> To sum up, the family assets are parcel C3963, where matrimonial home is built with adjoining land C7772 (subject to formal transfer of title). These properties are jointly owned by parties and bought during marriage (via loan). The land parcel C3992 was purchased by Mr Accouche in 1997, some nine years prior to the marriage. The property is in his sole name. Ms Hoareau was willing to let go of the claim over truck if she can get the property. Mr Accouche has indicated willingness to give Ms Hoareau C7772 plot of land, which is much less than half a share in jointly owned property.<br /> The Trial Judge has treated all three properties being part of matrimonial property and held that parties are entitled each one to 50% share each in the matrimonial property. As the Petitioner only asked for C3992 property, the Trial Judge has granted the full legal and beneficial ownership of the said land parcel to the Petitioner.</p> <p> <br /> GROUNDS OF APPEAL</p> <p>The Appellant submitted seven grounds of appeal in the Notice of Appeal. These grounds may be conveniently grouped and linked to the main issues in contention.<br /> Issue 1: Which property is considered to be matrimonial property and whether C3992 can be subject to property adjustment order, considering it is owned by the Appellant:</p> <p>Ground 1 – C3992 was purchased by the Appellant before marriage and could not have been considered as matrimonial property;<br /> Ground 2 – Failure to assess evidence in coming to the decision to award the Respondent 50% share in C3992;<br /> Ground 4 – Bias in ignoring Appellant’s case on his Counter Application in decision to award C3992 to the Respondent;</p> <p>Issue 2: What are the shares of the parties in the jointly owned properties and whether the Appellant’s share should be larger:</p> <p>Ground 3 – Appellant was sole person paying outstanding loan in relation to C7772 and C3963 since 2006 and accordingly had greater share in joint property;<br /> Ground 5 – Greater contribution in acquisition of jointly owned properties, C7772 and C3963;<br /> Ground 6 – Failure to consider Appellant’s willingness to compromise for the Respondent to be awarded C7772 along with the apportionments in monetary terms;<br /> Ground 7 – Emphasis on consideration of school fees being paid by the Respondent and that same would have relieved the burden on the Appellant.</p> <p>Prior to the analysis of the main issues it should be noted that the Petitioner (now Respondent) had applied to the Supreme Court to make orders under “rule 4”, which probably means Subsidiary Legislation: Section 27: Matrimonial Causes Rules (see B1 from the Court of Appeal Bundle), Rule 4: Claim for ancillary relief not included in the petition. The Petitioner appears to be referring to paragraphs (f), (j), (h) of Rule 4.<br /> In Freminot v Pauline (MA 169/2019 (arising in DS159/2016)) [2020] SCSC 190 (10 March 2020) the respondent moved for dismissal of the application on the basis that the applicant has failed to request leave of the Court as per Rule 34(1) of the Rules and the application was outside the prescribed time. Rule 34(1) states:</p> <p>“Payment for spouse and relief in respect of property<br /> 34.        (1) An application for a periodical payment or lump sum payment in accordance with rule 4(1) (b) or (c) or in relation to property in accordance with rule 4(1) (f), (h), (i) or (j) where a prayer for the same has not been included in the petition for divorce or nullity of marriage, may be made by the petitioner at any time after the expiration of the time for appearance to the petition, but no application shall be made later than two months after order absolute except by leave.”</p> <p>The Court in Freminot v Pauline dismissed the application with costs, however, reserved the right to consider any further application for ancillary relief under the Matrimonial Causes Act and Rules and cautioned the Counsel to ensure compliance with the provisions of the said Act and Rules.<br /> In  the case of Boniface v Malvina (SCA 41/2017) [2020] SCCA 11 (21 August 2020), the court noted the same irregularity in the proceedings in the Supreme Court (see paragraphs [8] and [13]) and stated that, “the correct course of action would have been for the plaint to be dismissed and for an action to be brought under the MCA for the division of the house pursuant to the MCA – seeking leave from the Court to do so out of time”.<br /> Similar issue appears to be in the present case, where the Divorce Order was made absolute on 3rd August 2016 (page F of the CA Bundle) and Petition (B1-B2) was brought almost year later, in June 2017. The Court of Appeal Bundle does not have application for leave of Court in order to proceed with application outside the prescribed time. This point, however, was not brought up by the parties, and need not concern us.</p> <p>Issue 1: Which property is considered to be matrimonial property and whether C3992 can be subject to property adjustment order, considering it is owned by the Appellant</p> <p>Community of property between spouses in Seychelles was abolished and unless spouses enter into a marriage settlement, property acquired by one spouse with their own money or resources remains personal property (Maurel v Maurel (1998-1999) SCAR 57, Etienne v Constance (1977) SLR 233 at 240; Albert v Albert (MA 39/2019 (arising in DV 97/2018)) [2020] SCSC 618 (01 September 2020) at paragraphs [91]-[93]).<br /> Section 20 of the Matrimonial Causes Act (the “MCA”) provides for ancillary relief upon divorce and gives the court the power to order a settlement as appears appropriate to remedy an unfairness upon divorce:</p> <p>Financial relief<br /> 20.        (1) Subject to section 24, on the granting of a conditional order of divorce or nullity or an order of separation, or at any time thereafter, the court may, after making such inquiries as the court thinks fit and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the ability and financial means of the parties to the marriage-<br /> . . .<br /> g) make such order, as the court thinks fit, in respect of any property of a party to a marriage or any interest or right of a party in any property for the benefit of the other party or a relevant child.</p> <p>Established case law indicates that the powers of the Court under section 20 are wide. In Renaud v. Gaetan SCA 48/1998 the Court of Appeal stated the following regarding the Court’s powers under section 20 (1) (g):</p> <p>“the powers of the Court pursuant to Section 20 (1) (g) of the Act must be read within the context of the totality of Section 20 of the Act which is designed for the grant of financial relief.  Such relief may consist of some periodical payments (Section 20 (1) (d) or lump sum payment (Section 21 (1) (e)) for the benefit of relevant child or property adjustment order (Section 21 (g).)<br /> The purpose of the provisions of the subsections is to ensure that upon dissolution of the marriage, a party to a marriage is not put at an unfair disadvantage in relation to the other, by reason of the breakdown of the marriage and or as far as possible, to enable the party applying to maintain a fair and reasonable standard of living, commensurate with or near the standard the parties have maintained before dissolution.”</p> <p>The case of Finesse v Banane (1981) SLR 103 established that under section 20 the Court can order either spouse to pay to the other a lump sum under or direct one party to transfer to the other party such property as may be specified under section 20. In making either of the orders the court may have regard to the contributions made by each party to the welfare of the family, including any contributions made by looking after the home or caring for the family. It was emphasised that the court should seek to place parties, so far as is practicable and just to do so, in the financial position in which they would have been if the marriage had not broken down and each had properly discharged the financial obligations and responsibilities towards each other (see also Florentine v Florentine (1990) SLR 141, which in addition held that it is desirable that the financial and proprietary interests of the parties should be determined with finality so  that the parties may make a “clean break”).<br /> In Boniface v Malvina (SCA 41/2017 ) [2020] SCCA 11 (21 August 2020) the Court of Appeal stated that the Supreme Court was wrong in relying on US, French and English law in order to define ‘matrimonial property’ and that it was not necessary to identify whether the property is ‘matrimonial property’. It was stated that under section 20 for the purposes of applying the MCA, the Court should not refer to ‘matrimonial property’, but simply ‘property of a party to a marriage’. It was held that the house in question was within the scope of the MCA and it did not matter whether the property was bought by the respondent before marriage.<br /> It was also held in Desaubin v Perriol (1996) SLR 90 that under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1992, the court has the power to vary and divide a property registered in the name of one party to a marriage if circumstances warrant such a division. The Court stated that the question is “what are the respective contributions of the parties”.<br /> The case of Pillay v Pillay and Pillay v Pillay (MA 322/2016 and MA 43/2016 (consolidated) (arising in CS78/2015)) [2017] SCSC 545 (27 June 2017) involved several properties in dispute, one of which was bought by the petitioner before the marriage (Parcel J1606). With regards to distinguishing between previously held property and matrimonial property, the Court cited Lord Nicholls’ comments in White v White [2001] 1 AC 596 (at paragraph [47]): </p> <p> “42. This distinction is a recognition of the view, widely but not universally held, that property owned by one spouse before the marriage, and inherited property whenever acquired, stand on a different footing from what may be loosely called matrimonial property. According to this view, on a breakdown of the marriage these two classes of property should not necessarily be treated in the same way. Property acquired before marriage and inherited property acquired during marriage come from a source wholly external to the marriage. In fairness, where this property still exists, the spouse to whom it was given should be allowed to keep it. Conversely, the other spouse has a weaker claim to such property than he or she may have regarding matrimonial property.<br /> 43. Plainly, when present, this factor is one of the circumstances of the case. It represents a contribution made to the welfare of the family by one of the parties to the marriage. The judge should take it into account. He should decide how important it is in the particular case. The nature and value of the property, and the time when and circumstances in which the property was acquired, are among the relevant matters to be considered. However, in the ordinary course, this factor can be expected to carry little weight, if any, in a case where the claimant's financial needs cannot be met without recourse to this property.”<br />  </p> <p>It is now established law that in assessing the parties’ share in the property the Court needs to consider not just the monetary contribution (see also Lesperance v Lesperance SCA 3 of 2001). In Samori v Charles (2012) SLR 371 the Court of Appeal stated:</p> <p>“We have no reason to interfere with any of the above findings of fact made by the learned Trial Judge as regards the financial contributions made by the two parties to the marriage.  But a marriage is not only about financial contributions, it is also about love, of friendship, of security, of commitment, of moral and emotional support; which combine together to make a success of the lives of the two people to the marriage.  These are matters that cannot easily be measured in monetary terms and also cannot be ignored when a court is called upon to make a determination on matrimonial property.”</p> <p>It follows from the above that although community of property was abolished, the property solely owned by one of the spouse can be taken into account by the Court in property adjustment orders under section 20 where it is just and necessary to ensure a party to a marriage is not put at an unfair advantage in relation to the other party. The Court therefore can order that some share in the property solely owned by one party be granted to the other spouse. The Court needs to consider various circumstance of the parties and in order to assess the share of each party, the Court needs to take into account the contributions of the parties, including monetary and non-monetary contributions.</p> <p>Analysis – C3992</p> <p>Since there is no community of property in Seychelles, arguably, the C3992 bought solely by the Appellant prior to marriage, should solely belong to the Appellant and not be included in the matrimonial property pot for division between the parties. On the other hand, given wide powers of the Court to make property adjustment order under section 20 and the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Boniface v Malvina (supra) and Arissol v Pillay (supra), the property which was bought prior to marriage and is solely owned may be subject to the order since the order can be made in respect of any property of a party to a marriage or any interest or right of a party in any property for the benefit of the other party. The above cited decisions also support the findings that share in a property bought solely by one party even prior to the marriage can be awarded to the other spouse.<br /> In many cases such property in dispute may also have a matrimonial home built upon it, which is not the case in the present suit. The matrimonial home of the parties in this case is built on the jointly owned land and since divorce has been occupied and solely enjoyed by the Appellant. There is no house built on C3992.<br /> In our opinion, if the Appellant has indeed discharged the loan taken to purchase the land within 5 years from the sale date, therefore, before the marriage to the Respondent, the land should not be included in the matrimonial pot for division as the Respondent has not contributed to the purchase of the land; the parties have not built anything on it together; and there are other two plots of land jointly owned by the parties.<br /> We are satisfied that granting half share in jointly owned property is sufficient to ensure fairness upon divorce, there should be no need to include C3992 for division.</p> <p>Issue 2: What are the shares of the parties in the jointly owned properties, namely C3963 and C7772, and whether the Appellant’s share should be larger </p> <p>As noted earlier both parties agree that C3963 and C7772 are jointly owned (subject to formal transfer of C7772). The parties did not provide a Title Deed, however, provided Transfer of Land document which states that land is transferred to “Bennet Duncun Accouche and Audrey Eline Accouche”. The document does not specify the nature of title that the parties hold.<br /> With regards to joint ownership of matrimonial property, it was held in Charles v Charles (2004-2005) SCAR 231 that where the parties own a house jointly, they are presumed to have intended to own the house in equal shares. The Court, however has a discretion to make orders to settle matrimonial property and such discretion is a judicial discretion that must be made in consideration of all relevant factors. It was further held that the starting-point is one of equal shares (also see Serret v Serret (2012) SLR 112). </p> <p>Analysis – C3963 and C7772</p> <p>As indicated by above case law, where matrimonial property is jointly owned the starting point is equal shares, however the court may vary the shares taking into account, among other factors, contribution by the parties, which includes non-monetary contribution.<br /> In the present case, the Appellant avers that he is entitled to larger share in the joint property than the Respondent as he has been the sole person paying the outstanding loan in relation to the properties and therefore had made greater contributions in acquisition of the matrimonial property.<br /> Both parties provided bank account statements which show some contributions into paying off the loan. The statements, however, are only for certain years during their marriage without exact indication for which exact loan payments were made. Testimony of the bank employee were also not helpful in determining which one of the parties paid exactly which sum towards the discharge of multiple loans.<br /> Furthermore, it was not denied by the Respondent that she contributed to the loan repayments only during certain years. She further stated that the spouses were in agreement to divide their expenses at certain points during their marriage, in that the Appellant would be making payments toward the loan and the Respondent would be paying for children’s school fees and household expenses. While the Respondent did not provide the invoices for the large sums of school fees, the Appellant also did not deny that the Respondent was paying the school fees. The Appellant has also provided certain receipts of payments for school and nursery fees.<br /> Taking documentary and oral evidence of financial contributions as a whole, in our opinion the Trial Judge did not err in finding that parties were entitled to equal shares of the matrimonial property, namely C3963 and C7772. This finding is further supported by the abovementioned case law which emphasises that it is not only monetary contributions that are taken into consideration by the Court in the matrimonial property adjustment orders. We are not of the opinion that the Appellant has shown that he is entitled to larger share in the jointly owned matrimonial property.</p> <p>CONCLUSION</p> <p>In all the circumstances of this case, it is our opinion that the Respondent should be entitled to 50% of the jointly owned C3963 and C7772.<br /> In the result the appeal succeeds. The order of the court below granting the Respondent ownership of C3992 is hereby quashed and set aside.<br /> We enter judgment in favour of the Appellant, namely that he is granted sole ownership of parcel C3992.<br /> We further affirm that the respondent is entitled to 50 % of the jointly owned C 3963 and C7772, and we so order. There is no order as to costs.</p> <p> </p> <p> <br /> ______________________<br /> Dr. O. Dingake, JA<br />  <br /> I concur                                                           ______________________<br />                                                                         Dr. Lillian Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza JA<br />  <br /> F. ROBINSON, JA<br />  </p> <p>The Respondent instituted these proceedings under the Matrimonial Causes Act. The Appellant resisted the Application and set up a Cross-Application.<br /> The learned Judge delivered a judgment on the 29 May 2019, which does not contain any assessment of the evidence and consideration of the Cross-Application. It is unclear on what basis the learned Judge had come to any finding in this case. It is to be observed that the learned Judge, in his judgment, sloppily ordered that a valuation be carried out.<br /> At the appeal hearing, both Counsel expressed their concerns regarding the approach of the learned Judge.<br /> After anxiously considering the proceedings in this case, including the judgment, I conclude that this is not a fit case for me to exercise powers under rule 31 of the Seychelles Court of Appeal Rules, 2005, as amended.<br /> For the reasons stated above, I set aside the orders of the learned Judge and remit the case for a fresh hearing in the Supreme Court.</p> <p> <br /> F. ROBINSON, JA<br /> Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 17 December 2021.</p></span></div></div> </div> </div> Thu, 23 Jun 2022 08:02:08 +0000 Anonymous 4265 at http://old2.seylii.org Cushion v Mein (SCA 44 of 2019) [2022] SCCA 26 (29 April 2022); http://old2.seylii.org/sc/judgment/court-appeal/2022/26 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">Cushion v Mein (SCA 44 of 2019) [2022] SCCA 26 (29 April 2022);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/159" hreflang="x-default">Family Law</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Anonymous (not verified)</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Thu, 06/23/2022 - 07:58</span> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-field-search-summary field--type-text-with-summary field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Search summary</div> <div class="field__item"><p>Divorce - Property adjustments - section 20(1)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act -  Home that the parties occupied after their marriage - Appellant continued to occupy the home with the three children - Beneficial share of the parties in the matrimonial home </p> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-field-headnote-and-holding field--type-text-long field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Headnote and holding</div> <div class="field__item"><p>The orders that the beneficial share of each party in the matrimonial home is half and that each party is entitled to SCR1,150,000 as their respective share in the matrimonial home are quashed.  The beneficial share of the Appellant and the Respondent in the matrimonial home is apportioned as sixty-one percent and thirty-nine percent, respectively.  Award the Appellant the sum of SCR1,281,000 as her share in the matrimonial home. Award the Respondent the sum of SCR819000 as his share in the matrimonial home.  The Appellant is given nine months from the date of this judgment within which to pay the Respondent the sum of SCR819,000, failing which the Respondent shall have nine months to pay the Appellant the sum of SCR1,281,000. If either party is unable to pay the other, the matrimonial home, the subject matter of the award, shall be sold to the highest bidder on the open market, and the proceeds of the sale shall be shared sixty-one: thirty-nine (61:39) between the Appellant and the Respondent.  Each party shall bear her or his costs of these proceedings.</p> </div> </div> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-pdf file--application-pdf"> <a href="https://media.seylii.org/files/judgments/scca/2022/26/2022-scca-26_1.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=862010">2022-scca-26.pdf</a></span> </div> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.seylii.org/files/judgments/scca/2022/26/2022-scca-26_1.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=51735">2022-scca-26.docx</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><p>IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF SEYCHELLES</p> <p> </p> <p>Reportable<br /> [2022] SCCA 26 (29 April 2022)<br /> SCA 44/2019<br /> (Appeal from CS 164/2014)<br />  <br /> In the matter between<br /> Bella Mein Nee Cushion                                                    Appellant<br /> (rep. by Mrs Domingue)<br />  <br /> and<br /> Bernard Mein                                                                     Respondent<br /> (rep. by Mr Rajasundaram)</p> <p> <br />  </p> <p>Neutral Citation: Cushion v Mein (SCA 44/2019) [2022] SCCA 26 (Arising in CS 164/2014)<br /> (29 April 2022)<br /> Before:                   Fernando President, Robinson, Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza, JJA<br /> Summary:             Divorce - Property adjustments - section 20(1)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act -  Home that the parties occupied after their marriage - Appellant continued to occupy the home with the three children - Beneficial share of the parties in the matrimonial home<br /> Heard:                    12 April 2022</p> <p>Delivered:              29 April 2022</p> <p>ORDER<br />  </p> <p>The orders that the beneficial share of each party in the matrimonial home is half and that each party is entitled to SCR1,150,000 as their respective share in the matrimonial home are quashed. </p> <p> </p> <p>The beneficial share of the Appellant and the Respondent in the matrimonial home is apportioned as sixty-one percent and thirty-nine percent, respectively. </p> <p> </p> <p>Award the Appellant the sum of SCR1,281,000 as her share in the matrimonial home.</p> <p> </p> <p>Award the Respondent the sum of SCR819000 as his share in the matrimonial home. <br /> The Appellant is given nine months from the date of this judgment within which to pay the Respondent the sum of SCR819,000, failing which the Respondent shall have nine months to pay the Appellant the sum of SCR1,281,000.</p> <p> </p> <p>If either party is unable to pay the other, the matrimonial home, the subject matter of the award, shall be sold to the highest bidder on the open market, and the proceeds of the sale shall be shared sixty-one: thirty-nine (61:39) between the Appellant and the Respondent. </p> <p> </p> <p>Each party shall bear her or his costs of these proceedings.</p> <p> </p> <p> <br /> JUDGMENT</p> <p> <br /> ROBINSON JA, (FERNANDO, PRESIDENT, TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA JA concurring)</p> <p>The Respondent and the Appellant were husband and wife. They got married to each other on the 22 September 1994. Two of the three children born of the marriage are minors. </p> <p> </p> <p>The Appellant and the Respondent were married for about twenty-one years. Their marriage was dissolved on the 9 March 2015 because of its irretrievable breakdown. A decree absolute was granted on the 12 May 2015. Although they separated in 2012, the Respondent stayed on in the house until 2014.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Appellant applied for property adjustments under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1992, on the 8 June 2017. She applied for an eighty percent share in the home and the first option to buy out the Respondent.</p> <p> </p> <p>In a judgment delivered on the 24 June 2019, a learned Judge of the Supreme Court found each party's share to be half in the matrimonial home. Hence, she ordered that each party is entitled to SCR1,150,000 as their respective share in the matrimonial home.<br /> She also ordered the Appellant to pay the Respondent his share in the matrimonial home in six months, failing which the Respondent shall then have six months to pay the Appellant her share. Further, she ordered that if either party cannot pay the other, the house shall be sold to the highest bidder on the open market, and the parties shall equally share the sale proceeds.</p> <p> <br /> The grounds of appeal</p> <p>The Appellant appealed on the grounds that ―</p> <p>″A. On the Facts<br />  <br /> 1. The learned Chief Justice erred in finding that both parties are entitled to a half share in the matrimonial property as this finding is not supported by the evidence.<br />  <br /> 2. The learned Chief Justice erred in her finding that the property had been paid for by the parties instead of accepting the evidence of the Petitioner and her half brother that Peter Tirant had gifted all of his children, including the Petitioner, with the property on which the parties built their matrimonial home. As a consequence, the learned Chief Justice should have made a finding that the Respondent was not entitled to any share in the property Title V9850.<br />  <br /> 3. The learned Chief Justice erred in not calling for a third valuation of the Property.<br />  <br /> 4. The learned Chief Justice though recognizing that the Petitioner had contributed more than the Respondent, still awarded the Respondent a half share in the matrimonial home and property.<br />  <br /> 5. The learned Chief Justice erred by not taking into account that the family of the Petitioner had helped the Petitioner and the Respondent by giving them accommodation and assisting them financially during the course of their marriage and further by assisting in obtaining the matrimonial property and building their matrimonial home on it.<br />  <br /> 6. The learned Chief Justice erred by not taking into account that two of the children of the parties are still living with the Petitioner and that they are still minors whilst she took into account that the Respondent had moved out of the matrimonial home since 2014 and that the Respondent had to pay for alternative accommodation whilst the Petitioner had full use and occupation of the home.<br />  <br /> B. On the Law<br />  <br /> The learned Chief Justice although alluding to the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1992 and the authorities cited by the parties did not apply the law and the authorities to the case″.<br />  </p> <p>The Appellant has abandoned ground 4 of the grounds.</p> <p> <br /> The evidence<br />  </p> <p>Before considering the grounds of appeal, and the written and oral submissions submitted on behalf of the Appellant and the Respondent, it is convenient to summarise the facts relevant to this appeal.</p> <p> </p> <p>The evidence of the Appellant. After getting married, the parties moved to the house of the Appellant's parents. She contributed SCR500 monthly to household expenses from her earnings. She was working for Mahe Shipping Company Limited at the time.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Appellant and the Respondent later moved from the house of the Appellant's parents to a small one-bedroom flat at Le Niole. The Appellant paid SCR500 monthly for the flat's rent from her earnings. </p> <p> </p> <p>When the Appellant gave birth to their first child in 1977, the family moved to the house of the Appellant's aunt. She gave her aunt SCR1000 monthly for living expenses from her earnings. The Respondent gave her SCR1,000 monthly from his earnings to buy food. The family moved out of her aunt's house in 2005.</p> <p> </p> <p>Mr Tirant, who is her stepfather, gifted her a parcel of land V9850 (327 square metres) (hereinafter referred to as the ″Land″) after she and the Respondent got married. As her earning power was insufficient to raise a loan, the Land was registered in their joint names on the 4 December 1997 to obtain loans. The Respondent merely lent his name to the transfer of the Land. They did not pay for the Land, although consideration of SCR15,000 was inserted in the Land transfer.<br /> They prepared the Land to build the house by excavating the big rocks and clearing. The Appellant testified that the proceeds of various loans financed the construction of the house.</p> <p> </p> <p>The parties took a loan of SCR150,000 in 2000 from the Housing Finance Company Limited. The Appellant claimed that she paid the monthly loan instalments from her salary, exhibit P4. On the 18 March 2005, Housing Finance Company Limited gave the parties a fourty percent discount on the amount still owed on the loan on the condition that the parties paid the amount of SCR97,061.62 within two weeks, exhibit P5. The Appellant paid off that amount in March 2005, exhibit P5. She claimed that the Respondent did not contribute to the loan payment.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Appellant took a ″Member Loan″ of SCR116,02.21 from the Seychelles Credit Union in 2005. She applied SCR97,000 from the proceeds of the Seychelles Credit Union loan to pay off the loan she had taken from the Housing Finance Company Limited. The Appellant paid off the loan in September 2014, exhibit P6. She claimed that the Respondent did not contribute to the loan payment.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Appellant took a loan of SCR25,000 from the Seychelles Savings Bank in 2005. The Respondent guaranteed the loan of the Appellant, exhibit P7. She purchased a mortgage protection assurance from the State Assurance Corporation of Seychelles concerning this loan in 2005, exhibit P7. She repaid the loan. She used the proceeds of the loan to buy building materials. The Respondent did not contribute to the payment of the loan.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Appellant took a loan of SCR45,000 from Barclays Bank (Seychelles) Ltd in 2007, exhibit P8. She paid off the loan. The Appellant applied the loan proceeds to buy home furnishings and some extras. On the 28 June 2007, she purchased a mortgage protection assurance from State Assurance Corporation of Seychelles concerning this loan. The Respondent did not contribute to the payment of the loan.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Appellant took a ″New Home Improvement Loan″ of SCR34,000 in 2008 from the Housing Finance Company Limited. The Appellant paid the monthly loan instalments from her salary, exhibit P11. She purchased a mortgage protection assurance from State Assurance Corporation of Seychelles concerning this loan, exhibit P11. The Respondent did not make any contribution to the repayment of the loan.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Appellant took a loan of SCR131,000 from Barclays Bank (Seychelles) Limited in 2013, exhibit P10. She paid the loan in monthly instalments of SCR3579. She paid off the loan. She applied the loan proceeds to fix up and improve the house. The Respondent did not contribute to the payment of the loan.</p> <p> </p> <p>She made financial contributions as she was in employment during the subsistence of the marriage and is still in employment. She worked for Mahe Shipping Company Limited for over twenty years, from the 3 August 1992 to the 3 December 2012. After leaving Mahe Shipping Company Limited, she worked for Benelux Shipping (Seychelles) Co. Ltd, from 4 September 2012 to 1 June 2015. After that, she formed Seyline Forwarding Agent in 2015. She also worked for ASL Seychelles Limited. When she worked for the different companies, her salary varied from SCR6,000, SCR8,500, SCR10,000 and SCR25,000 (see the salary receipts and other miscellaneous documents collectively referred to as exhibit P12).</p> <p> </p> <p>In addition to making loan repayments from her earnings, she applied her earnings to provide for and support her three children; pay for household expenses and utilities; pay the Respondent to paint the house – SCR1,000 yearly and pay her uncle to clean the exterior of the home. The Appellant did the household chores. She was the only one to care for the children when they were ill. </p> <p> </p> <p>During the subsistence of the marriage, the Respondent gave the Appellant SCR1,000 monthly for living expenses as he did not earn very much. The Respondent worked for Cable and Wireless; after that, he worked for Echo Car Hire and Classic Car Design. He also gave her that said amount after they had separated. The Respondent earned between SCR3,000 and SCR4,500.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Respondent took two loans - SCR127,000 and SCR142,000. With the proceeds of the loan of SCR 142,000, he financed the construction of the retaining wall, which cost about SCR135,000. The Appellant made two monthly payments on the Respondent's behalf towards the loan of SCR142,000, as he had defaulted on SCR4,200.</p> <p> </p> <p>When cross-examined, the Appellant stated that they started cohabiting one and half years before marriage. They lived at her parents' house. She was nineteen years old, and the Respondent was 21 years old when they got married in 1994.</p> <p> </p> <p>One Mr Joubert, a small building contractor, built the house. The parties provided the building materials. The Appellant gave money to the Respondent to buy the building materials. </p> <p> </p> <p>She could not state that the money given to her by the Respondent was insufficient because he could not give her more money as he did not earn more than SCR4,000 and was repaying a loan of SCR2,000. </p> <p> </p> <p>The evidence of Mr Georges Tirant. Mr Tirant is the half brother of the Appellant. All five siblings have inherited land from Mr Tirant and did not pay any consideration for their land. He was present in the office of Attorney Mr Gerard Morel when the parties to the transfer of the Land executed the said transfer. He ensured that no one misled Mr Tirant, who could not read and write, into signing the wrong document. Although a sum was inserted in the transfer of the Land, no money had exchanged hands. Mr Tirant has passed away.</p> <p> </p> <p>The evidence of Mrs Gerda Cushion. Mrs Cushion, who is sixty-nine years, is the Appellant's aunt. After the Appellant had her baby, the family moved to her house. They lived with her for seven years. The Appellant gave her SCR1000 monthly for living expenses. The Respondent did not give her any money. After the family had moved out, she assisted the Appellant and her kids financially and provided them with food. She helped the Appellant as she was paying loan instalments. Her brother cleans the exterior of the Appellant's house. </p> <p> </p> <p>The evidence of the Respondent. The Respondent worked for Cable and Wireless as a technician and then for Echo Car Hire as a salesman for ten years, where he earned SCR3,500. He has been working for Classic Car Hire for over fourteen and a half years. </p> <p> </p> <p>The transfer of the Land took place in the office of Mr Gerard Morel, a notary. He paid SCR8,000 for the Land, although consideration of SCR15,000 was inserted in the transfer of the Land. At the time, they lived with the Appellant's aunt. After that, the family rented a flat at Le Niole for a year. The family moved back to the house of the Appellant's aunt while building their home. They gave the Appellant's aunt SCR1,000 for food. </p> <p> </p> <p>The parties started building their three-bedroom house in 2001. The Respondent paid a monthly instalment of SCR1,258 for the first loan of SCR150,000 taken from the Housing Finance Company Limited to build their home, exhibit R1. He paid the loan for about four to five years. He also took a loan of SCR127,500 from the Seychelles Credit Union, exhibit R3, the proceeds of which were used to rebuild the retaining wall. He paid a monthly instalment of SCR1,950 for that loan, which was increased to SCR2,100. The Appellant took a loan for which she paid a monthly instalment of SCR2,200. He took a second loan of SCR142,100.58 from the Seychelles Credit Union on the 11 March 2004, exhibit R4 concerning the building of the house. He was unaware that the Appellant had taken more loans to improve or renovate the house. </p> <p> </p> <p>He ironed the children's school uniforms; took them to school every morning; picked them up in the evening; paid the utility bills; provided the washing machine, fridge, and cooker, and installed the kitchen cabinets. The Appellant earned about SCR500 more than him during the subsistence of the marriage. </p> <p> </p> <p>When cross-examined, the Respondent stated that they both paid the rent of SCR500 for the Le Niole flat. Both of them gave SCR1,000 to Mrs Cushion for food. They lived with Mrs Cushion for about six to seven years. He accepted that Mrs Cushion assisted the family.</p> <p> </p> <p>Concerning the Housing Finance Company Limited loan of SCR150,000, Counsel stated that the Appellant was not disputing that he paid a monthly instalment of SCR1,258 from 29 November 2000 to 28 February 2005. The Respondent was not sure whether or not the Appellant paid off the Housing Finance Company Limited's outstanding balance of SCR97,000.  </p> <p> </p> <p>He took a loan of SCR127,500 from the Seychelles Credit Union. He agreed with Counsel for the Appellant that the loan of SCR142,158 was not new but a top-up of the loan of SCR127,500. He stated that he missed two payments of the said loans, which the Appellant paid. He remembered only the Appellant's loan from Seychelles Savings Bank because he helped with the payment. He denied that the house had to be renovated as it is still a new house.  </p> <p> </p> <p>He took the children to school and did the cooking as the Appellant did not know how to cook. He agreed that the Appellant cleaned the house; ironed the clothes, and did the washing except for his washing and cared for the children. After the marriage broke down in 2012, he was still contributing and taking the children to school. He knew only of the basic salary of the Appellant, which was SCR4,500. He does not know of any other money that she was earning.</p> <p> <br /> Analysis of the contentions of the parties<br />  <br /> Ground 3 of the grounds of appeal<br />  </p> <p>Counsel for the Appellant, in her written submissions concerning this ground, contended that the learned Judge was wrong not to have called for a third quantity surveying report as there was a difference of SCR800,000 between the valuation of Mr Nigel Roucou (SCR1,700,000) tendered for the Appellant, and that of Mr Gustave Larue (SCR 2,500,000) tendered for the Respondent. The valuation tendered by Mr Roucou was the valuation at the date he prepared his report, 29 May 2018. Mr Roucou inspected the home on the 23 May 2018. The valuation given by Mr Larue was the valuation at the date he re-inspected the home, the 14 July 2017. I find this ground of appeal and the very brief supporting submissions devoid of merit. I give reasons for this finding.</p> <p> </p> <p>In her judgment, the learned Judge stated that Counsel for the Appellant had submitted in her closing written submissions that the valuation by the Appellant's quantity surveying expert and that of the Respondent has a discrepancy of SCR800,000, which could be resolved by joint valuation. The learned Judge did not accede to such a request made at the eleventh hour. She took an average value of the two valuations in dealing with the conflict of valuation evidence. The learned Judge held the view that ″given the fluid housing market in Seychelles, it is not totally unexpected that such variations in valuations can occur. To seek yet another valuation as proposed will not resolve the difference in values.″ </p> <p> </p> <p>In coming to her determination, the learned Judge was guided by the opinion of Mr Larue that the difference between the two valuations ″was not that really huge″. This dialogue between the Court and Mr Larue set out partly the opinion of Mr Larue  ―</p> <p> <br /> ″COURT TO WITNESS<br />  <br /> Q: In normal valuation processes, does it often happen that there is the variation in valuation  prices between 2 different valuations?<br /> A: It always happens.<br />  <br /> […].<br />  <br /> Q: What is your experience in Seychelles is it a huge margin?<br /> A: Normally it is not that really huge.<br />  <br /> Q: Okay a couple of 100,000?<br /> A: Hundred maybe million as well.<br />  <br /> Q: Sometimes million?<br /> A: Yes it does.<br />  <br /> Q: That has happened?<br /> A: Yes.″<br />  </p> <p>I observe that Counsel for the Appellant, during the cross-examination of Mr Larue, suggested briefly that his valuation was on the high side. Mr Larue explained why he gave the home the higher value. There is no evidence to suggest that the valuation of Mr Larue was wrong or on the high side. Overall, I observe that the Appellant did not materially dispute the valuation of Mr Larue. There is also no evidence which materially contradicts the valuation of Mr Roucou. </p> <p> </p> <p>In light of the above, I hold the view that the learned Judge cannot be faulted for accepting the evidence of both experts, on the whole, to be reliable and ″for closing the gap by taking an average of the two valuations″.</p> <p> </p> <p>The learned Judge found the difference between the two valuations to be SCR400,000. She incorrectly stated the valuation of Mr Roucou to be SCR2,100,000. Hence, she came to an average value of SCR2,300,000 for the matrimonial home. Counsel for the Appellant is correct in her written and oral submissions that the learned Judge should have reached an average value of SCR2,100,000, reflecting a fairer approach. I accept the submission of Counsel for the Appellant and find that the value of the matrimonial home is SCR2,100,000. </p> <p> </p> <p>For the reasons stated above, ground 3 stands dismissed, save for the finding that the average value of the matrimonial home is SCR2,100,000.</p> <p> <br /> Ground 6 of the grounds of appeal                               <br />  </p> <p>Concerning ground 6, I state that the learned Judge did not err in refusing to take into account the financial needs of the two minor children of the parties under the Matrimonial Causes Act, as the pleadings of the Appellant do not state any case concerning their financial needs and do not pray for any order for their benefit. The pleadings averred that proceedings concerning the financial needs of the two minor children were pending before the Family Tribunal. In Charlie v Francoise Civil Appeal No 12/1994 (delivered on the 12 May 1994), the Court of Appeal stated ―</p> <p> <br /> ″The system of civil justice in this country does not permit the Court to formulate a case for the parties after listening to the evidence and to grant a relief not sought by either of the parties that such evidence may sustain without amending the plaint. In the adversarial procedure the parties must state their respective cases on their pleadings and the plaintiff must state the relief he seeks on his plaint″. [Emphasis supplied]<br />  </p> <p>The Appellant also complained that the learned Judge erred in considering that the Respondent had to pay for alternative accommodation because the Respondent's pleadings do not state such a case, and the evidence does not support such a finding. Counsel for the Appellant is correct in her submissions. </p> <p> </p> <p>In exercising her discretion in adjusting the parties' property rights, under section 20(1) (g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, the learned Judge considered that the Respondent paid for alternative accommodation since he vacated the home in 2014. I find that the learned Judge was wrong to attach any weight to the fact that the Respondent paid for alternative accommodation since it did not arise on the pleadings, and there is no evidence to support such a finding.</p> <p> </p> <p>For the reasons stated above, ground 6 stands dismissed save for the finding that the learned Judge was wrong to attach any weight to the fact that the Respondent paid for alternative accommodation.</p> <p> <br /> Ground 2 of the grounds of appeal<br />  </p> <p>Under ground 2, Counsel for the Appellant contended in her skeleton heads of argument that the learned Judge erred in not accepting the evidence of the Appellant and Mr Georges Tirant that Mr Tirant, her stepfather, had gifted her the Land.<br /> In her judgment, the learned Judge found that the evidence relating to this fact and what took place in the notary's office amounted to back letters which are not admissible against the authenticity of the sale agreement registered on 4 December 1997, given the absolute nature of the provisions of Article 1321 alinéa 4 of the Civil Code of Seychelles. The learned Judge concluded that the Land was bought in equal shares on this basis. </p> <p> </p> <p>Since the Appellant is objecting to the conclusion of the learned Judge that the Land was bought in equal shares, the Appellant, in her ground of appeal, is also required to set forth the conclusions of the law to which the Appellant is objecting, rule 18(3) of the Seychelles Court of Appeal Rules, 2005, as amended. The said rule 18(3) stipulates ― ″(3) [s]uch grounds of appeal shall set forth in separate numbered paragraphs the finding of fact and conclusions of law to which the appellant is objecting and shall also state the particular respect in which the variation of the judgment or order is sought″. I also observe that the skeleton heads of argument provided on behalf of the Appellant do not at all address the reasoning and conclusions of law of the learned Judge. At the appeal hearing, the Appellant did not even address Article 1321 alinéa 4 of the Civil Code of Seychelles. </p> <p> </p> <p>I refuse to entertain ground 2 of the grounds of appeal for the above reasons. Hence, ground 2 of the grounds of appeal stands dismissed.</p> <p> <br /> Ground 1 of the grounds of appeal<br />  </p> <p>Under ground 1 of the grounds, the Appellant contended that the learned Judge erred in law in determining the beneficial share of the Appellant and the Respondent in the matrimonial home at fifty per cent each, given the substantial evidence which proved otherwise. </p> <p> </p> <p>In her supporting written and oral submissions, Counsel for the Appellant contended that the learned Judge failed to attach sufficient weight to the fact that she contributed far more and earned more than the Respondent. In this respect, she contended that the learned Judge erroneously found that she contributed SCR329,000 towards the matrimonial home. I observe that the parties did not question the approach of the learned Judge with respect to the computation of their financial contributions towards the matrimonial home. </p> <p> </p> <p>Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the learned Judge was correct in law to find that this was a case for a 50/50 split. He based his submissions on the cases of Esparon v Esparon 12/1997, [1998-1999] SCAR 191 and Chetty v Emile [2008-2009] SCAR 65. He explained that Esparon and Chetty remove the reliance upon assessing contributions in money or money's worth towards the recognition of marriage as a relationship in which each spouse contributes what they can in different ways. </p> <p> </p> <p>I have to determine whether or not the learned Judge erred in law in determining the beneficial share of the Appellant and the Respondent in the matrimonial home at fifty per cent each based on Esparon [supra] and Chetty [supra] </p> <p> </p> <p>The Land and the house situated thereon were the parties' matrimonial home. This was the home they lived in after their marriage and brought up their children. Section 20(1)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act stipulates ―</p> <p> <br /> ″20 (1) Subject to section 24, on the granting of a conditional order of divorce or nullity or an order of separation, or at any time thereafter, the Court may, after making such inquiries as the Court thinks fit and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the ability and financial means of the parties to the marriage ―<br />  <br /> […];<br />  <br /> (g) make such order, as the Court thinks fit, in respect of any property of a party to a marriage or any interest or right of a party in any property for the benefit of the other party or a relevant child″.<br />  </p> <p>The Supreme Court has a wide discretionary power to grant financial relief to adjust the parties' property rights when granting a divorce or after that. The Court must exercise its discretion judiciously by considering all relevant factors. For example, the Court of Appeal in Esparon [supra] stated ―</p> <p> <br /> ″[15] There is little doubt that by the deliberate use, in s 20(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, of the phrase the ″court may, after making such inquiries as the Court think fit and having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the ability and financial means of the parties of the marriage″, the Supreme Court when looking at ″all the circumstances of the case, may have regard, without being exhaustive, to such matters as the standard of living enjoyed by each of the parties before the breakdown of the marriage, the age of the parties and duration of the marriage, any physical or mental disability of either party, the contributions made by each to the welfare of the family including looking after the home or caring for the family and the value to either party of any benefit (like a pension) which a party will lose as a result of the divorce. As for the ″ability and financial means″ this covers such matters as income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each party has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future and the financial needs and obligations each party has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future″.<br />  <br />  </p> <p>The Court of Appeal in Chetty [supra] stated ―</p> <p> <br /> ″[30] Contributions towards matrimonial property cannot be measured in pure monetary terms, in hard cash. As stated earlier the love and sweat and long of vigil to bring up the family by the spouses all have a role to play in the accumulation of matrimonial property. The cooking, the sweeping, the cleaning, the sewing, the laundering, tendering to the children and the many other nameless chores in a home are not things for which a value can be put on, but certainly, contribute towards the building up of the matrimonial property″.<br />  </p> <p>The presumption is that each party has an equal share (Charles v Charles) (2004-2005) SCAR 231). </p> <p> </p> <p>This case is a twenty-one-year marriage (although the parties separated in 2012) with three children; both parties worked during the subsistence of the marriage and had made financial contributions. The Appellant progressed in her work, resulting in differences in earning power between the parties. </p> <p> </p> <p>The learned Judge stated in her judgment that ″[25] … There is evidence that the Petitioner contributed more towards the household expenses to enable the Respondent to make these repayments [loan repayments]″. The Appellant stated in her evidence that the Respondent could not give her more than SCR1,000 as he did not earn more than SCR4,000 and was paying a loan of SCR2,000. </p> <p> </p> <p>The learned Judge found that the Respondent had contributed SCR333,000 towards the matrimonial home, which amount Counsel for the Appellant contended was incorrect. The learned Judge came to this finding concerning the Respondent's financial contribution on the following basis ― ″ [27] I make a similar finding of a contribution of SCR75,000 by the Respondent in respect of the SHDC loan. He also borrowed SCR127,500 and SCR131,000 from the Credit Union which shows a total contribution of SCR333,000 towards the matrimonial home.″  </p> <p> </p> <p>I do not question the learned Judge's finding that the Respondent contributed SCR75,000 for the SHDC loan. I am concerned with the loan of SCR131,000, which the learned Judge found the Respondent took. The Respondent stated in paragraph 7 of his affidavit evidence ―</p> <p>″7a. That I took on my own a loan of SR127,500 for the construction of the house on V9850 and from the balance remaining at that time and the balance outstanding from the previous loan was carried forward to have a loan amount of SCR142,158.44 … I aver that I was the one who was solely paying the loan″.<br />  </p> <p>When cross-examined about the loan of SCR142,158, he agreed with Counsel for the Appellant that it was not a new loan but a top-up of the loan of SCR127,000. He missed two payments of the said loan, which the Appellant paid in the sum of SCR 4,200. </p> <p> </p> <p>Hence, I find that the financial contribution of the Respondent towards the matrimonial home is about SCR213,000, in line with the calculation of the learned Judge. </p> <p> </p> <p>I turn to the loan amount paid by the Appellant. In her supporting submissions, Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Appellant paid SCR369,959.79 (or SCR343,490.60) and not SCR329,000 as found by the learned Judge.</p> <p> </p> <p>The learned Judge explained her finding as follows ―</p> <p> <br /> ″[26] In particular, I find that the initial sum of SR150,000 was shared by both parties and in that respect I make a finding of a contribution of SR75,000 each. I allow an extra SR19,000 from the Credit Union loan taken by the Petitioner over and above what was borrowed to pay off the SHDC loan. I also accept her evidence that she borrowed the following sums towards the improvement of the home: SR25,000, SR45,000, SR24,000 and SR131,999 from the bank and the Credit Union. I find, therefore, that in total, she contributed SR329,000 towards the matrimonial home.″<br />  </p> <p>Concerning the first loan of SCR150,000, the Appellant contended that the learned Judge erred in her determination that the parties shared that loan. She claimed that she solely paid the amounts of SCRSCR97,061 + SCR52,938 = SCR150,000. I have stated above that I do not question the finding of the learned Judge that the Appellant and the Respondent shared the loan of SCR150,000. Hence, I reject the contention of Counsel for the Appellant concerning this loan.</p> <p> </p> <p>I turn to the loan of SCR161,02.21, which Counsel for the Appellant claimed that the Appellant paid in full. The learned Judge found that the Appellant took the said loan to pay off the SHDC loan. As I have accepted the finding of the learned Judge that the Appellant and the Respondent shared the loan of SCR150,000, I conclude that the learned Judge did not err in allowing ″an extra SR19,000 from the Credit Union loan taken by the Petitioner over and above what was borrowed to pay off the SHDC loan″. </p> <p> </p> <p>Next, I conclude that there is no evidence of a loan of SCR24,000. The record revealed that the Appellant took a loan of SCR34,000, exhibit P11, evidence the learned Judge has accepted. Despite this error, I note that the learned Judge had considered the loan of SCR34,000 in her calculation of the loan amount taken by the Appellant. Hence, I find that the contribution of the Appellant towards the matrimonial home was SCR334,199 (+4200) and not SCR329,000 as found by the learned Judge. </p> <p> </p> <p>In light of the above, the total loan amount taken by the Appellant and the Respondent was about SCR547,200 (SCR213,000 + SCR334,199). The Appellant took about sixty-one percent of the total loan. The Respondent took about thirty-nine per cent of the total loan.<br /> Under ground 6 of the grounds of appeal, I had found that there was no basis to support the learned Judge's finding that the Respondent paid for alternative accommodation when he left the matrimonial home in 2014.  </p> <p> </p> <p>Further, there is evidence that the Appellant cleaned the house and did the laundry; the Respondent did the cooking and took the children to school every day and ironed the children's school uniforms, which contributed to the building of the matrimonial home. </p> <p> </p> <p>Having regard to all the circumstances of this case, I hold that the learned Judge erred in finding that the parties' respective contributions towards the matrimonial home were equal. I find that the Appellant contributed about sixty-one percent towards the matrimonial home and that the Respondent contributed about thirty-nine percent. This finding takes into account the conclusion of the learned Judge that ″[25] … [t]here is evidence that the Petitioner contributed more towards the household expenses to enable the Respondent to make these repayments [loan repayments]″ and that the Appellant continued to occupy the house with the children after the Respondent had moved out in 2014. [Emphasis supplied] </p> <p> </p> <p>I allow ground 1 of the grounds of appeal. </p> <p> </p> <p>In light of my conclusion concerning ground 1, the ground formulated by Counsel based on the law does not arise for consideration. </p> <p> <br /> Ground 5 of the grounds of appeal<br />  </p> <p>Having considered ground 5 and the submissions of the Appellant and the Respondent with respect to this ground, I hold that the learned Judge did not err in not attaching any weight to the assistance given to the Appellant by her family. For instance, there is evidence that they both made a financial contribution to living expenses when they stayed with the Appellant's family.</p> <p> </p> <p>Ground 5 of the grounds of appeal stands dismissed.</p> <p> <br /> Decision<br />  </p> <p>For the reasons stated above, the appeal is partly allowed. Hence, I quash the order of the learned Judge that the beneficial share of each party in the matrimonial home is half, and that each party is entitled to SCR1,150,000 as their respective share in the matrimonial home. </p> <p> </p> <p>I have distributed the beneficial share of the Appellant and the Respondent in the matrimonial home to be sixty-one percent and thirty-nine percent, respectively. </p> <p> </p> <p>I have found the value of the matrimonial home to be SCR2,100,000 and not to be SCR2,300,000. I award the Appellant the sum of SCR1,281,000 and the Respondent the sum of  SCR819000 as their respective share in the matrimonial home.  </p> <p> </p> <p>I order the Appellant to pay the Respondent the sum of SCR819000.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Appellant is given nine months from the date of this judgment within which to pay the Respondent the sum of SCR819,000, failing which the Respondent shall have nine months to pay the Appellant her share. </p> <p> </p> <p>If either party is unable to pay the other, in that case, the matrimonial home, the subject matter of the award, shall be sold to the highest bidder on the open market, and the proceeds of the sale shall be shared sixty-one: thirty-nine (61:39) between the Appellant and the Respondent. </p> <p> </p> <p>Each party shall bear her or his costs of these proceedings.</p> <p> <br />  <br /> ____________________<br /> Robinson JA<br />  <br />  <br />  <br />                                                                                     _______________________<br /> I concur:                                                                      Fernando, President<br />  <br />  <br />  <br />                                                                                     _______________________<br /> I concur:                                                                      Dr. L. Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza JA<br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br /> Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 29 April 2022. </p> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-a5db7f71ec73a05f5701b4c12f2296b38db67abfe1b961cb6872006eeb1a9752"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><p>IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF SEYCHELLES</p> <p> </p> <p>Reportable<br /> [2022] SCCA 26 (29 April 2022)<br /> SCA 44/2019<br /> (Appeal from CS 164/2014)<br />  <br /> In the matter between<br /> Bella Mein Nee Cushion                                                    Appellant<br /> (rep. by Mrs Domingue)<br />  <br /> and<br /> Bernard Mein                                                                     Respondent<br /> (rep. by Mr Rajasundaram)</p> <p> <br />  </p> <p>Neutral Citation: Cushion v Mein (SCA 44/2019) [2022] SCCA 26 (Arising in CS 164/2014)<br /> (29 April 2022)<br /> Before:                   Fernando President, Robinson, Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza, JJA<br /> Summary:             Divorce - Property adjustments - section 20(1)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act -  Home that the parties occupied after their marriage - Appellant continued to occupy the home with the three children - Beneficial share of the parties in the matrimonial home<br /> Heard:                    12 April 2022</p> <p>Delivered:              29 April 2022</p> <p>ORDER<br />  </p> <p>The orders that the beneficial share of each party in the matrimonial home is half and that each party is entitled to SCR1,150,000 as their respective share in the matrimonial home are quashed. </p> <p> </p> <p>The beneficial share of the Appellant and the Respondent in the matrimonial home is apportioned as sixty-one percent and thirty-nine percent, respectively. </p> <p> </p> <p>Award the Appellant the sum of SCR1,281,000 as her share in the matrimonial home.</p> <p> </p> <p>Award the Respondent the sum of SCR819000 as his share in the matrimonial home. <br /> The Appellant is given nine months from the date of this judgment within which to pay the Respondent the sum of SCR819,000, failing which the Respondent shall have nine months to pay the Appellant the sum of SCR1,281,000.</p> <p> </p> <p>If either party is unable to pay the other, the matrimonial home, the subject matter of the award, shall be sold to the highest bidder on the open market, and the proceeds of the sale shall be shared sixty-one: thirty-nine (61:39) between the Appellant and the Respondent. </p> <p> </p> <p>Each party shall bear her or his costs of these proceedings.</p> <p> </p> <p> <br /> JUDGMENT</p> <p> <br /> ROBINSON JA, (FERNANDO, PRESIDENT, TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA JA concurring)</p> <p>The Respondent and the Appellant were husband and wife. They got married to each other on the 22 September 1994. Two of the three children born of the marriage are minors. </p> <p> </p> <p>The Appellant and the Respondent were married for about twenty-one years. Their marriage was dissolved on the 9 March 2015 because of its irretrievable breakdown. A decree absolute was granted on the 12 May 2015. Although they separated in 2012, the Respondent stayed on in the house until 2014.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Appellant applied for property adjustments under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1992, on the 8 June 2017. She applied for an eighty percent share in the home and the first option to buy out the Respondent.</p> <p> </p> <p>In a judgment delivered on the 24 June 2019, a learned Judge of the Supreme Court found each party's share to be half in the matrimonial home. Hence, she ordered that each party is entitled to SCR1,150,000 as their respective share in the matrimonial home.<br /> She also ordered the Appellant to pay the Respondent his share in the matrimonial home in six months, failing which the Respondent shall then have six months to pay the Appellant her share. Further, she ordered that if either party cannot pay the other, the house shall be sold to the highest bidder on the open market, and the parties shall equally share the sale proceeds.</p> <p> <br /> The grounds of appeal</p> <p>The Appellant appealed on the grounds that ―</p> <p>″A. On the Facts<br />  <br /> 1. The learned Chief Justice erred in finding that both parties are entitled to a half share in the matrimonial property as this finding is not supported by the evidence.<br />  <br /> 2. The learned Chief Justice erred in her finding that the property had been paid for by the parties instead of accepting the evidence of the Petitioner and her half brother that Peter Tirant had gifted all of his children, including the Petitioner, with the property on which the parties built their matrimonial home. As a consequence, the learned Chief Justice should have made a finding that the Respondent was not entitled to any share in the property Title V9850.<br />  <br /> 3. The learned Chief Justice erred in not calling for a third valuation of the Property.<br />  <br /> 4. The learned Chief Justice though recognizing that the Petitioner had contributed more than the Respondent, still awarded the Respondent a half share in the matrimonial home and property.<br />  <br /> 5. The learned Chief Justice erred by not taking into account that the family of the Petitioner had helped the Petitioner and the Respondent by giving them accommodation and assisting them financially during the course of their marriage and further by assisting in obtaining the matrimonial property and building their matrimonial home on it.<br />  <br /> 6. The learned Chief Justice erred by not taking into account that two of the children of the parties are still living with the Petitioner and that they are still minors whilst she took into account that the Respondent had moved out of the matrimonial home since 2014 and that the Respondent had to pay for alternative accommodation whilst the Petitioner had full use and occupation of the home.<br />  <br /> B. On the Law<br />  <br /> The learned Chief Justice although alluding to the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1992 and the authorities cited by the parties did not apply the law and the authorities to the case″.<br />  </p> <p>The Appellant has abandoned ground 4 of the grounds.</p> <p> <br /> The evidence<br />  </p> <p>Before considering the grounds of appeal, and the written and oral submissions submitted on behalf of the Appellant and the Respondent, it is convenient to summarise the facts relevant to this appeal.</p> <p> </p> <p>The evidence of the Appellant. After getting married, the parties moved to the house of the Appellant's parents. She contributed SCR500 monthly to household expenses from her earnings. She was working for Mahe Shipping Company Limited at the time.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Appellant and the Respondent later moved from the house of the Appellant's parents to a small one-bedroom flat at Le Niole. The Appellant paid SCR500 monthly for the flat's rent from her earnings. </p> <p> </p> <p>When the Appellant gave birth to their first child in 1977, the family moved to the house of the Appellant's aunt. She gave her aunt SCR1000 monthly for living expenses from her earnings. The Respondent gave her SCR1,000 monthly from his earnings to buy food. The family moved out of her aunt's house in 2005.</p> <p> </p> <p>Mr Tirant, who is her stepfather, gifted her a parcel of land V9850 (327 square metres) (hereinafter referred to as the ″Land″) after she and the Respondent got married. As her earning power was insufficient to raise a loan, the Land was registered in their joint names on the 4 December 1997 to obtain loans. The Respondent merely lent his name to the transfer of the Land. They did not pay for the Land, although consideration of SCR15,000 was inserted in the Land transfer.<br /> They prepared the Land to build the house by excavating the big rocks and clearing. The Appellant testified that the proceeds of various loans financed the construction of the house.</p> <p> </p> <p>The parties took a loan of SCR150,000 in 2000 from the Housing Finance Company Limited. The Appellant claimed that she paid the monthly loan instalments from her salary, exhibit P4. On the 18 March 2005, Housing Finance Company Limited gave the parties a fourty percent discount on the amount still owed on the loan on the condition that the parties paid the amount of SCR97,061.62 within two weeks, exhibit P5. The Appellant paid off that amount in March 2005, exhibit P5. She claimed that the Respondent did not contribute to the loan payment.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Appellant took a ″Member Loan″ of SCR116,02.21 from the Seychelles Credit Union in 2005. She applied SCR97,000 from the proceeds of the Seychelles Credit Union loan to pay off the loan she had taken from the Housing Finance Company Limited. The Appellant paid off the loan in September 2014, exhibit P6. She claimed that the Respondent did not contribute to the loan payment.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Appellant took a loan of SCR25,000 from the Seychelles Savings Bank in 2005. The Respondent guaranteed the loan of the Appellant, exhibit P7. She purchased a mortgage protection assurance from the State Assurance Corporation of Seychelles concerning this loan in 2005, exhibit P7. She repaid the loan. She used the proceeds of the loan to buy building materials. The Respondent did not contribute to the payment of the loan.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Appellant took a loan of SCR45,000 from Barclays Bank (Seychelles) Ltd in 2007, exhibit P8. She paid off the loan. The Appellant applied the loan proceeds to buy home furnishings and some extras. On the 28 June 2007, she purchased a mortgage protection assurance from State Assurance Corporation of Seychelles concerning this loan. The Respondent did not contribute to the payment of the loan.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Appellant took a ″New Home Improvement Loan″ of SCR34,000 in 2008 from the Housing Finance Company Limited. The Appellant paid the monthly loan instalments from her salary, exhibit P11. She purchased a mortgage protection assurance from State Assurance Corporation of Seychelles concerning this loan, exhibit P11. The Respondent did not make any contribution to the repayment of the loan.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Appellant took a loan of SCR131,000 from Barclays Bank (Seychelles) Limited in 2013, exhibit P10. She paid the loan in monthly instalments of SCR3579. She paid off the loan. She applied the loan proceeds to fix up and improve the house. The Respondent did not contribute to the payment of the loan.</p> <p> </p> <p>She made financial contributions as she was in employment during the subsistence of the marriage and is still in employment. She worked for Mahe Shipping Company Limited for over twenty years, from the 3 August 1992 to the 3 December 2012. After leaving Mahe Shipping Company Limited, she worked for Benelux Shipping (Seychelles) Co. Ltd, from 4 September 2012 to 1 June 2015. After that, she formed Seyline Forwarding Agent in 2015. She also worked for ASL Seychelles Limited. When she worked for the different companies, her salary varied from SCR6,000, SCR8,500, SCR10,000 and SCR25,000 (see the salary receipts and other miscellaneous documents collectively referred to as exhibit P12).</p> <p> </p> <p>In addition to making loan repayments from her earnings, she applied her earnings to provide for and support her three children; pay for household expenses and utilities; pay the Respondent to paint the house – SCR1,000 yearly and pay her uncle to clean the exterior of the home. The Appellant did the household chores. She was the only one to care for the children when they were ill. </p> <p> </p> <p>During the subsistence of the marriage, the Respondent gave the Appellant SCR1,000 monthly for living expenses as he did not earn very much. The Respondent worked for Cable and Wireless; after that, he worked for Echo Car Hire and Classic Car Design. He also gave her that said amount after they had separated. The Respondent earned between SCR3,000 and SCR4,500.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Respondent took two loans - SCR127,000 and SCR142,000. With the proceeds of the loan of SCR 142,000, he financed the construction of the retaining wall, which cost about SCR135,000. The Appellant made two monthly payments on the Respondent's behalf towards the loan of SCR142,000, as he had defaulted on SCR4,200.</p> <p> </p> <p>When cross-examined, the Appellant stated that they started cohabiting one and half years before marriage. They lived at her parents' house. She was nineteen years old, and the Respondent was 21 years old when they got married in 1994.</p> <p> </p> <p>One Mr Joubert, a small building contractor, built the house. The parties provided the building materials. The Appellant gave money to the Respondent to buy the building materials. </p> <p> </p> <p>She could not state that the money given to her by the Respondent was insufficient because he could not give her more money as he did not earn more than SCR4,000 and was repaying a loan of SCR2,000. </p> <p> </p> <p>The evidence of Mr Georges Tirant. Mr Tirant is the half brother of the Appellant. All five siblings have inherited land from Mr Tirant and did not pay any consideration for their land. He was present in the office of Attorney Mr Gerard Morel when the parties to the transfer of the Land executed the said transfer. He ensured that no one misled Mr Tirant, who could not read and write, into signing the wrong document. Although a sum was inserted in the transfer of the Land, no money had exchanged hands. Mr Tirant has passed away.</p> <p> </p> <p>The evidence of Mrs Gerda Cushion. Mrs Cushion, who is sixty-nine years, is the Appellant's aunt. After the Appellant had her baby, the family moved to her house. They lived with her for seven years. The Appellant gave her SCR1000 monthly for living expenses. The Respondent did not give her any money. After the family had moved out, she assisted the Appellant and her kids financially and provided them with food. She helped the Appellant as she was paying loan instalments. Her brother cleans the exterior of the Appellant's house. </p> <p> </p> <p>The evidence of the Respondent. The Respondent worked for Cable and Wireless as a technician and then for Echo Car Hire as a salesman for ten years, where he earned SCR3,500. He has been working for Classic Car Hire for over fourteen and a half years. </p> <p> </p> <p>The transfer of the Land took place in the office of Mr Gerard Morel, a notary. He paid SCR8,000 for the Land, although consideration of SCR15,000 was inserted in the transfer of the Land. At the time, they lived with the Appellant's aunt. After that, the family rented a flat at Le Niole for a year. The family moved back to the house of the Appellant's aunt while building their home. They gave the Appellant's aunt SCR1,000 for food. </p> <p> </p> <p>The parties started building their three-bedroom house in 2001. The Respondent paid a monthly instalment of SCR1,258 for the first loan of SCR150,000 taken from the Housing Finance Company Limited to build their home, exhibit R1. He paid the loan for about four to five years. He also took a loan of SCR127,500 from the Seychelles Credit Union, exhibit R3, the proceeds of which were used to rebuild the retaining wall. He paid a monthly instalment of SCR1,950 for that loan, which was increased to SCR2,100. The Appellant took a loan for which she paid a monthly instalment of SCR2,200. He took a second loan of SCR142,100.58 from the Seychelles Credit Union on the 11 March 2004, exhibit R4 concerning the building of the house. He was unaware that the Appellant had taken more loans to improve or renovate the house. </p> <p> </p> <p>He ironed the children's school uniforms; took them to school every morning; picked them up in the evening; paid the utility bills; provided the washing machine, fridge, and cooker, and installed the kitchen cabinets. The Appellant earned about SCR500 more than him during the subsistence of the marriage. </p> <p> </p> <p>When cross-examined, the Respondent stated that they both paid the rent of SCR500 for the Le Niole flat. Both of them gave SCR1,000 to Mrs Cushion for food. They lived with Mrs Cushion for about six to seven years. He accepted that Mrs Cushion assisted the family.</p> <p> </p> <p>Concerning the Housing Finance Company Limited loan of SCR150,000, Counsel stated that the Appellant was not disputing that he paid a monthly instalment of SCR1,258 from 29 November 2000 to 28 February 2005. The Respondent was not sure whether or not the Appellant paid off the Housing Finance Company Limited's outstanding balance of SCR97,000.  </p> <p> </p> <p>He took a loan of SCR127,500 from the Seychelles Credit Union. He agreed with Counsel for the Appellant that the loan of SCR142,158 was not new but a top-up of the loan of SCR127,500. He stated that he missed two payments of the said loans, which the Appellant paid. He remembered only the Appellant's loan from Seychelles Savings Bank because he helped with the payment. He denied that the house had to be renovated as it is still a new house.  </p> <p> </p> <p>He took the children to school and did the cooking as the Appellant did not know how to cook. He agreed that the Appellant cleaned the house; ironed the clothes, and did the washing except for his washing and cared for the children. After the marriage broke down in 2012, he was still contributing and taking the children to school. He knew only of the basic salary of the Appellant, which was SCR4,500. He does not know of any other money that she was earning.</p> <p> <br /> Analysis of the contentions of the parties<br />  <br /> Ground 3 of the grounds of appeal<br />  </p> <p>Counsel for the Appellant, in her written submissions concerning this ground, contended that the learned Judge was wrong not to have called for a third quantity surveying report as there was a difference of SCR800,000 between the valuation of Mr Nigel Roucou (SCR1,700,000) tendered for the Appellant, and that of Mr Gustave Larue (SCR 2,500,000) tendered for the Respondent. The valuation tendered by Mr Roucou was the valuation at the date he prepared his report, 29 May 2018. Mr Roucou inspected the home on the 23 May 2018. The valuation given by Mr Larue was the valuation at the date he re-inspected the home, the 14 July 2017. I find this ground of appeal and the very brief supporting submissions devoid of merit. I give reasons for this finding.</p> <p> </p> <p>In her judgment, the learned Judge stated that Counsel for the Appellant had submitted in her closing written submissions that the valuation by the Appellant's quantity surveying expert and that of the Respondent has a discrepancy of SCR800,000, which could be resolved by joint valuation. The learned Judge did not accede to such a request made at the eleventh hour. She took an average value of the two valuations in dealing with the conflict of valuation evidence. The learned Judge held the view that ″given the fluid housing market in Seychelles, it is not totally unexpected that such variations in valuations can occur. To seek yet another valuation as proposed will not resolve the difference in values.″ </p> <p> </p> <p>In coming to her determination, the learned Judge was guided by the opinion of Mr Larue that the difference between the two valuations ″was not that really huge″. This dialogue between the Court and Mr Larue set out partly the opinion of Mr Larue  ―</p> <p> <br /> ″COURT TO WITNESS<br />  <br /> Q: In normal valuation processes, does it often happen that there is the variation in valuation  prices between 2 different valuations?<br /> A: It always happens.<br />  <br /> […].<br />  <br /> Q: What is your experience in Seychelles is it a huge margin?<br /> A: Normally it is not that really huge.<br />  <br /> Q: Okay a couple of 100,000?<br /> A: Hundred maybe million as well.<br />  <br /> Q: Sometimes million?<br /> A: Yes it does.<br />  <br /> Q: That has happened?<br /> A: Yes.″<br />  </p> <p>I observe that Counsel for the Appellant, during the cross-examination of Mr Larue, suggested briefly that his valuation was on the high side. Mr Larue explained why he gave the home the higher value. There is no evidence to suggest that the valuation of Mr Larue was wrong or on the high side. Overall, I observe that the Appellant did not materially dispute the valuation of Mr Larue. There is also no evidence which materially contradicts the valuation of Mr Roucou. </p> <p> </p> <p>In light of the above, I hold the view that the learned Judge cannot be faulted for accepting the evidence of both experts, on the whole, to be reliable and ″for closing the gap by taking an average of the two valuations″.</p> <p> </p> <p>The learned Judge found the difference between the two valuations to be SCR400,000. She incorrectly stated the valuation of Mr Roucou to be SCR2,100,000. Hence, she came to an average value of SCR2,300,000 for the matrimonial home. Counsel for the Appellant is correct in her written and oral submissions that the learned Judge should have reached an average value of SCR2,100,000, reflecting a fairer approach. I accept the submission of Counsel for the Appellant and find that the value of the matrimonial home is SCR2,100,000. </p> <p> </p> <p>For the reasons stated above, ground 3 stands dismissed, save for the finding that the average value of the matrimonial home is SCR2,100,000.</p> <p> <br /> Ground 6 of the grounds of appeal                               <br />  </p> <p>Concerning ground 6, I state that the learned Judge did not err in refusing to take into account the financial needs of the two minor children of the parties under the Matrimonial Causes Act, as the pleadings of the Appellant do not state any case concerning their financial needs and do not pray for any order for their benefit. The pleadings averred that proceedings concerning the financial needs of the two minor children were pending before the Family Tribunal. In Charlie v Francoise Civil Appeal No 12/1994 (delivered on the 12 May 1994), the Court of Appeal stated ―</p> <p> <br /> ″The system of civil justice in this country does not permit the Court to formulate a case for the parties after listening to the evidence and to grant a relief not sought by either of the parties that such evidence may sustain without amending the plaint. In the adversarial procedure the parties must state their respective cases on their pleadings and the plaintiff must state the relief he seeks on his plaint″. [Emphasis supplied]<br />  </p> <p>The Appellant also complained that the learned Judge erred in considering that the Respondent had to pay for alternative accommodation because the Respondent's pleadings do not state such a case, and the evidence does not support such a finding. Counsel for the Appellant is correct in her submissions. </p> <p> </p> <p>In exercising her discretion in adjusting the parties' property rights, under section 20(1) (g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, the learned Judge considered that the Respondent paid for alternative accommodation since he vacated the home in 2014. I find that the learned Judge was wrong to attach any weight to the fact that the Respondent paid for alternative accommodation since it did not arise on the pleadings, and there is no evidence to support such a finding.</p> <p> </p> <p>For the reasons stated above, ground 6 stands dismissed save for the finding that the learned Judge was wrong to attach any weight to the fact that the Respondent paid for alternative accommodation.</p> <p> <br /> Ground 2 of the grounds of appeal<br />  </p> <p>Under ground 2, Counsel for the Appellant contended in her skeleton heads of argument that the learned Judge erred in not accepting the evidence of the Appellant and Mr Georges Tirant that Mr Tirant, her stepfather, had gifted her the Land.<br /> In her judgment, the learned Judge found that the evidence relating to this fact and what took place in the notary's office amounted to back letters which are not admissible against the authenticity of the sale agreement registered on 4 December 1997, given the absolute nature of the provisions of Article 1321 alinéa 4 of the Civil Code of Seychelles. The learned Judge concluded that the Land was bought in equal shares on this basis. </p> <p> </p> <p>Since the Appellant is objecting to the conclusion of the learned Judge that the Land was bought in equal shares, the Appellant, in her ground of appeal, is also required to set forth the conclusions of the law to which the Appellant is objecting, rule 18(3) of the Seychelles Court of Appeal Rules, 2005, as amended. The said rule 18(3) stipulates ― ″(3) [s]uch grounds of appeal shall set forth in separate numbered paragraphs the finding of fact and conclusions of law to which the appellant is objecting and shall also state the particular respect in which the variation of the judgment or order is sought″. I also observe that the skeleton heads of argument provided on behalf of the Appellant do not at all address the reasoning and conclusions of law of the learned Judge. At the appeal hearing, the Appellant did not even address Article 1321 alinéa 4 of the Civil Code of Seychelles. </p> <p> </p> <p>I refuse to entertain ground 2 of the grounds of appeal for the above reasons. Hence, ground 2 of the grounds of appeal stands dismissed.</p> <p> <br /> Ground 1 of the grounds of appeal<br />  </p> <p>Under ground 1 of the grounds, the Appellant contended that the learned Judge erred in law in determining the beneficial share of the Appellant and the Respondent in the matrimonial home at fifty per cent each, given the substantial evidence which proved otherwise. </p> <p> </p> <p>In her supporting written and oral submissions, Counsel for the Appellant contended that the learned Judge failed to attach sufficient weight to the fact that she contributed far more and earned more than the Respondent. In this respect, she contended that the learned Judge erroneously found that she contributed SCR329,000 towards the matrimonial home. I observe that the parties did not question the approach of the learned Judge with respect to the computation of their financial contributions towards the matrimonial home. </p> <p> </p> <p>Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the learned Judge was correct in law to find that this was a case for a 50/50 split. He based his submissions on the cases of Esparon v Esparon 12/1997, [1998-1999] SCAR 191 and Chetty v Emile [2008-2009] SCAR 65. He explained that Esparon and Chetty remove the reliance upon assessing contributions in money or money's worth towards the recognition of marriage as a relationship in which each spouse contributes what they can in different ways. </p> <p> </p> <p>I have to determine whether or not the learned Judge erred in law in determining the beneficial share of the Appellant and the Respondent in the matrimonial home at fifty per cent each based on Esparon [supra] and Chetty [supra] </p> <p> </p> <p>The Land and the house situated thereon were the parties' matrimonial home. This was the home they lived in after their marriage and brought up their children. Section 20(1)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act stipulates ―</p> <p> <br /> ″20 (1) Subject to section 24, on the granting of a conditional order of divorce or nullity or an order of separation, or at any time thereafter, the Court may, after making such inquiries as the Court thinks fit and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the ability and financial means of the parties to the marriage ―<br />  <br /> […];<br />  <br /> (g) make such order, as the Court thinks fit, in respect of any property of a party to a marriage or any interest or right of a party in any property for the benefit of the other party or a relevant child″.<br />  </p> <p>The Supreme Court has a wide discretionary power to grant financial relief to adjust the parties' property rights when granting a divorce or after that. The Court must exercise its discretion judiciously by considering all relevant factors. For example, the Court of Appeal in Esparon [supra] stated ―</p> <p> <br /> ″[15] There is little doubt that by the deliberate use, in s 20(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, of the phrase the ″court may, after making such inquiries as the Court think fit and having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the ability and financial means of the parties of the marriage″, the Supreme Court when looking at ″all the circumstances of the case, may have regard, without being exhaustive, to such matters as the standard of living enjoyed by each of the parties before the breakdown of the marriage, the age of the parties and duration of the marriage, any physical or mental disability of either party, the contributions made by each to the welfare of the family including looking after the home or caring for the family and the value to either party of any benefit (like a pension) which a party will lose as a result of the divorce. As for the ″ability and financial means″ this covers such matters as income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each party has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future and the financial needs and obligations each party has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future″.<br />  <br />  </p> <p>The Court of Appeal in Chetty [supra] stated ―</p> <p> <br /> ″[30] Contributions towards matrimonial property cannot be measured in pure monetary terms, in hard cash. As stated earlier the love and sweat and long of vigil to bring up the family by the spouses all have a role to play in the accumulation of matrimonial property. The cooking, the sweeping, the cleaning, the sewing, the laundering, tendering to the children and the many other nameless chores in a home are not things for which a value can be put on, but certainly, contribute towards the building up of the matrimonial property″.<br />  </p> <p>The presumption is that each party has an equal share (Charles v Charles) (2004-2005) SCAR 231). </p> <p> </p> <p>This case is a twenty-one-year marriage (although the parties separated in 2012) with three children; both parties worked during the subsistence of the marriage and had made financial contributions. The Appellant progressed in her work, resulting in differences in earning power between the parties. </p> <p> </p> <p>The learned Judge stated in her judgment that ″[25] … There is evidence that the Petitioner contributed more towards the household expenses to enable the Respondent to make these repayments [loan repayments]″. The Appellant stated in her evidence that the Respondent could not give her more than SCR1,000 as he did not earn more than SCR4,000 and was paying a loan of SCR2,000. </p> <p> </p> <p>The learned Judge found that the Respondent had contributed SCR333,000 towards the matrimonial home, which amount Counsel for the Appellant contended was incorrect. The learned Judge came to this finding concerning the Respondent's financial contribution on the following basis ― ″ [27] I make a similar finding of a contribution of SCR75,000 by the Respondent in respect of the SHDC loan. He also borrowed SCR127,500 and SCR131,000 from the Credit Union which shows a total contribution of SCR333,000 towards the matrimonial home.″  </p> <p> </p> <p>I do not question the learned Judge's finding that the Respondent contributed SCR75,000 for the SHDC loan. I am concerned with the loan of SCR131,000, which the learned Judge found the Respondent took. The Respondent stated in paragraph 7 of his affidavit evidence ―</p> <p>″7a. That I took on my own a loan of SR127,500 for the construction of the house on V9850 and from the balance remaining at that time and the balance outstanding from the previous loan was carried forward to have a loan amount of SCR142,158.44 … I aver that I was the one who was solely paying the loan″.<br />  </p> <p>When cross-examined about the loan of SCR142,158, he agreed with Counsel for the Appellant that it was not a new loan but a top-up of the loan of SCR127,000. He missed two payments of the said loan, which the Appellant paid in the sum of SCR 4,200. </p> <p> </p> <p>Hence, I find that the financial contribution of the Respondent towards the matrimonial home is about SCR213,000, in line with the calculation of the learned Judge. </p> <p> </p> <p>I turn to the loan amount paid by the Appellant. In her supporting submissions, Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Appellant paid SCR369,959.79 (or SCR343,490.60) and not SCR329,000 as found by the learned Judge.</p> <p> </p> <p>The learned Judge explained her finding as follows ―</p> <p> <br /> ″[26] In particular, I find that the initial sum of SR150,000 was shared by both parties and in that respect I make a finding of a contribution of SR75,000 each. I allow an extra SR19,000 from the Credit Union loan taken by the Petitioner over and above what was borrowed to pay off the SHDC loan. I also accept her evidence that she borrowed the following sums towards the improvement of the home: SR25,000, SR45,000, SR24,000 and SR131,999 from the bank and the Credit Union. I find, therefore, that in total, she contributed SR329,000 towards the matrimonial home.″<br />  </p> <p>Concerning the first loan of SCR150,000, the Appellant contended that the learned Judge erred in her determination that the parties shared that loan. She claimed that she solely paid the amounts of SCRSCR97,061 + SCR52,938 = SCR150,000. I have stated above that I do not question the finding of the learned Judge that the Appellant and the Respondent shared the loan of SCR150,000. Hence, I reject the contention of Counsel for the Appellant concerning this loan.</p> <p> </p> <p>I turn to the loan of SCR161,02.21, which Counsel for the Appellant claimed that the Appellant paid in full. The learned Judge found that the Appellant took the said loan to pay off the SHDC loan. As I have accepted the finding of the learned Judge that the Appellant and the Respondent shared the loan of SCR150,000, I conclude that the learned Judge did not err in allowing ″an extra SR19,000 from the Credit Union loan taken by the Petitioner over and above what was borrowed to pay off the SHDC loan″. </p> <p> </p> <p>Next, I conclude that there is no evidence of a loan of SCR24,000. The record revealed that the Appellant took a loan of SCR34,000, exhibit P11, evidence the learned Judge has accepted. Despite this error, I note that the learned Judge had considered the loan of SCR34,000 in her calculation of the loan amount taken by the Appellant. Hence, I find that the contribution of the Appellant towards the matrimonial home was SCR334,199 (+4200) and not SCR329,000 as found by the learned Judge. </p> <p> </p> <p>In light of the above, the total loan amount taken by the Appellant and the Respondent was about SCR547,200 (SCR213,000 + SCR334,199). The Appellant took about sixty-one percent of the total loan. The Respondent took about thirty-nine per cent of the total loan.<br /> Under ground 6 of the grounds of appeal, I had found that there was no basis to support the learned Judge's finding that the Respondent paid for alternative accommodation when he left the matrimonial home in 2014.  </p> <p> </p> <p>Further, there is evidence that the Appellant cleaned the house and did the laundry; the Respondent did the cooking and took the children to school every day and ironed the children's school uniforms, which contributed to the building of the matrimonial home. </p> <p> </p> <p>Having regard to all the circumstances of this case, I hold that the learned Judge erred in finding that the parties' respective contributions towards the matrimonial home were equal. I find that the Appellant contributed about sixty-one percent towards the matrimonial home and that the Respondent contributed about thirty-nine percent. This finding takes into account the conclusion of the learned Judge that ″[25] … [t]here is evidence that the Petitioner contributed more towards the household expenses to enable the Respondent to make these repayments [loan repayments]″ and that the Appellant continued to occupy the house with the children after the Respondent had moved out in 2014. [Emphasis supplied] </p> <p> </p> <p>I allow ground 1 of the grounds of appeal. </p> <p> </p> <p>In light of my conclusion concerning ground 1, the ground formulated by Counsel based on the law does not arise for consideration. </p> <p> <br /> Ground 5 of the grounds of appeal<br />  </p> <p>Having considered ground 5 and the submissions of the Appellant and the Respondent with respect to this ground, I hold that the learned Judge did not err in not attaching any weight to the assistance given to the Appellant by her family. For instance, there is evidence that they both made a financial contribution to living expenses when they stayed with the Appellant's family.</p> <p> </p> <p>Ground 5 of the grounds of appeal stands dismissed.</p> <p> <br /> Decision<br />  </p> <p>For the reasons stated above, the appeal is partly allowed. Hence, I quash the order of the learned Judge that the beneficial share of each party in the matrimonial home is half, and that each party is entitled to SCR1,150,000 as their respective share in the matrimonial home. </p> <p> </p> <p>I have distributed the beneficial share of the Appellant and the Respondent in the matrimonial home to be sixty-one percent and thirty-nine percent, respectively. </p> <p> </p> <p>I have found the value of the matrimonial home to be SCR2,100,000 and not to be SCR2,300,000. I award the Appellant the sum of SCR1,281,000 and the Respondent the sum of  SCR819000 as their respective share in the matrimonial home.  </p> <p> </p> <p>I order the Appellant to pay the Respondent the sum of SCR819000.</p> <p> </p> <p>The Appellant is given nine months from the date of this judgment within which to pay the Respondent the sum of SCR819,000, failing which the Respondent shall have nine months to pay the Appellant her share. </p> <p> </p> <p>If either party is unable to pay the other, in that case, the matrimonial home, the subject matter of the award, shall be sold to the highest bidder on the open market, and the proceeds of the sale shall be shared sixty-one: thirty-nine (61:39) between the Appellant and the Respondent. </p> <p> </p> <p>Each party shall bear her or his costs of these proceedings.</p> <p> <br />  <br /> ____________________<br /> Robinson JA<br />  <br />  <br />  <br />                                                                                     _______________________<br /> I concur:                                                                      Fernando, President<br />  <br />  <br />  <br />                                                                                     _______________________<br /> I concur:                                                                      Dr. L. Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza JA<br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br /> Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 29 April 2022. </p></span></div></div> </div> </div> Thu, 23 Jun 2022 07:58:20 +0000 Anonymous 4237 at http://old2.seylii.org Hoareau v Azemia (SCA 43 of 2019) [2022] SCCA 24 (29 April 2022); http://old2.seylii.org/sc/judgment/court-appeal/2022/24 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">Hoareau v Azemia (SCA 43 of 2019) [2022] SCCA 24 (29 April 2022);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/159" hreflang="x-default">Family Law</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Anonymous (not verified)</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Thu, 06/23/2022 - 07:57</span> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-field-search-summary field--type-text-with-summary field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Search summary</div> <div class="field__item"><p>Matrimonial Property- Appeal against property adjustment order.Where legal ownership of matrimonial assets is vested in one party, but there is evidence that the other party contributed significantly towards the property, court can order that the property be vested in both parties.</p> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-field-headnote-and-holding field--type-text-long field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Headnote and holding</div> <div class="field__item"><p>The appeal succeeds.  Consequently, the judgment and orders of the lower court are quashed.  The Respondent is to pay the Appellant 50% value of the property within 6 months. No order is made as to costs</p> </div> </div> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.seylii.org/files/judgments/scca/2022/24/2022-scca-24_1.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=37209">2022-scca-24.docx</a></span> </div> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-pdf file--application-pdf"> <a href="https://media.seylii.org/files/judgments/scca/2022/24/2022-scca-24_1.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=779855">2022-scca-24.pdf</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><p>IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF SEYCHELLES</p> <p> </p> <p>Reportable<br /> [2022] SCCA 24 (29 April 2022)<br /> SCA 43/2019<br /> (Appeal arising in DV 102/2006)<br />  <br /> In the matter between<br />  <br /> Franky Hoareau                                                                Appellant<br /> (rep. by Charles Lucas)<br />  <br />  <br /> and<br />  <br />  <br /> Mary Azemia                                                                     Respondent<br /> (rep. by S. Rajasundaram)<br />  </p> <p> </p> <p>Neutral Citation: Hoareau v Azemia (SCA 43/2019) [2022] SCCA 24 (29 April 2022)<br />                                 (Arising in DV 102/2006)<br /> Before:                   Fernando, President, Twomey and Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza, JJA. <br /> Summary:             Matrimonial Property- Appeal against property adjustment order.<br />                                Where legal ownership of matrimonial assets is vested in one party, but there is evidence that the other party contributed significantly towards the property, court can order that the property be vested in both parties.<br />  Heard:                  11 and 13 April 2022<br /> Delivered:              29 April 2022<br />  </p> <p>ORDER<br />  <br /> The appeal succeeds.  Consequently, the judgment and orders of the lower court are quashed.  The Respondent is to pay the Appellant 50% value of the property within 6 months. No order is made as to costs.</p> <p> <br />                                                                    JUDGMENT<br />  <br /> ______________________________________________________________________________<br />  <br /> DR. L. TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA, JA.<br />  </p> <p>This is an appeal from a property adjustment order of the Supreme Court (F. Robinson, J.) dated 10th July 2019.<br /> The background facts as accepted in the lower court are that the Appellant and Respondent cohabited together for 19 years. The duo got married in 2004 and had one child but in July 2006, the Respondent commenced divorce proceedings on ground that the marriage had irretrievably broken down. Subsequently, the marriage was dissolved by a court order in March 2007. Tension broke out as to what shares the applicant and Respondent were entitled to in respect of the matrimonial home.<br /> It is an undisputed fact that the home was built on land belonging to the Respondent and she continued living in the matrimonial home after the dissolution of the marriage.<br /> The Appellant therefore instituted a claim for a property adjustment order in the sum of SR 615,781 from the Respondent. By Notice of Motion dated 6th March 2015, the Appellant applied for leave of court to amend his pleadings dated 8th August 2007 to increase his claim from the sum of SCR 615, 781 to half the total value of the property as at the date that the court makes a final adjudication on his share in the property. The motion was granted on May 24th 2017.<br /> At the hearing in the Supreme Court, the Appellant testified that together with the Respondent, they started building the matrimonial home in 1992. At the time, the Respondent was a clerk working at "Maison Du Peuple" and her salary was about SR 1500/- to SR 1700/-.<br /> He further testified that the building contractor quoted a price of SR 400,000/- to build the matrimonial home.<br /> That the Respondent obtained a bank loan from the Seychelles Housing Development Corporation (the "SHDC') of SR 150,000/-, which was her sole contribution to the building of the matrimonial home.<br /> That the rest of the balance for the construction was out of his funds. The Appellant testified that out of the proceeds of sale of his land comprised in title number J435 situated at Bel Ombre which he sold to his brother, Cliff HOAREAU, he managed to contribute SR 150,000 to the construction of the matrimonial home.<br /> He also stated that between 1984 and 2004, he received gratuity of a total sum of SR350, 000/- from the Seychelles Peoples Defence Forces (SPDF) of which he contributed SR 175,000/- to the building of the matrimonial home and a retaining wall on the Respondent's property. <br /> He further explained that he took three loans from Barclays Bank, amounting to SR96,000/-which he used as contribution to the building of the matrimonial home. He adduced the loan documents as well as invoices of building materials in the trial court.<br /> However, the Respondent objected to the documents being admitted in evidence because they were not issued in the Appellant's names. The Appellant explained that some of the receipts and invoices were made out to individuals who bought building materials on his behalf.<br /> The Court overruled the objection and noted that the documents, including the receipts and the invoices, related to the period of construction of the matrimonial home.<br /> Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled that it would decide on the weight that should be attached to the documents in the judgment.<br /> The Appellant also stated that on 10 June 2006, before he left the matrimonial home, he conducted an inventory of the furniture and equipment he purchased and found that it was worth SR150,000/-. He stated that of the mentioned sum, he was claiming only SR 50,000/-because his son used the furniture.<br /> The Appellant also stated that he borrowed money from the Children Welfare Fund in the sum of SR 10,000/- which was channeled to the building of the matrimonial home. In 2000, he borrowed an additional sum of SR10,000/-. He paid the loans out of his salary.<br /> Furthermore, the Appellant claimed to have spent about SR50, 000/- on the purchase of some building materials for tiling, plumbing of the bathroom and kitchen. He added that he had spent more than the said amount, but he was only claiming SR50, 000/-.<br /> He stated that the Respondent did not have to borrow SR150, 000/ from Nouvobanq in relation to the matrimonial home because it was in good state of repair when he left it.<br /> On the other hand, the Respondent stated that the Appellant was not entitled to any share in the matrimonial home because he did not make any contributions towards its construction.<br /> Although she admitted that the Appellant sold his house at Bel Ombre for SR 150,000 she denied him making any contributions out of the proceeds of the sale to the home. The Respondent stated that she is the one who single handedly built the home.<br /> She testified that she took out a loan of SR150, 000 from the Seychelles Housing Development Corporation to pay for the houses but she neither recalled the date the loan was processed nor the monthly dues she paid towards the loan.<br /> In regard to the retaining wall, the Respondent stated that it was built by a contractor hired by the Ministry of Local Government after the wall was damaged by the tsunamis in 2004.<br /> SACOS paid her some money for the damaged furniture because she had insured the house with them.<br /> She added that the furniture was bought with her own money since she was the only one working at the time she lived with the Appellant.<br /> The Respondent further stated that in 2005 when the divorce proceedings were underway, she took out a loan of SR 260,000/- from Nouvobanq to repair damages to the house and wall caused by the floods. She stated that she was still paying off the loan.<br /> She also paid for the carport, external shower, and extension to the kitchen, master bedroom and veranda.<br /> Mr. Brian Kilindo a contractor hired by the Disaster Fund of the Ministry of Local Government to build the retaining wall stated that the price was about SR 80,000.<br /> Upon evaluation of the evidence by the parties, the trial Judge was satisfied by the appellant's evidence and held that the Appellant provided his best recollection, and that it had not been coloured or diminished by the passage of time. The court based its assessment on the impression it had of the Appellant’s oral evidence and the documents produced by him. However, the court observed that the evidence of the Appellant with respect to some of the items being claimed, was not clear.<br /> For the Respondent the court observed that she had done her best to discount the monetary contribution of the Appellant in relation to the construction of the matrimonial home. The trial Judge found the Respondent to be evasive and her evidence to be scant in relation to the facts in issue. The Judge noted that the Respondent had difficulty in remembering any of the salaries she earned at the material time, and gave imprecise evidence of loans she took out except for the SHDC loan.<br /> The court concluded that it was due to the bitterness still being felt by the Respondent towards the Appellant that resulted in her not wanting the latter to receive any share in the matrimonial home.<br /> Arising from the evaluation of the evidence, the Judge entered judgment in favour of the Appellant and awarded him a total sum of SR 450,000 as the equivalent of his monetary contributions to the matrimonial house. The Judge also granted the Appellant interest on the said sum at a legal rate of 4% from the date of judgment until full payment of the decretal sum.<br /> The breakdown of the said award was as follows:</p> <p>Under claim for contributions out of the land sale proceeds- SR75, 000/-.<br /> Claim arising out of Barclays Bank loans - SR96, 000/-.<br /> under claim for contributions from gratuity- SRI 50,000/-<br /> For contributions out of SPDF loans - SR25,000/-<br /> In relation to expenses n building materials for tiling the bathroom kitchen and plumbing works-SR24, 000/-.<br /> For claim of money expended on building materials- SR60,000/-<br /> For a third share in household movables- SR 20,000.</p> <p>Dissatisfied with the judgment, the Appellant appealed to this Court on the following grounds:</p> <p>1. The learned Judge failed to properly evaluate and consider the evidence relating to the contributions made by the Appellant as she erroneously refused to admit pleaded documentary evidence to that effect.<br /> 2. The trial Judge erred in her analysis on the value of the structures on the premises despite the fact that there were three altogether. (sic)<br /> 3. The learned Judge erred in awarding the Appellant a sum tantamount to a refund of his contributions he made over 20 years ago instead of applying the principles under Section 20 (1) (g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act. In so doing, the trial judge failed to show how she reached the decision on the quantum of award in paragraph 73 of the judgment.<br /> 4. The trial Judge failed to appreciate the reliability and truthful accounts given by the Appellant relating to the relationship, disparity in contributions, the standard of proof to be of the documents attached to the affidavits and the discredit of the Respondent's testimony by cross examination. Her award of less 25% of the value to the Appellant in that respect is unjustified and unfounded.<br /> 5. The trial judge failed to discount the extra benefit the Respondent enjoyed from the Appellant's share of the matrimonial home which includes his share in the movables, rentals collected from the annex apartment, sole occupation of the premises while the Appellant made out of pock expenses for alternative accommodation since 2005.<br /> 6. The trial Judge failed to adjudicate on the Appellant's Motion which amended his original demand for SR 615,718 and was wrong at paragraph 72 of the judgment to adjudicate on a demand that had been substituted by an amended demand for 50% since June 2017.<br />  <br /> Prayers</p> <p>The Appellant prayed that this Court reverses the orders in paragraph 73 of the judgment and awards him at least 50% of the value of the structures on the Respondent's land.</p> <p>Court’s analysis</p> <p> The central issue for determination in this appeal is whether the Learned Trial Judge followed the correct principles in granting an award for contributions made towards a matrimonial home and whether proper evaluation of the documentary evidence was carried out.<br /> I will resolve the grounds in the following order: Ground 6, Ground 1 and 4, Ground 3 and 5 together and end with Ground 2.<br /> Ground 6: This ground in essence faults the Trial Judge for proceeding to determine the award to him on the basis of pleadings which were originally filed in court but later amended.<br /> It is on record that the Appellant, with leave of the court, amended his claim on the disputed property by increasing it from the sum of SCR 615, 781.00 to half the total value of the property “as at the date that the court would make a final adjudication on his share in the property registered in the Respondent’s name.”<br /> However, the Trial Judge preceded her costing of the award by stating that the applicant: “is asking this court for the sum of SCR 615, 781.00.”<br /> In this, the Trial Judge erred. The court’s point of departure should have been the amended pleadings. Consequently, ground 6 succeeds.<br /> Nevertheless, the amount originally claimed and that which the court awarded will be useful in answering the question: did the Appellant make substantial contribution to the building of the matrimonial property in dispute?</p> <p> </p> <p>Grounds 1 and 4 </p> <p>Ground 1 faults the trial judge for not properly evaluating the documentary evidence adduced in court. Ground 4 faults the Judge for failing to appreciate the reliability and truthful accounts given by the Appellant relating to disparity in contributions. Both groundd1 and 4 deal with evaluation of evidence.<br /> [42]     A look at the proceedings in the court below show that the Appellant’s case was based on affidavit evidence, oral evidence resulting from examination in chief as well as in cross examination.<br /> [43]     Documents indicating the loans the Appellant accessed, the gratuity paid to him by his employer, funds received from the sale of his land etc. during the relevant period, as well as documents indicating purchases of building materials were adduced in evidence.<br /> [44]     Regarding documentary evidence Counsel for the Respondent objected to the admission of particular documents for various reasons. However, a reading of the court proceedings reveals various pieces of evidence which were admitted in evidence but with a rider that the Learned Judge would decide what weight/evidential value she would attach to the evidence in question. And in the judgement of the court below, the Trial Judge said:<br /> The Applicant ushered in evidence miscellaneous including invoices and receipts which according to his evidence showed that he bought building materials from …building material retail outlets between 1993 and 1994 and in 1996 for the construction of the matrimonial home. … According to the affidavit evidence of the Applicant, he spent about SR 79,013.88/- on building materials. Objections were taken to most of these documents being ushered into evidence on the ground that they are not made out in the name of the Applicant. The Applicant explained that some of the receipts and invoices are made out to individuals who bought the building materials on his behalf. This court noted that the documents, including the receipts and the invoices, related to the period of construction of the matrimonial home.  … This court admitted those disputed documents and, further, ruled that it will decide on the weight that should be attached to them at time of judgment<br /> [45]     And indeed although the Appellant claimed a total of 129,013 as money spent on miscellaneous building materials, only 84,000 was awarded.<br /> [46]     Specific mention should also be made of a document emanating from an electrician indicating that he did electrical installation works at the matrimonial home. Its admission was objected to by the Respondent because it was a letter and not an invoice or receipt. The letter stated that the works amounted to SR 18,768. Although the Appellant’s Counsel informed court that the author would be called to testify, this did not happen. This amount was not awarded. In regard to this, the reason is clear.<br /> [47]     The Appellant also testified that he had obtained loans from Barclays Bank (SCR 96,000) as well as SCR 37,000 from his place of work (SPDF). He produced the loan offer from the Bank and the documents indicate the purpose for the loan to be: RENOVATION OF HOUSE. The Trial Judge credited the full Barclays Loan to the Appellant by awarding him the 96,000 claim.<br />  <br /> [48]     Regarding the SPDF loans, the Appellant adduced in evidence documents showing that a total of 37,000 was extended to him as a loan in instalments.<br />  <br /> [49]     The documents indicated what the purpose of the loan was: “to extend one bedroom”, another was to “build stone wall” etc. The loan request indicated the specific purchases to be made using the loan and a look at the details will indicate different building materials and labour. Comments from the officers in charge indicated that site visits were conducted.<br />  <br /> [50]     However, the Trial Judge gave only 25,000 to the Appellant and she indicates that the award is for “SPDF loans and labour for workers”. I note that the Appellant adduced in evidence had testified that he had paid SR 10,000 as labour for erection of walls.  This amount was pleaded separately from the loan of 37,000. No explanation is given for declining to accept the full claim.<br />  <br /> [51]     The Appellant further testifies that he spent SCR 175,000, which was part of his gratuity, on the development of the property. Documents to support his having received gratuity after very two years as an employee of the Forces were adduced in evidence. The Learned Judge gave an award of 150,000. No explanation for not giving the whole pleaded sum was given.<br />  <br /> Pleaded amount by the Plaintiff- Appellant </p> <p>Heading </p> <p>Pleaded amount SCR</p> <p>Awarded amount SCR</p> <p>Exhibit number </p> <p>From proceeds of sale of J 435</p> <p>100,000</p> <p>75,000</p> <p>1</p> <p>Barclays Loans </p> <p>96,000</p> <p>96,000</p> <p>2</p> <p>SPDF Gratuity </p> <p>175,000</p> <p>150,000</p> <p> </p> <p>SPDF loans and labour for workers</p> <p>47,000</p> <p>25,000</p> <p>3</p> <p>Electrical Installation  and materials </p> <p>18,768</p> <p>-</p> <p>4</p> <p>Building materials </p> <p>50,000</p> <p>24,000</p> <p> </p> <p>Building Materials </p> <p>79,013 </p> <p>60,000</p> <p>5</p> <p>1/3 share in household movables </p> <p>50,000</p> <p>20,000</p> <p>6</p> <p> </p> <p>615,781</p> <p>450,000</p> <p> </p> <p> <br /> [52]     However, in her judgment, the Learned Trial makes a finding that the Appellant was a credible witness. In her words:<br />  <br /> This court is satisfied that the Applicant provided his best recollection, and that his recollection had not been coloured or diminished by the passage of time. This court has based its assessment on the impression made by the oral evidence of the Applicant against the conclusions to be drawn from the miscellanies documents produced by Him. However, this court observes that the evidence of the Applicant with respect to some of the items being claimed is not clear.<br />  <br /> [53]     It may be safe to conclude that the Learned Trial Judge cannot be faulted for attaching little or no evidential value to documents such as receipts written in the names of individuals other than the Appellant.<br />  <br /> [54]     There is no doubt that a judge who is presented with documentary evidence has the authority and opportunity to determine the weight to be attached to the evidence.<br />  <br /> [55]     However, after expressing satisfaction with the credibility of the Appellant as a witness, the Learned Trial Judge ought to have given explanations regarding the weight attached to documents whose authenticity was not questionable and the justification for treating the loan from the Barclays Bank differently from the loan from the employer. Justice would have been served better if the Learned Judge had given explanations as to why evidence which on the face of it was similar was nevertheless treated/assessed differently and thus leading to partial awards in one instance and full awards in another.<br />  <br /> [56]     In comparison to the Appellant, the Learned Trial Judge made a finding which for all intents and purposes discredited the Respondent as an unreliable witness. In her words:<br />  <br /> … the Respondent did her utmost to discount the monetary contribution of the Applicant in relation to the construction of the matrimonial home. This court found the Respondent to be evasive and her evidence to be scant in relation to the facts in issue. The Respondent had difficulty in remembering any of the salaries she earned at the material time, and gave imprecise evidence of loans she took, except for the SHDC loan.<br />  <br /> [57]     What can be deduced from the Judge’s observation above is that the only amount which could with certainty be accepted as the Respondent’s contribution to the development of the property is the SCR 150,000/ she obtained as a loan.<br />  <br /> [58]     Nevertheless, a look at the proceedings at the lower court show that the Respondent purchased various types of construction materials which she claimed to have used to make improvements to the property in 2005. Counsel for the Appellant did not object to adducing receipts and invoices written in the name of the Respondent. The Judge however did not make any findings on the relevance of the purchases to the dispute in issue.<br />  <br />  [59]    I scrutinised the purchases and calculated the total spent on expenses which add value to the structure as indicated in the table below. I left out purchases for items such as furniture and other movable property.<br />  </p> <p>  Exhibit Number (R)</p> <p>Description</p> <p>Value</p> <p>Date</p> <p>7</p> <p>Cash Sale UCPS</p> <p>264.96</p> <p>12.08.05</p> <p>8</p> <p>Cash Sale UCPS</p> <p>106</p> <p>12.08.05</p> <p>9</p> <p>SMB Reinforcing Bar</p> <p>185</p> <p>12.08.05</p> <p>10</p> <p>SMB Tiles</p> <p>750</p> <p>23.09.05</p> <p>11</p> <p>SMB Timber</p> <p>7438</p> <p>01.09.05</p> <p>12</p> <p>SMB Timber</p> <p>612</p> <p>03.10.05</p> <p>13</p> <p>Civil Construction Ltd</p> <p>470</p> <p>03.10.05</p> <p>14</p> <p>SMB Timber</p> <p>306</p> <p>17.10.05</p> <p>15</p> <p>Cash Sale UCPS</p> <p>535</p> <p>04.08.05</p> <p>16</p> <p>Cash Sale UCPS</p> <p>326</p> <p>08.07.05</p> <p>17</p> <p>Cash Sale UCPS</p> <p>549.4</p> <p>08.07.05</p> <p>18</p> <p>Cash Sale UCPS</p> <p>795</p> <p>04.07.05</p> <p>19</p> <p>Cash Sale UCPS</p> <p>640</p> <p>04.07.05</p> <p>20</p> <p>Cash Sale UCPS</p> <p>326.4</p> <p>04.07.05</p> <p>21</p> <p>Cash Sale UCPS</p> <p>459</p> <p>04.07.05</p> <p>22</p> <p>Bodco Conduit</p> <p>885</p> <p>13.08.05</p> <p>23</p> <p>SMB welded mesh and MS bar</p> <p>1670</p> <p>05.07.05</p> <p>25</p> <p>Plywood</p> <p>842</p> <p>08.07.05</p> <p>28</p> <p>Rapid Roofing</p> <p>35895</p> <p>19.05.05</p> <p>29</p> <p>UCPS</p> <p>263</p> <p>28.09.05</p> <p>30</p> <p>Bodco</p> <p>108</p> <p>15.10.05</p> <p>31</p> <p>Bodco</p> <p>1385.4</p> <p>18.10.05</p> <p>32</p> <p>Bodco</p> <p>346.8</p> <p>18.10.05</p> <p>33</p> <p>Home accessories -Tiles</p> <p>7500</p> <p>18.10.05</p> <p>51</p> <p>Air Conditioning</p> <p>7425</p> <p>25.01.05</p> <p> </p> <p>TOTAL</p> <p>70082.96</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>[60]     The total value came to SCR 70,082.96. The dates on the receipts range between 04.07.2005 to 18.10.2005. This would bring the Respondents contribution to 150,000 + 70,082.96 = 220,082.96.  If we are to accept that the cost was SCR 45,000, the Respondent’s contribution would be 48.89% of the cost of the development.<br /> [61]     There is no set mathematical formula by which matrimonial property should be divided and each case is considered on its merits.<br /> [62]     However, Section 20 (1) (g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act gives guidance on how courts should determine division of matrimonial property. The Section provides that:<br />  (1) Subject to section 24, on the granting of a conditional order of divorce or nullity or an order of separation, or at any time thereafter, the court may, after making such inquiries as the court thinks fit and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the ability and financial means of the parties to the marriage-<br /> (g) make such order, as the court thinks fit, in respect of any property of a party to a marriage or any interest or right of a party in any property for the benefit of the other party or a relevant child. [Court’s emphasis]<br /> [63]     In Esparon vs. Esparon[1] this Court interpreted the meaning of the above provision as follows:<br /> “all the circumstances of the case, [and] may have regard, without being exhaustive, to such matters as the standard of living enjoyed by each of the parties before the breakdown of the marriage, the age of the parties and duration of the marriage, any physical or mental disability of any party, the contributions made by each to the welfare of the family, including looking after the home or caring for the family or the value to either party of any benefit (like a pension) which a party will lose as a result of the divorce….”<br /> [64]     Furthermore, courts in exercising their discretion in division of matrimonial property are to be guided by the goal of ensuring that one party is not to be put at an unfair advantage in relation to the other. In my view, this is the principle of fairness and equity. In Hoareau vs. Hoareau[2] , this Court emphasized the principle as follows:<br /> “It is important not to forget to ensure that a party is not put at an unfair advantage. In the process, the court should try, as far as possible, to come up with an award that will enable the other party to maintain a fair reasonable living which is “commensurate or near the standard” the parties were maintaining before the dissolution of the marriage. We know and appreciate that this is not an easy task but courts should keep on trying so that the wider goal of ensuring that one party is not put at an unfair advantage in relation to the other is achieved.”<br /> [65]     In determining the equitable balance in matrimonial property, the starting point is looking at the legal ownership and then subsequently adjust the shares of each party based on the level of contributions made by each party.[3]<br /> [66]     In Lepathy v Lepathy [2020] SCSC 142 this Court dealt with a case in which matrimonial property was in the name of one spouse only. The Court answered the question: what contribution and factors are to be taken into account in dividing such property?<br />  <br /> [67]     Court noted that case law has established that the point of departure in the division of matrimonial property where only one party has title to the property is to consider the assets held in the name of one spouse as that spouses’ property unless it is established that that was not the intention of the parties (see Etienne v Constance (1977) SLR 233 and Maurel v Maurel (1998-1999) SCAR 57. <br />  <br /> [68]     It was however also held that  it is also firmly established in Seychellois jurisprudence that where the legal ownership of a matrimonial asset is vested solely in one party but there is overwhelming and convincing evidence that the other party made significant contributions towards the matrimonial asset in issue, the matrimonial property should be vested in both parties given the express terms of section 20 (1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act giving a large discretion to the court with regard to all the circumstances of the case (Esparon v Esparon (1998-1999) SCAR 191).<br />  <br /> [69]     In other words, court starts with acknowledging the legal ownership of the property on the one hand and then acknowledges the contributions made towards the property by each of the parties, on the other hand.<br />  <br /> [70]     In line with the two principles enunciated above, courts answer the question: did the party with no legal ownership adduce evidence to prove their contribution towards the property in issue? And what value should be put to the contribution?<br />  <br /> [71]     In the matter before us, even if we are to give the modest figure of 45000 as contribution by the Appellant, juxtaposed with the contribution of the Respondent, I come to the finding that the Appellant made significant contributions to the matrimonial property in issue. It is however on record that the Appellant is willing to be awarded 50% of the value of the property.<br />  <br /> Ground 3<br />  <br /> [72]     The essence of this ground is that whatever amount of money is accepted by the court as the Appellant’s contribution to the building of the matrimonial property, to order that it be refunded to him would lead to an injustice against him. The essence of the argument is that he should receive the value of his “investment” at the time of division of the property.<br />  <br /> [73]     It is on record that in 2008, the lower court ordered for a Quantity Surveyor to value the property in dispute. But the case only eventually took off in 2017. The court then appointed another Quantity Surveyor – Nigel Roucou.<br />  <br /> [74]     At the hearing of the appeal, Counsel for both parties were informed that due to the fact that this matter had been in the courts as far back as 2006, the Court would use the 2017 Quantity Surveyor’s Report, the latest report, rather than send the case back to the Supreme Court with orders that the court appoints a Quantity Surveyor. In valuing the property, the 2017 report excluded the value of the land. This is because it was an uncontested fact that the Respondent had sole legal ownership of the land.<br />  <br /> [75]     The property was valued at SR 2,975,000.00. The value (296,500) attached to the reinforced concrete retaining wall has been excluded from the figure above because evidence adduced proves that the cost was done by neither of the parties.<br />  <br /> [76]     What remains is SCR 2,678,500 to be shared between the parties in equal shares.<br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br /> ORDER<br />  <br /> [77]     The Respondent is in occupation of the matrimonial home. In the circumstances, I make the following orders:</p> <p>The Respondent is to pay the Appellant the sum of 1,339,250 within 6 months of this Judgment.</p> <p> </p> <p>In the event that the Respondent fails to make payment within 6 months of this Judgment, the property will be sold and the proceedings shared between the two parties in the ratio specified in this Order.</p> <p> <br />  <br />  <br /> ____________________________                                                   <br /> Dr. L. Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza, JA                                     <br />  <br /> I concur:                                                                      ___________________<br />                                                                                     Fernando, President<br />  <br />  <br /> I concur:                                                                      ____________________<br />                                                                                     M. Twomey, JA<br />  <br />  <br />  <br /> Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 29 April 2022.<br />  </p> <p>[1] [1998-1999] SCAR 191.</p> <p>[2] SCA 30/1996.</p> <p>[3] Esparon v Esparon (footnote 1)</p> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-6959a74c57839e773f41520e9808465d99731fde687c1529cf2036615648736e"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><p>IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF SEYCHELLES</p> <p> </p> <p>Reportable<br /> [2022] SCCA 24 (29 April 2022)<br /> SCA 43/2019<br /> (Appeal arising in DV 102/2006)<br />  <br /> In the matter between<br />  <br /> Franky Hoareau                                                                Appellant<br /> (rep. by Charles Lucas)<br />  <br />  <br /> and<br />  <br />  <br /> Mary Azemia                                                                     Respondent<br /> (rep. by S. Rajasundaram)<br />  </p> <p> </p> <p>Neutral Citation: Hoareau v Azemia (SCA 43/2019) [2022] SCCA 24 (29 April 2022)<br />                                 (Arising in DV 102/2006)<br /> Before:                   Fernando, President, Twomey and Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza, JJA. <br /> Summary:             Matrimonial Property- Appeal against property adjustment order.<br />                                Where legal ownership of matrimonial assets is vested in one party, but there is evidence that the other party contributed significantly towards the property, court can order that the property be vested in both parties.<br />  Heard:                  11 and 13 April 2022<br /> Delivered:              29 April 2022<br />  </p> <p>ORDER<br />  <br /> The appeal succeeds.  Consequently, the judgment and orders of the lower court are quashed.  The Respondent is to pay the Appellant 50% value of the property within 6 months. No order is made as to costs.</p> <p> <br />                                                                    JUDGMENT<br />  <br /> ______________________________________________________________________________<br />  <br /> DR. L. TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA, JA.<br />  </p> <p>This is an appeal from a property adjustment order of the Supreme Court (F. Robinson, J.) dated 10th July 2019.<br /> The background facts as accepted in the lower court are that the Appellant and Respondent cohabited together for 19 years. The duo got married in 2004 and had one child but in July 2006, the Respondent commenced divorce proceedings on ground that the marriage had irretrievably broken down. Subsequently, the marriage was dissolved by a court order in March 2007. Tension broke out as to what shares the applicant and Respondent were entitled to in respect of the matrimonial home.<br /> It is an undisputed fact that the home was built on land belonging to the Respondent and she continued living in the matrimonial home after the dissolution of the marriage.<br /> The Appellant therefore instituted a claim for a property adjustment order in the sum of SR 615,781 from the Respondent. By Notice of Motion dated 6th March 2015, the Appellant applied for leave of court to amend his pleadings dated 8th August 2007 to increase his claim from the sum of SCR 615, 781 to half the total value of the property as at the date that the court makes a final adjudication on his share in the property. The motion was granted on May 24th 2017.<br /> At the hearing in the Supreme Court, the Appellant testified that together with the Respondent, they started building the matrimonial home in 1992. At the time, the Respondent was a clerk working at "Maison Du Peuple" and her salary was about SR 1500/- to SR 1700/-.<br /> He further testified that the building contractor quoted a price of SR 400,000/- to build the matrimonial home.<br /> That the Respondent obtained a bank loan from the Seychelles Housing Development Corporation (the "SHDC') of SR 150,000/-, which was her sole contribution to the building of the matrimonial home.<br /> That the rest of the balance for the construction was out of his funds. The Appellant testified that out of the proceeds of sale of his land comprised in title number J435 situated at Bel Ombre which he sold to his brother, Cliff HOAREAU, he managed to contribute SR 150,000 to the construction of the matrimonial home.<br /> He also stated that between 1984 and 2004, he received gratuity of a total sum of SR350, 000/- from the Seychelles Peoples Defence Forces (SPDF) of which he contributed SR 175,000/- to the building of the matrimonial home and a retaining wall on the Respondent's property. <br /> He further explained that he took three loans from Barclays Bank, amounting to SR96,000/-which he used as contribution to the building of the matrimonial home. He adduced the loan documents as well as invoices of building materials in the trial court.<br /> However, the Respondent objected to the documents being admitted in evidence because they were not issued in the Appellant's names. The Appellant explained that some of the receipts and invoices were made out to individuals who bought building materials on his behalf.<br /> The Court overruled the objection and noted that the documents, including the receipts and the invoices, related to the period of construction of the matrimonial home.<br /> Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled that it would decide on the weight that should be attached to the documents in the judgment.<br /> The Appellant also stated that on 10 June 2006, before he left the matrimonial home, he conducted an inventory of the furniture and equipment he purchased and found that it was worth SR150,000/-. He stated that of the mentioned sum, he was claiming only SR 50,000/-because his son used the furniture.<br /> The Appellant also stated that he borrowed money from the Children Welfare Fund in the sum of SR 10,000/- which was channeled to the building of the matrimonial home. In 2000, he borrowed an additional sum of SR10,000/-. He paid the loans out of his salary.<br /> Furthermore, the Appellant claimed to have spent about SR50, 000/- on the purchase of some building materials for tiling, plumbing of the bathroom and kitchen. He added that he had spent more than the said amount, but he was only claiming SR50, 000/-.<br /> He stated that the Respondent did not have to borrow SR150, 000/ from Nouvobanq in relation to the matrimonial home because it was in good state of repair when he left it.<br /> On the other hand, the Respondent stated that the Appellant was not entitled to any share in the matrimonial home because he did not make any contributions towards its construction.<br /> Although she admitted that the Appellant sold his house at Bel Ombre for SR 150,000 she denied him making any contributions out of the proceeds of the sale to the home. The Respondent stated that she is the one who single handedly built the home.<br /> She testified that she took out a loan of SR150, 000 from the Seychelles Housing Development Corporation to pay for the houses but she neither recalled the date the loan was processed nor the monthly dues she paid towards the loan.<br /> In regard to the retaining wall, the Respondent stated that it was built by a contractor hired by the Ministry of Local Government after the wall was damaged by the tsunamis in 2004.<br /> SACOS paid her some money for the damaged furniture because she had insured the house with them.<br /> She added that the furniture was bought with her own money since she was the only one working at the time she lived with the Appellant.<br /> The Respondent further stated that in 2005 when the divorce proceedings were underway, she took out a loan of SR 260,000/- from Nouvobanq to repair damages to the house and wall caused by the floods. She stated that she was still paying off the loan.<br /> She also paid for the carport, external shower, and extension to the kitchen, master bedroom and veranda.<br /> Mr. Brian Kilindo a contractor hired by the Disaster Fund of the Ministry of Local Government to build the retaining wall stated that the price was about SR 80,000.<br /> Upon evaluation of the evidence by the parties, the trial Judge was satisfied by the appellant's evidence and held that the Appellant provided his best recollection, and that it had not been coloured or diminished by the passage of time. The court based its assessment on the impression it had of the Appellant’s oral evidence and the documents produced by him. However, the court observed that the evidence of the Appellant with respect to some of the items being claimed, was not clear.<br /> For the Respondent the court observed that she had done her best to discount the monetary contribution of the Appellant in relation to the construction of the matrimonial home. The trial Judge found the Respondent to be evasive and her evidence to be scant in relation to the facts in issue. The Judge noted that the Respondent had difficulty in remembering any of the salaries she earned at the material time, and gave imprecise evidence of loans she took out except for the SHDC loan.<br /> The court concluded that it was due to the bitterness still being felt by the Respondent towards the Appellant that resulted in her not wanting the latter to receive any share in the matrimonial home.<br /> Arising from the evaluation of the evidence, the Judge entered judgment in favour of the Appellant and awarded him a total sum of SR 450,000 as the equivalent of his monetary contributions to the matrimonial house. The Judge also granted the Appellant interest on the said sum at a legal rate of 4% from the date of judgment until full payment of the decretal sum.<br /> The breakdown of the said award was as follows:</p> <p>Under claim for contributions out of the land sale proceeds- SR75, 000/-.<br /> Claim arising out of Barclays Bank loans - SR96, 000/-.<br /> under claim for contributions from gratuity- SRI 50,000/-<br /> For contributions out of SPDF loans - SR25,000/-<br /> In relation to expenses n building materials for tiling the bathroom kitchen and plumbing works-SR24, 000/-.<br /> For claim of money expended on building materials- SR60,000/-<br /> For a third share in household movables- SR 20,000.</p> <p>Dissatisfied with the judgment, the Appellant appealed to this Court on the following grounds:</p> <p>1. The learned Judge failed to properly evaluate and consider the evidence relating to the contributions made by the Appellant as she erroneously refused to admit pleaded documentary evidence to that effect.<br /> 2. The trial Judge erred in her analysis on the value of the structures on the premises despite the fact that there were three altogether. (sic)<br /> 3. The learned Judge erred in awarding the Appellant a sum tantamount to a refund of his contributions he made over 20 years ago instead of applying the principles under Section 20 (1) (g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act. In so doing, the trial judge failed to show how she reached the decision on the quantum of award in paragraph 73 of the judgment.<br /> 4. The trial Judge failed to appreciate the reliability and truthful accounts given by the Appellant relating to the relationship, disparity in contributions, the standard of proof to be of the documents attached to the affidavits and the discredit of the Respondent's testimony by cross examination. Her award of less 25% of the value to the Appellant in that respect is unjustified and unfounded.<br /> 5. The trial judge failed to discount the extra benefit the Respondent enjoyed from the Appellant's share of the matrimonial home which includes his share in the movables, rentals collected from the annex apartment, sole occupation of the premises while the Appellant made out of pock expenses for alternative accommodation since 2005.<br /> 6. The trial Judge failed to adjudicate on the Appellant's Motion which amended his original demand for SR 615,718 and was wrong at paragraph 72 of the judgment to adjudicate on a demand that had been substituted by an amended demand for 50% since June 2017.<br />  <br /> Prayers</p> <p>The Appellant prayed that this Court reverses the orders in paragraph 73 of the judgment and awards him at least 50% of the value of the structures on the Respondent's land.</p> <p>Court’s analysis</p> <p> The central issue for determination in this appeal is whether the Learned Trial Judge followed the correct principles in granting an award for contributions made towards a matrimonial home and whether proper evaluation of the documentary evidence was carried out.<br /> I will resolve the grounds in the following order: Ground 6, Ground 1 and 4, Ground 3 and 5 together and end with Ground 2.<br /> Ground 6: This ground in essence faults the Trial Judge for proceeding to determine the award to him on the basis of pleadings which were originally filed in court but later amended.<br /> It is on record that the Appellant, with leave of the court, amended his claim on the disputed property by increasing it from the sum of SCR 615, 781.00 to half the total value of the property “as at the date that the court would make a final adjudication on his share in the property registered in the Respondent’s name.”<br /> However, the Trial Judge preceded her costing of the award by stating that the applicant: “is asking this court for the sum of SCR 615, 781.00.”<br /> In this, the Trial Judge erred. The court’s point of departure should have been the amended pleadings. Consequently, ground 6 succeeds.<br /> Nevertheless, the amount originally claimed and that which the court awarded will be useful in answering the question: did the Appellant make substantial contribution to the building of the matrimonial property in dispute?</p> <p> </p> <p>Grounds 1 and 4 </p> <p>Ground 1 faults the trial judge for not properly evaluating the documentary evidence adduced in court. Ground 4 faults the Judge for failing to appreciate the reliability and truthful accounts given by the Appellant relating to disparity in contributions. Both groundd1 and 4 deal with evaluation of evidence.<br /> [42]     A look at the proceedings in the court below show that the Appellant’s case was based on affidavit evidence, oral evidence resulting from examination in chief as well as in cross examination.<br /> [43]     Documents indicating the loans the Appellant accessed, the gratuity paid to him by his employer, funds received from the sale of his land etc. during the relevant period, as well as documents indicating purchases of building materials were adduced in evidence.<br /> [44]     Regarding documentary evidence Counsel for the Respondent objected to the admission of particular documents for various reasons. However, a reading of the court proceedings reveals various pieces of evidence which were admitted in evidence but with a rider that the Learned Judge would decide what weight/evidential value she would attach to the evidence in question. And in the judgement of the court below, the Trial Judge said:<br /> The Applicant ushered in evidence miscellaneous including invoices and receipts which according to his evidence showed that he bought building materials from …building material retail outlets between 1993 and 1994 and in 1996 for the construction of the matrimonial home. … According to the affidavit evidence of the Applicant, he spent about SR 79,013.88/- on building materials. Objections were taken to most of these documents being ushered into evidence on the ground that they are not made out in the name of the Applicant. The Applicant explained that some of the receipts and invoices are made out to individuals who bought the building materials on his behalf. This court noted that the documents, including the receipts and the invoices, related to the period of construction of the matrimonial home.  … This court admitted those disputed documents and, further, ruled that it will decide on the weight that should be attached to them at time of judgment<br /> [45]     And indeed although the Appellant claimed a total of 129,013 as money spent on miscellaneous building materials, only 84,000 was awarded.<br /> [46]     Specific mention should also be made of a document emanating from an electrician indicating that he did electrical installation works at the matrimonial home. Its admission was objected to by the Respondent because it was a letter and not an invoice or receipt. The letter stated that the works amounted to SR 18,768. Although the Appellant’s Counsel informed court that the author would be called to testify, this did not happen. This amount was not awarded. In regard to this, the reason is clear.<br /> [47]     The Appellant also testified that he had obtained loans from Barclays Bank (SCR 96,000) as well as SCR 37,000 from his place of work (SPDF). He produced the loan offer from the Bank and the documents indicate the purpose for the loan to be: RENOVATION OF HOUSE. The Trial Judge credited the full Barclays Loan to the Appellant by awarding him the 96,000 claim.<br />  <br /> [48]     Regarding the SPDF loans, the Appellant adduced in evidence documents showing that a total of 37,000 was extended to him as a loan in instalments.<br />  <br /> [49]     The documents indicated what the purpose of the loan was: “to extend one bedroom”, another was to “build stone wall” etc. The loan request indicated the specific purchases to be made using the loan and a look at the details will indicate different building materials and labour. Comments from the officers in charge indicated that site visits were conducted.<br />  <br /> [50]     However, the Trial Judge gave only 25,000 to the Appellant and she indicates that the award is for “SPDF loans and labour for workers”. I note that the Appellant adduced in evidence had testified that he had paid SR 10,000 as labour for erection of walls.  This amount was pleaded separately from the loan of 37,000. No explanation is given for declining to accept the full claim.<br />  <br /> [51]     The Appellant further testifies that he spent SCR 175,000, which was part of his gratuity, on the development of the property. Documents to support his having received gratuity after very two years as an employee of the Forces were adduced in evidence. The Learned Judge gave an award of 150,000. No explanation for not giving the whole pleaded sum was given.<br />  <br /> Pleaded amount by the Plaintiff- Appellant </p> <p>Heading </p> <p>Pleaded amount SCR</p> <p>Awarded amount SCR</p> <p>Exhibit number </p> <p>From proceeds of sale of J 435</p> <p>100,000</p> <p>75,000</p> <p>1</p> <p>Barclays Loans </p> <p>96,000</p> <p>96,000</p> <p>2</p> <p>SPDF Gratuity </p> <p>175,000</p> <p>150,000</p> <p> </p> <p>SPDF loans and labour for workers</p> <p>47,000</p> <p>25,000</p> <p>3</p> <p>Electrical Installation  and materials </p> <p>18,768</p> <p>-</p> <p>4</p> <p>Building materials </p> <p>50,000</p> <p>24,000</p> <p> </p> <p>Building Materials </p> <p>79,013 </p> <p>60,000</p> <p>5</p> <p>1/3 share in household movables </p> <p>50,000</p> <p>20,000</p> <p>6</p> <p> </p> <p>615,781</p> <p>450,000</p> <p> </p> <p> <br /> [52]     However, in her judgment, the Learned Trial makes a finding that the Appellant was a credible witness. In her words:<br />  <br /> This court is satisfied that the Applicant provided his best recollection, and that his recollection had not been coloured or diminished by the passage of time. This court has based its assessment on the impression made by the oral evidence of the Applicant against the conclusions to be drawn from the miscellanies documents produced by Him. However, this court observes that the evidence of the Applicant with respect to some of the items being claimed is not clear.<br />  <br /> [53]     It may be safe to conclude that the Learned Trial Judge cannot be faulted for attaching little or no evidential value to documents such as receipts written in the names of individuals other than the Appellant.<br />  <br /> [54]     There is no doubt that a judge who is presented with documentary evidence has the authority and opportunity to determine the weight to be attached to the evidence.<br />  <br /> [55]     However, after expressing satisfaction with the credibility of the Appellant as a witness, the Learned Trial Judge ought to have given explanations regarding the weight attached to documents whose authenticity was not questionable and the justification for treating the loan from the Barclays Bank differently from the loan from the employer. Justice would have been served better if the Learned Judge had given explanations as to why evidence which on the face of it was similar was nevertheless treated/assessed differently and thus leading to partial awards in one instance and full awards in another.<br />  <br /> [56]     In comparison to the Appellant, the Learned Trial Judge made a finding which for all intents and purposes discredited the Respondent as an unreliable witness. In her words:<br />  <br /> … the Respondent did her utmost to discount the monetary contribution of the Applicant in relation to the construction of the matrimonial home. This court found the Respondent to be evasive and her evidence to be scant in relation to the facts in issue. The Respondent had difficulty in remembering any of the salaries she earned at the material time, and gave imprecise evidence of loans she took, except for the SHDC loan.<br />  <br /> [57]     What can be deduced from the Judge’s observation above is that the only amount which could with certainty be accepted as the Respondent’s contribution to the development of the property is the SCR 150,000/ she obtained as a loan.<br />  <br /> [58]     Nevertheless, a look at the proceedings at the lower court show that the Respondent purchased various types of construction materials which she claimed to have used to make improvements to the property in 2005. Counsel for the Appellant did not object to adducing receipts and invoices written in the name of the Respondent. The Judge however did not make any findings on the relevance of the purchases to the dispute in issue.<br />  <br />  [59]    I scrutinised the purchases and calculated the total spent on expenses which add value to the structure as indicated in the table below. I left out purchases for items such as furniture and other movable property.<br />  </p> <p>  Exhibit Number (R)</p> <p>Description</p> <p>Value</p> <p>Date</p> <p>7</p> <p>Cash Sale UCPS</p> <p>264.96</p> <p>12.08.05</p> <p>8</p> <p>Cash Sale UCPS</p> <p>106</p> <p>12.08.05</p> <p>9</p> <p>SMB Reinforcing Bar</p> <p>185</p> <p>12.08.05</p> <p>10</p> <p>SMB Tiles</p> <p>750</p> <p>23.09.05</p> <p>11</p> <p>SMB Timber</p> <p>7438</p> <p>01.09.05</p> <p>12</p> <p>SMB Timber</p> <p>612</p> <p>03.10.05</p> <p>13</p> <p>Civil Construction Ltd</p> <p>470</p> <p>03.10.05</p> <p>14</p> <p>SMB Timber</p> <p>306</p> <p>17.10.05</p> <p>15</p> <p>Cash Sale UCPS</p> <p>535</p> <p>04.08.05</p> <p>16</p> <p>Cash Sale UCPS</p> <p>326</p> <p>08.07.05</p> <p>17</p> <p>Cash Sale UCPS</p> <p>549.4</p> <p>08.07.05</p> <p>18</p> <p>Cash Sale UCPS</p> <p>795</p> <p>04.07.05</p> <p>19</p> <p>Cash Sale UCPS</p> <p>640</p> <p>04.07.05</p> <p>20</p> <p>Cash Sale UCPS</p> <p>326.4</p> <p>04.07.05</p> <p>21</p> <p>Cash Sale UCPS</p> <p>459</p> <p>04.07.05</p> <p>22</p> <p>Bodco Conduit</p> <p>885</p> <p>13.08.05</p> <p>23</p> <p>SMB welded mesh and MS bar</p> <p>1670</p> <p>05.07.05</p> <p>25</p> <p>Plywood</p> <p>842</p> <p>08.07.05</p> <p>28</p> <p>Rapid Roofing</p> <p>35895</p> <p>19.05.05</p> <p>29</p> <p>UCPS</p> <p>263</p> <p>28.09.05</p> <p>30</p> <p>Bodco</p> <p>108</p> <p>15.10.05</p> <p>31</p> <p>Bodco</p> <p>1385.4</p> <p>18.10.05</p> <p>32</p> <p>Bodco</p> <p>346.8</p> <p>18.10.05</p> <p>33</p> <p>Home accessories -Tiles</p> <p>7500</p> <p>18.10.05</p> <p>51</p> <p>Air Conditioning</p> <p>7425</p> <p>25.01.05</p> <p> </p> <p>TOTAL</p> <p>70082.96</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>[60]     The total value came to SCR 70,082.96. The dates on the receipts range between 04.07.2005 to 18.10.2005. This would bring the Respondents contribution to 150,000 + 70,082.96 = 220,082.96.  If we are to accept that the cost was SCR 45,000, the Respondent’s contribution would be 48.89% of the cost of the development.<br /> [61]     There is no set mathematical formula by which matrimonial property should be divided and each case is considered on its merits.<br /> [62]     However, Section 20 (1) (g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act gives guidance on how courts should determine division of matrimonial property. The Section provides that:<br />  (1) Subject to section 24, on the granting of a conditional order of divorce or nullity or an order of separation, or at any time thereafter, the court may, after making such inquiries as the court thinks fit and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the ability and financial means of the parties to the marriage-<br /> (g) make such order, as the court thinks fit, in respect of any property of a party to a marriage or any interest or right of a party in any property for the benefit of the other party or a relevant child. [Court’s emphasis]<br /> [63]     In Esparon vs. Esparon[1] this Court interpreted the meaning of the above provision as follows:<br /> “all the circumstances of the case, [and] may have regard, without being exhaustive, to such matters as the standard of living enjoyed by each of the parties before the breakdown of the marriage, the age of the parties and duration of the marriage, any physical or mental disability of any party, the contributions made by each to the welfare of the family, including looking after the home or caring for the family or the value to either party of any benefit (like a pension) which a party will lose as a result of the divorce….”<br /> [64]     Furthermore, courts in exercising their discretion in division of matrimonial property are to be guided by the goal of ensuring that one party is not to be put at an unfair advantage in relation to the other. In my view, this is the principle of fairness and equity. In Hoareau vs. Hoareau[2] , this Court emphasized the principle as follows:<br /> “It is important not to forget to ensure that a party is not put at an unfair advantage. In the process, the court should try, as far as possible, to come up with an award that will enable the other party to maintain a fair reasonable living which is “commensurate or near the standard” the parties were maintaining before the dissolution of the marriage. We know and appreciate that this is not an easy task but courts should keep on trying so that the wider goal of ensuring that one party is not put at an unfair advantage in relation to the other is achieved.”<br /> [65]     In determining the equitable balance in matrimonial property, the starting point is looking at the legal ownership and then subsequently adjust the shares of each party based on the level of contributions made by each party.[3]<br /> [66]     In Lepathy v Lepathy [2020] SCSC 142 this Court dealt with a case in which matrimonial property was in the name of one spouse only. The Court answered the question: what contribution and factors are to be taken into account in dividing such property?<br />  <br /> [67]     Court noted that case law has established that the point of departure in the division of matrimonial property where only one party has title to the property is to consider the assets held in the name of one spouse as that spouses’ property unless it is established that that was not the intention of the parties (see Etienne v Constance (1977) SLR 233 and Maurel v Maurel (1998-1999) SCAR 57. <br />  <br /> [68]     It was however also held that  it is also firmly established in Seychellois jurisprudence that where the legal ownership of a matrimonial asset is vested solely in one party but there is overwhelming and convincing evidence that the other party made significant contributions towards the matrimonial asset in issue, the matrimonial property should be vested in both parties given the express terms of section 20 (1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act giving a large discretion to the court with regard to all the circumstances of the case (Esparon v Esparon (1998-1999) SCAR 191).<br />  <br /> [69]     In other words, court starts with acknowledging the legal ownership of the property on the one hand and then acknowledges the contributions made towards the property by each of the parties, on the other hand.<br />  <br /> [70]     In line with the two principles enunciated above, courts answer the question: did the party with no legal ownership adduce evidence to prove their contribution towards the property in issue? And what value should be put to the contribution?<br />  <br /> [71]     In the matter before us, even if we are to give the modest figure of 45000 as contribution by the Appellant, juxtaposed with the contribution of the Respondent, I come to the finding that the Appellant made significant contributions to the matrimonial property in issue. It is however on record that the Appellant is willing to be awarded 50% of the value of the property.<br />  <br /> Ground 3<br />  <br /> [72]     The essence of this ground is that whatever amount of money is accepted by the court as the Appellant’s contribution to the building of the matrimonial property, to order that it be refunded to him would lead to an injustice against him. The essence of the argument is that he should receive the value of his “investment” at the time of division of the property.<br />  <br /> [73]     It is on record that in 2008, the lower court ordered for a Quantity Surveyor to value the property in dispute. But the case only eventually took off in 2017. The court then appointed another Quantity Surveyor – Nigel Roucou.<br />  <br /> [74]     At the hearing of the appeal, Counsel for both parties were informed that due to the fact that this matter had been in the courts as far back as 2006, the Court would use the 2017 Quantity Surveyor’s Report, the latest report, rather than send the case back to the Supreme Court with orders that the court appoints a Quantity Surveyor. In valuing the property, the 2017 report excluded the value of the land. This is because it was an uncontested fact that the Respondent had sole legal ownership of the land.<br />  <br /> [75]     The property was valued at SR 2,975,000.00. The value (296,500) attached to the reinforced concrete retaining wall has been excluded from the figure above because evidence adduced proves that the cost was done by neither of the parties.<br />  <br /> [76]     What remains is SCR 2,678,500 to be shared between the parties in equal shares.<br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br /> ORDER<br />  <br /> [77]     The Respondent is in occupation of the matrimonial home. In the circumstances, I make the following orders:</p> <p>The Respondent is to pay the Appellant the sum of 1,339,250 within 6 months of this Judgment.</p> <p> </p> <p>In the event that the Respondent fails to make payment within 6 months of this Judgment, the property will be sold and the proceedings shared between the two parties in the ratio specified in this Order.</p> <p> <br />  <br />  <br /> ____________________________                                                   <br /> Dr. L. Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza, JA                                     <br />  <br /> I concur:                                                                      ___________________<br />                                                                                     Fernando, President<br />  <br />  <br /> I concur:                                                                      ____________________<br />                                                                                     M. Twomey, JA<br />  <br />  <br />  <br /> Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 29 April 2022.<br />  </p> <p>[1] [1998-1999] SCAR 191.</p> <p>[2] SCA 30/1996.</p> <p>[3] Esparon v Esparon (footnote 1)</p></span></div></div> </div> </div> Thu, 23 Jun 2022 07:57:45 +0000 Anonymous 4233 at http://old2.seylii.org Nicette v Marimba (SCA 51 of 2019) [2022] SCCA 17 (29 April 2022); http://old2.seylii.org/sc/judgment/court-appeal/2022/17 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">Nicette v Marimba (SCA 51 of 2019) [2022] SCCA 17 (29 April 2022);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/159" hreflang="x-default">Family Law</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Anonymous (not verified)</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Thu, 06/23/2022 - 07:57</span> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-field-search-summary field--type-text-with-summary field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Search summary</div> <div class="field__item"><p>Paternity- Appeal against the decision of Supreme Court declaring the respondent the father of Grace Heidi Trisha Nicette and grant of an order that the Civil Status Officer rectifies the Act of Birth to reflect the declaration</p> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-field-headnote-and-holding field--type-text-long field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Headnote and holding</div> <div class="field__item"><p>The appeal is dismissed.  The orders of the Supreme Court are upheld.  </p> </div> </div> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.seylii.org/files/judgments/scca/2022/17/2022-scca-17_1.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=38156">2022-scca-17.docx</a></span> </div> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-pdf file--application-pdf"> <a href="https://media.seylii.org/files/judgments/scca/2022/17/2022-scca-17_1.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=1111310">2022-scca-17.pdf</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><p>IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF SEYCHELLES</p> <p> </p> <p>Reportable<br /> [2022] SCCA 17 (29 April 2022)<br /> SCA 51/2019<br /> (Appeal from CS 59/2019)<br />  <br /> In the matter between<br />  <br /> Sheryl Nicette                                                                     Appellant                                                                                                                     <br /> (rep by Mr. France Bonte)<br />  <br />  <br /> and<br />  <br /> Derreck Marimba                                                              Respondent<br /> (rep by Mrs. Alexia Amesbury) </p> <p>Neutral Citation:    Nicette v Marimba (SCA 51/2019) [2022] SCCA 17<br />                                  (Arising in CS 59/2019)   (29 April 2022)</p> <p>Before:  </p> <p> </p> <p>Fernando President, Robinson, Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza, JJA.  </p> <p>Summary:  </p> <p> </p> <p>Paternity- Appeal against the decision of Supreme Court declaring the respondent the father of Grace Heidi Trisha Nicette and grant of an order that the Civil Status Officer rectifies the Act of Birth to reflect the declaration. </p> <p>Heard:  </p> <p> </p> <p>12 April 2022.</p> <p>Delivered: </p> <p> </p> <p>29 April 2022  </p> <p>                                                       <br /> ORDER<br /> The appeal is dismissed.  The orders of the Supreme Court are upheld. <br /> ______________________________________________________________________________<br />                                        <br />                                                                    JUDGMENT<br /> ______________________________________________________________________________<br />  <br /> DR. L. TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA, JA.<br />  <br />  </p> <p>This is an action against the lower court’s declaration of the respondent as the biological father of Grace Heidi Tricia Nicette.<br /> The facts as accepted by the Supreme Court are that the appellant and the respondent were in an intimate relationship in 2016.  The respondent did not deny her relationship with the appellant and their concubinage notoire. In July 2017 the child in issue was born and the appellant named her Grace Heidi Trisha Nicette.<br /> The respondent testified that he learnt from the appellant's family that the appellant was expecting his child. He then approached the appellant who did not deny the fact that the respondent had made her pregnant but accused him of doing so deliberately and messing up her plans. She told him that she would do her best to keep the child away from him.<br /> That acting on her word, the appellant denied the respondent access to the child.<br /> Consequently, the respondent filed a case for access before the Family Tribunal which ordered that a DNA test be carried out to establish the child's paternity.<br /> The appellant successfully appealed to the Supreme Court to have the Tribunal's order set aside. The Supreme Court inter alia held that the Tribunal's order could only have effect if the parties were willing to voluntarily take the test. That since the appellant was unwilling to subject her child to a DNA test, the order could not be enforced.<br /> It was subsequent to this that the respondent filed a paternity suit in the Supreme Court seeking to be declared the father of the child.<br /> During the hearing of the suit, the respondent testified that he formally acknowledged the said child by notarial deed in January 2018 and made a similar declaration to the Civil Status Office which amended the child's Birth Certificate to include his name as the child's father. The respondent also testified that there were several writings in the form of text messages emanating from him to the appellant in which he admitted that he was the father of the child. The text messages to this effect were adduced in court as evidence and not objected to by the appellant.<br /> In defence, the appellant stated that she was not sure that the respondent was her child's father because she was involved in several intimate relationships at the time she became pregnant with the child in issue. However, when asked to mention the persons she was intimately involved with, she did not name them. She also stated that she was unwilling to have the child undergo a DNA test but that if the child became of age, she could make her independent decision to take the test. She further stated that she did not want to have anything to do with the respondent.<br /> The respondent's counsel argued that since the appellant in her defence did not challenge the respondent's notarial deed in which he acknowledged being the child's father, it was taken to be an admission that he was indeed the father and this was sufficient evidence to establish paternity.<br /> Counsel for the appellant on the other hand argued that the evidence produced by the respondent to prove that he is the father of the child was not sufficient to pass the evidential threshold since no independent corroborative evidence was adduced. <br /> In determining the issue as to whether the respondent was the child's father, the learned Trial Judge, Twomey, CJ, held that the respondent's evidence was overwhelmingly compelling that he was the father. The Judge on the other hand found the appellant to be untruthful.<br /> Dissatisfied with the decision, the appellant sought to have the decision of the lower court quashed.<br /> Ground of Appeal: The Judgment is against the weight of evidence.<br /> Relief Sought from the Court of Appeal: The decision of the Supreme Court be quashed.</p> <p> <br /> Court’s analysis<br /> [16]     Counsel for the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal in which there was but one Ground of Appeal: The Judgment is against the weight of evidence.<br />  <br /> [17]     However, in the written submissions, Counsel raises issues in regard to how the Trial Judge dealt with the plea in limine litis he raised at the lower court to wit that the Respondent had no locus standi to proceed under Article 340 (3) (a) of the Civil Code. He also faults the Trial Judge’s interpretation of the effect of Article 35 of the Civil Status Act and further questions whether the Supreme Court has the authority/jurisdiction to declare guardianship over a child. It is my view that such are exclusively legal and/or procedural issues. It cannot be said that they question adequacy or sufficiency of evidence adduced at trial to prove paternity. <br />  <br /> [18]     Under Rule 54 (3) of the Court of Appeal Rules, it is provided that: Every notice of appeal shall set forth concisely and under distinct heads, without argument or narrative, the grounds of the appeal, specifying the points of law or fact which are alleged to have been wrongly decided. Rule 18(8) provides that an appellant shall not without leave of the Court be permitted, on the hearing of that appeal, to rely on any grounds of appeal other than those set forth in the notice of appeal.<br />  <br /> [19]     In line with the above rules, case law has firmly established that a party is bound by its pleadings.[1] An appellant cannot go outside the scope of the pleadings they filed in court. A party cannot seek relief outside his grounds of appeal.<br />  <br /> [20]     The appellant did not seek the leave of this Court to challenge the Trial Court’s findings and decision on the plea limine litis raised at trial but made submissions faulting the Judge’s decision that the respondent had locus to proceed under Article 340 (3) (a) for a judicial declaration that he was the father of the child. By rule 18(8) of the Court of Appeal Rules the Court cannot entertain such ground without leave of the Court, which has in the present matter neither been sought nor granted.<br />  <br /> [21]     Consequently, the submissions made regarding locus standi were ill founded.<br />  <br /> [22]     This Court will therefore address its mind solely on the aspect of sufficiency of evidence adduced to prove paternity.<br />  <br /> [23]     Was the Judgment against the weight of evidence adduced?<br /> [24]     Issues of paternity are established by a preponderance of evidence - which shows that a man is more likely than not to be the father of the child. In determining whether a claim for paternity has been proved, the court will rely on the credibility of the witnesses, their testimonies and circumstantial evidence.[2]<br /> [25]     The law governing proof paternity is set out in the Civil Code as follows: Article 321 (1) of the Civil Code Act provides that:<br /> Possession of status may be established when there is sufficient coincidence of fact indicating the relationship of descent and parenthood between a person and the family to which he claims to belong … (Emphasis of Court)<br /> [26]     Article 340 of the Civil Code Act provides that:<br /> 1.      It shall not be allowed to prove paternal descent, except:<br /> (a)    <br /> (b)    <br /> (c)      <br /> (d)    When there exist letters or other writings emanating from the alleged father containing an unequivocal admission of paternity.<br /> (e)      When the alleged father and the mother have notoriously lived together as husband and wife, during the period of conception.<br /> (f)    <br /> (2).    The right to prove paternal descent under this Article is for the benefit of the child alone, even if born of an incestuous or adulterous relationship.<br /> 3.         ……………………….<br /> 4.     A child whose paternal descent has been proved under this Article is entitled to bear his father's name in addition to a share in his father's succession under the title Succession. (My emphasis)<br /> [27]     In the present matter, the appellant faulted the trial Judge for according weight to the evidence adduced by the respondent to come to the conclusion and declaration that the respondent is the natural father of Grace Heidi Trisha Nicette. It was submitted by counsel for the appellant that the trial judge failed to appreciate the evidence of the appellant in toto and simply inferred fatherhood from the fact that the appellant and respondent were girl and boy friend and “slept together.” It was also submitted by counsel that the appellant’s refusal to name the other men she was intimate with had been used by the judge against the appellant. That in the absence of a DNA test there was insufficient evidence to satisfy the burden of proof required to prove paternity. Counsel also argued that the comments of the Judge on the state of the law regarding DNA evidence shows prejudice and bias hence causing injustice to the appellant.<br /> [28]     In dealing with the matter, the trial Judge held as follows:<br /> “The appellant has never denied her relationship with the respondent and their concubinage notoire. That concubinage notoire does not have to amount to the parties cohabiting – it suffices that they conducted themselves as if they were living together … In respect of the provisions of Articles 321 and 340 of the Civil Code, I find that the status of the child is established … since the child’s Birth Certificate contains her father’s name and her father’s recognition of her in the deed of acknowledgment.”<br /> In my view what the Trial Judge stated above brings the case within the ambit of sufficient coincidence of fact articulated in Article 321 (1) of the Civil Code<br /> The Trial Judge held further that:<br />  Similarly, the provisions of Article 340 are satisfied by the writings emanating from the respondent containing an unequivocal admission of paternity and the concubinage notoire of the parties.<br /> [29]     I find no fault with the trial Judge’s findings above. The trial Judge considered the evidence of the notorious cohabitation, the Respondent’s acknowledgement through a notarial deed that the child was his, the text messages exchanged between the parties and more specifically writings emanating from the respondent containing an unequivocal admission of paternity There was also the child's birth certificate containing the respondent’s name as the father of the child. It is on these various pieces of evidence that the judge based her declaration that paternity had been established and proved.<br /> [30]     I note that the respondent’s notarial deed which he signed on 15th February 2018 was never disputed by the appellant. Whereas the respondent adduced evidence of a deed to prove he was the child’s father, the appellant did not adduce evidence to rebut the claim. It is a principle of evidence that every claim or allegation which is not expressly denied is taken as an admission. Evidence of words or conduct on the part of the defendant which amounts to an admission is sufficient to corroborate a fact.[3] It is my finding that the evidence adduced by the respondent in the trial court was sufficient to support his claim of paternity. It can therefore be seen that the submission by counsel that the judge simply inferred fatherhood from the fact that the appellant and respondent were girl and boy friend and “slept together” is not supported by the record. And it cannot be said that the judge reached her decision without further evidence from which it could be inferred that the respondent was the father of the child.<br /> [31]     It must also be noted that whereas the Respondent was willing to subject himself to a DNA test, the appellant was categorical that she was not willing to subject the child to the test. It must be further noted that indeed as was stated by the Trial Judge, at the time when the case was heard by the Supreme Court, the law did not allow the court to order DNA evidence as it does now under Article 375 (2) of the Civil Code. The judge in fact “bemoaned” the state of the law thus:<br /> despite scientific advances of nearly twenty years, the Legislature has not … permit(ted) the use of DNA tests to prove or disprove the paternity of a child. That would have been conclusive evidence in this case to settle the matter. Instead the court has only arcane and outdated tool at its disposal to help it in its enquiry, namely the provisions of Article 321.<br /> Thus, the court was left to determine paternity by evaluating other adduced evidence.<br /> [32]     Counsel also argued that the comments of the Judge on the state of the law regarding DNA evidence shows prejudice and bias hence causing injustice to the appellant.<br /> [33]     I am astonished that Counsel could interprete the Learned Judge’s statement as evidence of bias and prejudice towards the appellant. But I will leave it at that.<br /> [34]     It is also clear from the judgment that the appellant has misinterpreted the basis of the decision of the judge. Whereas indeed the trial judge made a finding that the testimony of the appellant that at the time of conception of the child she did not have an exclusive relationship with the respondent but was “sleeping around” was a lie, the trial judge explained why she disbelieved the testimony of the appellant. The court’s explanation was hinged on the issue of the appellant’s credibility as a witness - or more precisely her lack of it.<br /> [35]     The judge inter alia stated that whereas the plaintiff’s evidence was overwhelmingly compelling, the evidence of the defendant was incredible and the witness was unimpressive and untruthful.<br /> [36]     As I stated in Carolus and Others v Scully and Others[4] it is a generally accepted principle in court hearings that the demeanour of a witness is of value in shedding light on the credibility of a witness. Demeanor evidence refers to the non-verbal cues given by a witness while testifying, including voice tone, facial expressions, body language, and other cues such as the manner of testifying, and the attitude of a witness while testifying. The opportunity to observe the demeanor of a witness while testifying is often exclusive to the trial court, the court where evidence and testimony are first introduced, received, and considered.<br /> [37]     It is trite that an appellate court should not lightly disturb a finding of fact arrived at by the trial judge who had the opportunity of observing the demeanour of witnesses and hearing them. I have found no reason to depart from the findings of the trial court.<br /> [38]     From the above analysis, I come to the conclusion that the trial Judge was right in declaring the respondent as the natural father of Grace Heidi Trisha Nicette and for ordering rectification of the birth register for the child to bear her father’s name.<br /> Orders.<br /> [39]     The appeal fails.<br /> The judgment and the orders of the Supreme Court are upheld.<br /> I make no order as to costs as the appellant appears in forma pauperis.<br />  <br />  <br />  <br /> …………………………………………….<br />  <br /> Dr. Lillian Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza, JA.<br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br /> I concur                                                    ……………………………………………<br />                                                                                     Fernando, President<br />            <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br /> Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 29 April 2022.<br />  <br />  <br />  <br /> ROBINSON JA<br />  <br /> [1]       The appellant has appealed a decision of the Supreme Court dated 10 September 2019 in which the Court held that the respondent’s evidence was overwhelmingly compelling that he was the father.<br /> [2]       The appellant has appealed the judgment on the ground that the judgment is against the weight of evidence.<br /> [3]       Clearly, the ground of appeal raised by the appellant is tantamount to there being no ground: see the cases of Petit v Bonte [2000] SCCA 1 (SCA 45/1999) [2000]SCCA 13 (14 April 2000) and Chetty v Esther  (SCCA 44/2020 (Appeal from MA No. 156/2020 and MC No. 69/2020)) [2021] SCCA 12 (13 May 2021). It is observed that the ground of appeal runs afoul of rule 18(3) of the Seychelles Court of Appeal Rules 2005, as amended. Rule 18 (3) of the Seychelles Court of Appeal Rules provides ―<br />  ″[…] grounds of appeal shall set forth in separate numbered paragraphs the findings of fact and conclusions of law to which the appellant is objecting and shall also state the particular respect in which the variation of judgment or order is sought.″<br />  <br /> [4]       Given the mandatory wording of the provisions of rule 18(7) of the Seychelles Court of Appeal Rules 2005 as amended, I have no option but to strike out the notice of appeal.<br /> [5]       The appeal is dismissed and the orders of the Supreme Court are upheld.<br /> [6]       I make no order as to costs.<br />  <br />  <br /> _____________<br /> F. Robinson, JA<br />  <br /> Signed, dated, and delivered at Ile du Port on 29 April 2022.<br />  <br />  </p> <p>[1] E.g. Confait &amp; Anor v Port-Louis &amp; Anor (SCA 66/2018) [2021] SCCA 39; Re Ailee Development Corporation and the Companies Act 1972 (SCA 13/2008) [2010] SCCA 1<br />  </p> <p>[2] Jean-Baptiste vs. Dogley SSC 383/2006, 18 February 2011.</p> <p>[3] Moncherry v Rassool (1976) SLR 168; Crea v Agathine (N0.2) (1977) slr 153 and Marie v Julienne (1978) SLR 135.</p> <p>[4] </p> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-eb4538d57a75f2c22b88327f9be4e5376a5cca4585369a6a5d70a73e7bbee408"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><p>IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF SEYCHELLES</p> <p> </p> <p>Reportable<br /> [2022] SCCA 17 (29 April 2022)<br /> SCA 51/2019<br /> (Appeal from CS 59/2019)<br />  <br /> In the matter between<br />  <br /> Sheryl Nicette                                                                     Appellant                                                                                                                     <br /> (rep by Mr. France Bonte)<br />  <br />  <br /> and<br />  <br /> Derreck Marimba                                                              Respondent<br /> (rep by Mrs. Alexia Amesbury) </p> <p>Neutral Citation:    Nicette v Marimba (SCA 51/2019) [2022] SCCA 17<br />                                  (Arising in CS 59/2019)   (29 April 2022)</p> <p>Before:  </p> <p> </p> <p>Fernando President, Robinson, Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza, JJA.  </p> <p>Summary:  </p> <p> </p> <p>Paternity- Appeal against the decision of Supreme Court declaring the respondent the father of Grace Heidi Trisha Nicette and grant of an order that the Civil Status Officer rectifies the Act of Birth to reflect the declaration. </p> <p>Heard:  </p> <p> </p> <p>12 April 2022.</p> <p>Delivered: </p> <p> </p> <p>29 April 2022  </p> <p>                                                       <br /> ORDER<br /> The appeal is dismissed.  The orders of the Supreme Court are upheld. <br /> ______________________________________________________________________________<br />                                        <br />                                                                    JUDGMENT<br /> ______________________________________________________________________________<br />  <br /> DR. L. TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA, JA.<br />  <br />  </p> <p>This is an action against the lower court’s declaration of the respondent as the biological father of Grace Heidi Tricia Nicette.<br /> The facts as accepted by the Supreme Court are that the appellant and the respondent were in an intimate relationship in 2016.  The respondent did not deny her relationship with the appellant and their concubinage notoire. In July 2017 the child in issue was born and the appellant named her Grace Heidi Trisha Nicette.<br /> The respondent testified that he learnt from the appellant's family that the appellant was expecting his child. He then approached the appellant who did not deny the fact that the respondent had made her pregnant but accused him of doing so deliberately and messing up her plans. She told him that she would do her best to keep the child away from him.<br /> That acting on her word, the appellant denied the respondent access to the child.<br /> Consequently, the respondent filed a case for access before the Family Tribunal which ordered that a DNA test be carried out to establish the child's paternity.<br /> The appellant successfully appealed to the Supreme Court to have the Tribunal's order set aside. The Supreme Court inter alia held that the Tribunal's order could only have effect if the parties were willing to voluntarily take the test. That since the appellant was unwilling to subject her child to a DNA test, the order could not be enforced.<br /> It was subsequent to this that the respondent filed a paternity suit in the Supreme Court seeking to be declared the father of the child.<br /> During the hearing of the suit, the respondent testified that he formally acknowledged the said child by notarial deed in January 2018 and made a similar declaration to the Civil Status Office which amended the child's Birth Certificate to include his name as the child's father. The respondent also testified that there were several writings in the form of text messages emanating from him to the appellant in which he admitted that he was the father of the child. The text messages to this effect were adduced in court as evidence and not objected to by the appellant.<br /> In defence, the appellant stated that she was not sure that the respondent was her child's father because she was involved in several intimate relationships at the time she became pregnant with the child in issue. However, when asked to mention the persons she was intimately involved with, she did not name them. She also stated that she was unwilling to have the child undergo a DNA test but that if the child became of age, she could make her independent decision to take the test. She further stated that she did not want to have anything to do with the respondent.<br /> The respondent's counsel argued that since the appellant in her defence did not challenge the respondent's notarial deed in which he acknowledged being the child's father, it was taken to be an admission that he was indeed the father and this was sufficient evidence to establish paternity.<br /> Counsel for the appellant on the other hand argued that the evidence produced by the respondent to prove that he is the father of the child was not sufficient to pass the evidential threshold since no independent corroborative evidence was adduced. <br /> In determining the issue as to whether the respondent was the child's father, the learned Trial Judge, Twomey, CJ, held that the respondent's evidence was overwhelmingly compelling that he was the father. The Judge on the other hand found the appellant to be untruthful.<br /> Dissatisfied with the decision, the appellant sought to have the decision of the lower court quashed.<br /> Ground of Appeal: The Judgment is against the weight of evidence.<br /> Relief Sought from the Court of Appeal: The decision of the Supreme Court be quashed.</p> <p> <br /> Court’s analysis<br /> [16]     Counsel for the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal in which there was but one Ground of Appeal: The Judgment is against the weight of evidence.<br />  <br /> [17]     However, in the written submissions, Counsel raises issues in regard to how the Trial Judge dealt with the plea in limine litis he raised at the lower court to wit that the Respondent had no locus standi to proceed under Article 340 (3) (a) of the Civil Code. He also faults the Trial Judge’s interpretation of the effect of Article 35 of the Civil Status Act and further questions whether the Supreme Court has the authority/jurisdiction to declare guardianship over a child. It is my view that such are exclusively legal and/or procedural issues. It cannot be said that they question adequacy or sufficiency of evidence adduced at trial to prove paternity. <br />  <br /> [18]     Under Rule 54 (3) of the Court of Appeal Rules, it is provided that: Every notice of appeal shall set forth concisely and under distinct heads, without argument or narrative, the grounds of the appeal, specifying the points of law or fact which are alleged to have been wrongly decided. Rule 18(8) provides that an appellant shall not without leave of the Court be permitted, on the hearing of that appeal, to rely on any grounds of appeal other than those set forth in the notice of appeal.<br />  <br /> [19]     In line with the above rules, case law has firmly established that a party is bound by its pleadings.[1] An appellant cannot go outside the scope of the pleadings they filed in court. A party cannot seek relief outside his grounds of appeal.<br />  <br /> [20]     The appellant did not seek the leave of this Court to challenge the Trial Court’s findings and decision on the plea limine litis raised at trial but made submissions faulting the Judge’s decision that the respondent had locus to proceed under Article 340 (3) (a) for a judicial declaration that he was the father of the child. By rule 18(8) of the Court of Appeal Rules the Court cannot entertain such ground without leave of the Court, which has in the present matter neither been sought nor granted.<br />  <br /> [21]     Consequently, the submissions made regarding locus standi were ill founded.<br />  <br /> [22]     This Court will therefore address its mind solely on the aspect of sufficiency of evidence adduced to prove paternity.<br />  <br /> [23]     Was the Judgment against the weight of evidence adduced?<br /> [24]     Issues of paternity are established by a preponderance of evidence - which shows that a man is more likely than not to be the father of the child. In determining whether a claim for paternity has been proved, the court will rely on the credibility of the witnesses, their testimonies and circumstantial evidence.[2]<br /> [25]     The law governing proof paternity is set out in the Civil Code as follows: Article 321 (1) of the Civil Code Act provides that:<br /> Possession of status may be established when there is sufficient coincidence of fact indicating the relationship of descent and parenthood between a person and the family to which he claims to belong … (Emphasis of Court)<br /> [26]     Article 340 of the Civil Code Act provides that:<br /> 1.      It shall not be allowed to prove paternal descent, except:<br /> (a)    <br /> (b)    <br /> (c)      <br /> (d)    When there exist letters or other writings emanating from the alleged father containing an unequivocal admission of paternity.<br /> (e)      When the alleged father and the mother have notoriously lived together as husband and wife, during the period of conception.<br /> (f)    <br /> (2).    The right to prove paternal descent under this Article is for the benefit of the child alone, even if born of an incestuous or adulterous relationship.<br /> 3.         ……………………….<br /> 4.     A child whose paternal descent has been proved under this Article is entitled to bear his father's name in addition to a share in his father's succession under the title Succession. (My emphasis)<br /> [27]     In the present matter, the appellant faulted the trial Judge for according weight to the evidence adduced by the respondent to come to the conclusion and declaration that the respondent is the natural father of Grace Heidi Trisha Nicette. It was submitted by counsel for the appellant that the trial judge failed to appreciate the evidence of the appellant in toto and simply inferred fatherhood from the fact that the appellant and respondent were girl and boy friend and “slept together.” It was also submitted by counsel that the appellant’s refusal to name the other men she was intimate with had been used by the judge against the appellant. That in the absence of a DNA test there was insufficient evidence to satisfy the burden of proof required to prove paternity. Counsel also argued that the comments of the Judge on the state of the law regarding DNA evidence shows prejudice and bias hence causing injustice to the appellant.<br /> [28]     In dealing with the matter, the trial Judge held as follows:<br /> “The appellant has never denied her relationship with the respondent and their concubinage notoire. That concubinage notoire does not have to amount to the parties cohabiting – it suffices that they conducted themselves as if they were living together … In respect of the provisions of Articles 321 and 340 of the Civil Code, I find that the status of the child is established … since the child’s Birth Certificate contains her father’s name and her father’s recognition of her in the deed of acknowledgment.”<br /> In my view what the Trial Judge stated above brings the case within the ambit of sufficient coincidence of fact articulated in Article 321 (1) of the Civil Code<br /> The Trial Judge held further that:<br />  Similarly, the provisions of Article 340 are satisfied by the writings emanating from the respondent containing an unequivocal admission of paternity and the concubinage notoire of the parties.<br /> [29]     I find no fault with the trial Judge’s findings above. The trial Judge considered the evidence of the notorious cohabitation, the Respondent’s acknowledgement through a notarial deed that the child was his, the text messages exchanged between the parties and more specifically writings emanating from the respondent containing an unequivocal admission of paternity There was also the child's birth certificate containing the respondent’s name as the father of the child. It is on these various pieces of evidence that the judge based her declaration that paternity had been established and proved.<br /> [30]     I note that the respondent’s notarial deed which he signed on 15th February 2018 was never disputed by the appellant. Whereas the respondent adduced evidence of a deed to prove he was the child’s father, the appellant did not adduce evidence to rebut the claim. It is a principle of evidence that every claim or allegation which is not expressly denied is taken as an admission. Evidence of words or conduct on the part of the defendant which amounts to an admission is sufficient to corroborate a fact.[3] It is my finding that the evidence adduced by the respondent in the trial court was sufficient to support his claim of paternity. It can therefore be seen that the submission by counsel that the judge simply inferred fatherhood from the fact that the appellant and respondent were girl and boy friend and “slept together” is not supported by the record. And it cannot be said that the judge reached her decision without further evidence from which it could be inferred that the respondent was the father of the child.<br /> [31]     It must also be noted that whereas the Respondent was willing to subject himself to a DNA test, the appellant was categorical that she was not willing to subject the child to the test. It must be further noted that indeed as was stated by the Trial Judge, at the time when the case was heard by the Supreme Court, the law did not allow the court to order DNA evidence as it does now under Article 375 (2) of the Civil Code. The judge in fact “bemoaned” the state of the law thus:<br /> despite scientific advances of nearly twenty years, the Legislature has not … permit(ted) the use of DNA tests to prove or disprove the paternity of a child. That would have been conclusive evidence in this case to settle the matter. Instead the court has only arcane and outdated tool at its disposal to help it in its enquiry, namely the provisions of Article 321.<br /> Thus, the court was left to determine paternity by evaluating other adduced evidence.<br /> [32]     Counsel also argued that the comments of the Judge on the state of the law regarding DNA evidence shows prejudice and bias hence causing injustice to the appellant.<br /> [33]     I am astonished that Counsel could interprete the Learned Judge’s statement as evidence of bias and prejudice towards the appellant. But I will leave it at that.<br /> [34]     It is also clear from the judgment that the appellant has misinterpreted the basis of the decision of the judge. Whereas indeed the trial judge made a finding that the testimony of the appellant that at the time of conception of the child she did not have an exclusive relationship with the respondent but was “sleeping around” was a lie, the trial judge explained why she disbelieved the testimony of the appellant. The court’s explanation was hinged on the issue of the appellant’s credibility as a witness - or more precisely her lack of it.<br /> [35]     The judge inter alia stated that whereas the plaintiff’s evidence was overwhelmingly compelling, the evidence of the defendant was incredible and the witness was unimpressive and untruthful.<br /> [36]     As I stated in Carolus and Others v Scully and Others[4] it is a generally accepted principle in court hearings that the demeanour of a witness is of value in shedding light on the credibility of a witness. Demeanor evidence refers to the non-verbal cues given by a witness while testifying, including voice tone, facial expressions, body language, and other cues such as the manner of testifying, and the attitude of a witness while testifying. The opportunity to observe the demeanor of a witness while testifying is often exclusive to the trial court, the court where evidence and testimony are first introduced, received, and considered.<br /> [37]     It is trite that an appellate court should not lightly disturb a finding of fact arrived at by the trial judge who had the opportunity of observing the demeanour of witnesses and hearing them. I have found no reason to depart from the findings of the trial court.<br /> [38]     From the above analysis, I come to the conclusion that the trial Judge was right in declaring the respondent as the natural father of Grace Heidi Trisha Nicette and for ordering rectification of the birth register for the child to bear her father’s name.<br /> Orders.<br /> [39]     The appeal fails.<br /> The judgment and the orders of the Supreme Court are upheld.<br /> I make no order as to costs as the appellant appears in forma pauperis.<br />  <br />  <br />  <br /> …………………………………………….<br />  <br /> Dr. Lillian Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza, JA.<br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br /> I concur                                                    ……………………………………………<br />                                                                                     Fernando, President<br />            <br />  <br />  <br />  <br />  <br /> Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 29 April 2022.<br />  <br />  <br />  <br /> ROBINSON JA<br />  <br /> [1]       The appellant has appealed a decision of the Supreme Court dated 10 September 2019 in which the Court held that the respondent’s evidence was overwhelmingly compelling that he was the father.<br /> [2]       The appellant has appealed the judgment on the ground that the judgment is against the weight of evidence.<br /> [3]       Clearly, the ground of appeal raised by the appellant is tantamount to there being no ground: see the cases of Petit v Bonte [2000] SCCA 1 (SCA 45/1999) [2000]SCCA 13 (14 April 2000) and Chetty v Esther  (SCCA 44/2020 (Appeal from MA No. 156/2020 and MC No. 69/2020)) [2021] SCCA 12 (13 May 2021). It is observed that the ground of appeal runs afoul of rule 18(3) of the Seychelles Court of Appeal Rules 2005, as amended. Rule 18 (3) of the Seychelles Court of Appeal Rules provides ―<br />  ″[…] grounds of appeal shall set forth in separate numbered paragraphs the findings of fact and conclusions of law to which the appellant is objecting and shall also state the particular respect in which the variation of judgment or order is sought.″<br />  <br /> [4]       Given the mandatory wording of the provisions of rule 18(7) of the Seychelles Court of Appeal Rules 2005 as amended, I have no option but to strike out the notice of appeal.<br /> [5]       The appeal is dismissed and the orders of the Supreme Court are upheld.<br /> [6]       I make no order as to costs.<br />  <br />  <br /> _____________<br /> F. Robinson, JA<br />  <br /> Signed, dated, and delivered at Ile du Port on 29 April 2022.<br />  <br />  </p> <p>[1] E.g. Confait &amp; Anor v Port-Louis &amp; Anor (SCA 66/2018) [2021] SCCA 39; Re Ailee Development Corporation and the Companies Act 1972 (SCA 13/2008) [2010] SCCA 1<br />  </p> <p>[2] Jean-Baptiste vs. Dogley SSC 383/2006, 18 February 2011.</p> <p>[3] Moncherry v Rassool (1976) SLR 168; Crea v Agathine (N0.2) (1977) slr 153 and Marie v Julienne (1978) SLR 135.</p> <p>[4] </p></span></div></div> </div> </div> Thu, 23 Jun 2022 07:57:28 +0000 Anonymous 4230 at http://old2.seylii.org Belmont v Belmont (SCA 41 of 2017) [2020] SCCA 18 (21 August 2020); http://old2.seylii.org/sc/judgment/court-appeal/2020/18 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">Belmont v Belmont (SCA 41 of 2017) [2020] SCCA 18 (21 August 2020);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/159" hreflang="x-default">Family Law</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Anonymous (not verified)</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Thu, 03/04/2021 - 05:56</span> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-field-headnote-and-holding field--type-text-long field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Headnote and holding</div> <div class="field__item"><p>Appeal is allowed, and respondent is granted sole guardianship. </p> </div> </div> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.seylii.org/files/judgments/scca/2020/18/2020-scca-18.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=45197">2020-scca-18.docx</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><div class="WordSection1"> <p align="center" style="border:none; text-align:center; padding:0in"><span style="display: none;"> </span><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="line-height:115%"><b><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:115%">ORDER</span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="border:none; text-align:justify; padding:0in"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="line-height:115%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:115%">The appeal is allowed. The orders of the learned trial judge are set aside. The appointment of Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont as joint guardians of the Respondent is set aside, substituting therefor the Appellant, Karine Belmont as sole guardian and</span></span> <span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:115%">to administer and manage the Respondent's affairs and property. No order is made as to costs. </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p align="center" style="text-align:center; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="line-height:107%"><b><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%">JUDGMENT</span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="line-height:200%"><b><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%">ROBINSON JA</span></span></b></span></span></span></p> </div> <div class="WordSection1"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><sdt docpart="612AC9AC918F41B198F099A7A1862DF7" id="-5060379"><br /> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p></p></sdt></span></div> <p><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><sdt docpart="612AC9AC918F41B198F099A7A1862DF7" id="-5060379"></sdt></span></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><sdtpr></sdtpr></span></span></span></p> <ol> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">This appeal proceeded on the premise that two guardians could be appointed to an interdicted person, and the two guardians appointed would discharge their duties jointly. I have proceeded on the same premise, without expressing any views as to its correctness. I mention that this Court requested additional submissions per letter of the Assistant Registrar, dated the 15 July 2020. One of the questions posed by this Court was whether or not two guardians could be appointed to an interdicted person, as in the present case. This Court obtained additional submissions from Counsel for the Appellant, and is grateful to Counsel for his views concerning this very pertinent point. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="2"> <li style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Miss Karine Belmont, the Appellant, is the daughter of the Respondent, Mr Joseph Belmont, who at the time of the commencement of these proceedings in 2017, was 69 years old. Mrs Christianne Belmont, the spouse of the Respondent, is the stepmother of the Appellant. Mr Antoine Belmont is the elder brother of the Respondent. </span></span></span></li> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">The Appellant entered proceedings in the Supreme Court for the interdiction of the Respondent by a petition addressed to the Supreme Court under Article 490</span></span><a href="#_ftn1" title=""><sup><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><sup><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%">[1]</span></span></sup></span></span></sup></a><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"> <i>alinéa</i> 1 of the Civil Code of Seychelles. The petition was supported by an affidavit. The Respondent filed a written answer in which he resisted the application under Article 492 of the Civil Code of Seychelles.</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="4"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">The Appellant and the Respondent testified in the case at first instance on the 11 December 2017. An essential aspect of this case is that Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont neither cross - petitioned nor gave evidence at the trial.</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="5"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">The learned trial Judge made the following orders at paragraph 8 of the judgment, dated 11 December 2017 ―</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:145px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">″1.       I make an order of interdiction in respect of Mr Joseph Belmont.</span></i></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:145px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">2.         I find that Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont are able and willing to be appointed as guardian and to carry out the duties of a guardian to the Respondent and that they are both not subject to any legal incapacity to be appointed as such.</span></i></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:145px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in"> </p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:145px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">In this respect I appoint as guardian of Mr Belmont the Respondent in this matter.″ </span></i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">Verbatim</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="6"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Given order 2 of the orders contained in paragraph 8 of the judgment, referred to at paragraph 5 hereof, I read the order: ″<i>In this respect I appoint as guardian of Mr Belmont the Respondent in this matter″ </i>to mean that Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont had been appointed as the guardians of the Respondent. The appeal proceeded on this basis.</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="7"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">The learned trial Judge did not appoint the Appellant as the guardian of the Respondent as she was <i>″not satisfied that she </i>[was]<i> best placed to be appointed legal guardian given the fact that there was an obvious friction between herself and the Respondent's wife Mrs Christianne Belmont″. </i></span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="8"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">The learned trial Judge<i> </i>was also <i>″not persuaded by the evidence that the other two guardians proposed will not act in the best interest of the Respondent″. </i>She held the view that Mrs Christianne Belmont, who lives with the Respondent ″<i>is in the circumstances the best person to be appointed as his guardian and that there is no evidence that she will not act in his best interest</i>″. She went on to appoint Mr Antoine Belmont as co-guardian of the Respondent<i> ″out of an abundance of caution to protect the rights and interest of the Respondent″.</i> </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="9"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">The Appellant appealed against the learned trial Judge’s failure to appoint her as the guardian of the Respondent on two grounds, which read as follows ―</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:145px"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">″Following her correct interdiction of the Respondent at the instance of the Appellant, the Learned Chief Justice erred in failing to consider ―</span></i></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:145px"> </p> <ol> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:128px"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">That she was not appointing a physical carer for the Respondent but also a guardian to ensure the proper management of his financial affairs;</span></i></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:168px"> </p> <ol start="2"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:128px"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">That the Respondent alone, or in conjunction with the Respondent's wife, would have been the more suitable guardian or combination of guardians for the Respondent″.</span></i></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:168px"> </p> <ol start="10"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">By way of relief, the Appellant sought the following order ―</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">″An order allowing the appeal, cancelling the appointments of Mrs Christianne Belmont and Antione Belmont as guardians of the Respondent and substituting therefore the Appellant as sole guardian, or the Appellant and Mrs Christianne Belmont as joint guardians, for the Respondent″</span></i></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="11"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">The Attorney General as <i>Ministère Public</i> submitted that Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont should not have been appointed as joint guardians because they were never before the Court, and, therefore, not examined about their willingness and fitness to be appointed as joint guardians. The Attorney General as <i>Ministère Public</i> urged us to remit the case to the Supreme Court for Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont to be appropriately examined concerning their willingness and fitness to act in the best interest of the Respondent.  </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p> </p> <ol start="12"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Counsel for the Appellant argued both grounds of appeal together. He submitted in his Heads of Argument and oral submissions that the learned trial Judge approached the Appellant's application on incorrect grounds. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="13"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Firstly, he submitted that the learned trial Judge placed a burden on the Appellant to satisfy her as to why the two persons eventually appointed could not be guardians. He was of the view that this was not a duty to be placed on the Appellant, who had made it clear in her petition that she wanted to be appointed guardian. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px"> </p> <ol start="14"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Secondly, he argued that the learned trial Judge improperly conflated the duties of carer with those of guardian. Counsel referred to the bottom of page 34 of the brief, where he stated the learned trial Judge clearly demonstrated this error in her thinking with the question, <i>″So, how do you propose to be his guardian and give him care if you do not live with him?″. </i>He stated that the duty of a guardian includes care of the person, certainly, but also, and especially, representation in all legal acts and administration of the property of the person. He added that there would have been no issue at all with the legal affairs of the Respondent being vested in another person. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="15"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">He went on further to submit that the learned trial Judge never once addressed her mind to the possibility of appointing Mrs Christianne Belmont and the Appellant as joint guardians. She simply dismissed the possibility with two statements: <i>(i) </i>at paragraph 4 of her Order, that there was <i>obvious friction</i> between the appellant and Mrs Christianne Belmont, which precluded the Appellant's appointment as sole guardian and <i>(ii)</i> that she was not persuaded that Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont would not act in the Respondent's best interests.</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="16"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Before I consider the questions in issue, I rehearse the salient facts of this case.</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="17"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">On the 11 December 2017, before the hearing of the case at first instance started, the Respondent through Counsel informed the learned trial Judge that he was desirous of Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont being appointed as his joint guardians. The evidence revealed that the Respondent has a mild cognitive impairment, but he was still in a position to make some decisions. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p> </p> <ol start="18"> <li class="CxSpLast" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">A close reading of the whole record of proceedings showed that the learned trial Judge did not address her mind to the possibility of appointing the Appellant as the guardian of the Respondent. It appears that, because Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont were not before the Court, the learned trial Judge placed a burden on the Appellant to satisfy her as to why they would not be good guardians: <i>″<u>COURT TO WITNESS</u>  Q. </i> […]<i> You need to be able to demonstrate to the Court why</i> [Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p style="margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p class="CxSpFirst" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Antoine Belmont] <i>would not be good guardians</i>″ and ″<i><u>COURT TO WITNESS</u></i> <i>Q. […] The question that is being put to you is very specific, can you demonstrate to the Court why the 2 persons suggested should not be appointed legal guardians? <u>That is the only question</u>. Is there a reason why you do not think they can be guardians</i>″. </span></span></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="19"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">The Appellant testified that: <i>″I do not understand why I am not also included as the person to be able to be his guardian because I am also his child</i>″. She also testified that she would leave her current employment to care for the Respondent if she were to be appointed as his guardian. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="20"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">According to the testimony of the Respondent, Mrs Christianne Belmont takes care of his affairs, including looking after his money and signing cheques, and takes care of him. When asked whether or not he had any objection to the Appellant being appointed as his guardian to take care of his affairs, his response was: ″<i>A: No because my wife and me we are still capable of doing our house so I do not see why she would come there when we can do it now. So I do not see this no. She has a place where she is living</i>″. The Respondent also testified that the Appellant is a good daughter to him, and that he has no reason to believe that she was trying to take his property. He testified that he would visit her regularly at her house, which he had given to her and his son, one Karl Belmont. According to the evidence of the Respondent, Mr Antoine Belmont does not live with him but he [the Respondent] would meet him occasionally at the church and during the week. He testified that Mr Antoine Belmont would assist if something <i>grave</i> were to happen. It appears that the learned trial Judge had relied on this evidence to appoint Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont as joint guardians and persuade herself that they would act in the best interest of the Respondent. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="21"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">With respect to the finding made that there was <i>obvious friction</i> between Mrs Christianne Belmont and the Appellant, it appears from a reading of the brief that the <i>friction</i> has to do with the Appellant and Karl Belmont being reserved heirs. The application by the Appellant <i>inter alia</i> revealed a suspicion of the reserved heirs that they were being side-lined and might lose out in the succession of the Respondent in favour of the spouse, Mrs Christianne Belmont. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="22"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">A guardian's duties are set out in Article 450 of the Civil Code of Seychelles by reference thereto in Article 509 of the said Code. Articles 509 and 450 of the Civil Code of Seychelles provide ―</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="background:white"><span style="line-height:normal"><i>″<span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">Article 509</span></span></i></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="background:white"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">The interdicted person is assimilated to a minor, both in regard to his person and to his property; the laws relating to the guardianship of minors shall apply to the guardianship of interdicted persons″.</span></span></i></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="background:white"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black"> and</span></span></i></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">″Article 450     </span></i></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="background:white"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">1. The guardian shall have the care of the person of the minor and shall represent him in all legal acts.</span></span></i></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="background:white"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">He shall administer his property showing in this respect, reasonable care, and shall be liable for damages which may arise from his mal-administration. </span></span></i></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="background:white"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">He shall neither buy the property of the minor nor take it on lease, nor shall he consent to the assignment of a right belonging to the pupil or bind the minor's property to the payment of any sum.</span></span></i></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="background:white"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">2. Except when authorised by a Judge in chambers, the guardian shall only invest the minor's funds in such stocks and securities as are mentioned in laws enacted from time to time.</span></span></i></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="background:white"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">Pending investment, the guardian shall deposit into a Savings Bank or the Treasury or a Bank approved by a Judge all the funds which are not required for the yearly expenses of a minor and for the administration of the minor's property, and he shall owe interest on all funds not so deposited. He shall not withdraw the funds deposited, or any part thereof, without the authorisation of a Judge in chambers.</span></span></i></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="background:white"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">3. Provided that nothing in this article shall be construed as preventing a guardian from setting up a fiduciary fund. However, in that case, the safeguards of the minor's property contained in this Code shall be read into the notarial setting up such fund″.</span></span></i></span></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="23"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Under Article 490 <i>alinéa</i> 1 of the Civil Code of Seychelles proceedings for interdiction shall be entered in the Supreme Court and shall be commenced by petition. Article 490 <i> alinéa </i>4 stipulates that: <i>″the person whose interdiction is sought shall be made a respondent in the case, and the petition and such other process as the Court may direct shall be served on him</i>″.  </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="24"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">It is fundamental under Article 491 of the Civil Code of Seychelles that: <i>″</i>[w]<i>hen the application for interdiction is not made at the instance of the Attorney-General, a copy of the petition shall be served on him and the matters shall be referred to him in accordance with the provisions of section 151</i></span></span><a href="#_ftn2" title=""><i><sup><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><b><sup><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%">[2]</span></span></sup></b></span></span></sup></i></a><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"> of the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure (Cap 213)″. </span></span></i></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="25"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Under section 151 of the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure matters relating to the interdiction of persons shall be referred to the Attorney General for his conclusions as <i>Ministère Public</i>. Nonetheless, section 151 of the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure provides that: <i>″henceforth there shall be no obligation upon him to give conclusions as Ministère Public, in any matter referred to him, unless required to do by the court, and no judgment shall be held to be invalid for want of such conclusions″. </i></span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="26"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Article 495 of the Civil Code of Seychelles provides ―</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">″No judgment shall be vitiated or rendered invalid on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the proceedings arising from or depending upon the provisions of the <b>three preceding articles</b> unless such error, omission or irregularity has in fact occasioned a miscarriage of justice″. </span></i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">Emphasis supplied.</span></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">I observe that Article 495 of the Civil Code of Seychelles does not concern Articles 490 and 491 of the said Code. </span></span></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="27"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">A careful reading of Article 490 of the Civil Code of Seychelles has led me to conclude that it gives an exhaustive list of persons, who may enter proceedings for interdiction in the Supreme Court. I mention in passing that the Civil Code of Seychelles does not contain an article similar to that as obtained in the <i>Code Civil Mauricien</i>: <i>″504 L’époux est tuteur de son conjoint, à moins que la communauté de vie n’ait cessé entre eux ou que le juge en Chambre n’estime qu’une cause interdit  de lui confier la tutelle″.</i> </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="28"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Further, a close reading of Articles 490 and 491 of the Civil Code of Seychelles has led me to conclude that the said provisions of the Civil Code of Seychelles have the <i>caractère d’ordre public</i>. </span></span><span lang="FR" xml:lang="FR" xml:lang="FR"><span style="line-height:150%">In <i>Civ. 1er, 23 juin 1987, 85-17126, </i>the Cour de Cassation held: <i>″<span style="background:white"><span style="color:black">Mais attendu que les dispositions de l'article 493, alinéa 1<sup>er</sup>, du Code civil, qui énumèrent limitativement les personnes qui ont qualité pour requérir l'ouverture de la tutelle, <b>édictées dans un souci de protection de la liberté, ont un caractère d'ordre public</b> ; que le juge doit relever d'office les fins de non-recevoir fondées sur ce texte;″. </span></span></i></span></span><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="background:white"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="color:black">Emphasis supplied<i>.</i></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="29"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">In the present appeal, the Appellant, the daughter of the Respondent, entered proceedings, before the Supreme Court, for the interdiction of the Respondent, who was made a Respondent. Her petition was also styled: ″<i>In the presence of: the Attorney General</i>″. In that regard, Article 491 of the Civil Code of Seychelles was correctly complied with. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p> </p> <ol start="30"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">As mentioned above, the fundamental issue with respect to this case is that Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont neither cross-petitioned nor were before the Court. Both of them had not asked to be appointed as the guardians of the Respondent. The Appellate Court stated in the case of<b> Jourdanne Guy v Dianna Sedgwick and Anor </b><i>SCA54/2011</i>, (delivered on 11 April 2014), at paragraph 21, that: <i>″We not only have to do justice but have to do justice according to the law″</i>.  </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="31"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Although prayer (3) had asked the Court to ″<i>3. make such other orders that this Honourable Court shall deem fit in the circumstances of this case″</i>, I find that the pleadings, including prayer (3), were not sufficiently wide to permit the learned trial Judge to make the findings and grant the relief she did. The petition stated, <i>inter alia</i> ―</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">″7. The Petitioner proposes that the Petitioner be appointed as the Guardian of the Respondent.</span></i></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">8. The Petitioner is able and willing to be appointed guardian of the Respondent  and to carry out duties of guardian of the Respondent.</span></i></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">9. The petitioner is not subject to any legal incapacity to be appointed as guardian of the Respondent.</span></i></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">10. That it is, therefore, urgent and necessary that the Respondent be interdicted  and the Petitioner be appointed as Guardian for the Respondent and to administer and manage the Respondent's affairs and property.″</span></i></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">The Appellant had not asked in her petition for Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont to be appointed as guardians. There were no indications that Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont were able and willing, and that they were not subject to any legal incapacity as found by the learned trial Judge. In addition, I accept the contention of Counsel for the Appellant that the learned trial Judge was not correct to place a burden on the Appellant to satisfy her as to why Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont should not be guardians.</span></span></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="32"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">The Respondent in his answer stated that: ″<i>he is in good mental health and that the Petitioner is unfit to act as his guardian and that she should be examined to certify her fitness</i>″. The Respondent also alleged in his answer that the Petitioner had filed this petition because she wanted to have total control of his property. None of those allegations were proved at the hearing of the application. As mentioned above, the Respondent testified to the effect that the Appellant was a good daughter to him, and that he had no reason to believe that the Appellant was after his property.  </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="33"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">There was no evidence to show that the Appellant was not a fit and proper person to be appointed as the guardian of the Respondent. The evidence also did not reveal any factor disqualifying her from appointment as guardian. It was not alleged that the conduct of the Appellant was notorious, nor was it established. Further, whether or not the learned trial Judge was correct to conflate the duties of carer with those of guardian does not arise for my consideration in view of the statement made at paragraph 1 hereof. The Appellant testified to the effect that she was able and willing to be appointed as a guardian and to carry out the duties of a guardian to the Respondent and would be ready to leave her job to take care of the Respondent as his carer if she were to be appointed. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="34"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">For the reasons stated above, I hold the view that the learned trial Judge erred in finding that Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont were able and willing to be appointed as guardians and to carry out the duties of guardians to the Respondent, and that they are both not subject to any legal incapacity to be appointed as such. I make this finding paying due regard to the view of the Attorney General as the <i>Ministère Public</i>, who was not in favour of Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont being appointed as joint guardians of the Respondent, two people who were never before the Court. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="35"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"> Thus, I accept the contention of the Appellant that the learned trial Judge denied the Appellant the relief she sought, namely to be appointed as guardian of the Respondent after she had successfully petitioned to have him interdicted and sought her appointment as guardian over his affairs.</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="36"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">I make orders allowing the appeal, setting aside the appointment of Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont as joint guardians of the Respondent and substituting therefor the Appellant, Miss Karine Belmont as sole guardian for the Respondent and to administer and manage the Respondent's affairs and property.</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="37"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">I make no order as to costs. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <div style="page-break-after: always"><span style="display: none;"> </span></div> <p style="margin-top:8px"> </p> <p style="margin-top:8px"> </p> <p style="margin-top:8px"> </p> <p style="margin-top:8px"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="line-height:200%"><b><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><sdt combobox="t" docpart="A5DA3DA95E9D4112942859207A1DB27F" id="1342433808"><br /> <listitem datavalue="F. MacGregor (PCA)" listvalue="F. MacGregor (PCA)"></listitem> <listitem datavalue="A.Fernando (President)" listvalue="A.Fernando (President)"></listitem> <listitem datavalue="M. Twomey (J.A)" listvalue="M. Twomey (J.A)"></listitem> <listitem datavalue="B. Renaud (J.A)" listvalue="B. Renaud (J.A)"></listitem> <listitem datavalue="F. Robinson (J.A)" listvalue="F. Robinson (J.A)"></listitem> F. Robinson (J.A)</sdt></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p> </p> <p style="margin-top:25px; margin-bottom:16px"> </p> <p> </p> <p style="margin-top:25px; margin-bottom:16px"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="line-height:200%"><b><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><sdtpr></sdtpr><sdt contentlocked="t" docpart="E13ABC822BDC4F5FAC609B34284800E8" id="570630719" text="t">I concur:.</sdt></span></span></b><b><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%">                                ………………….                               </span></span></b><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><sdt combobox="t" docpart="A2239E41731648439628DBE6EE7FA357" id="550192873"><br /> <listitem datavalue="F. MacGregor (PCA)" listvalue="F. MacGregor (PCA)"></listitem> <listitem datavalue="A.Fernando (President)" listvalue="A.Fernando (President)"></listitem> <listitem datavalue="M. Twomey (J.A)" listvalue="M. Twomey (J.A)"></listitem> <listitem datavalue="L. Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza (J.A)" listvalue="L. Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza (J.A)"></listitem> <listitem datavalue="F. Robinson (J.A)" listvalue="F. Robinson (J.A)"></listitem> A.Fernando (President)</sdt></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-top:25px; margin-bottom:16px"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="line-height:200%"><b><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%">I concur:.                                ………………….                               </span></span></b><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%">M. Burhan (J.A)</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-top:25px; margin-bottom:16px"> </p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px"> </p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><sdt contentlocked="t" docpart="670358A5D09B4B839F16355D9A0550C8" docparttype="Quick Parts" id="-1131636047" sdtdocpartlist="t">Signed, dated and delivered at Palais de Justice, Ile du Port on</sdt><sdt calendar="t" calendartype="Gregorian" date="2020-08-21T00:00:00Z" dateformat="dd MMMM yyyy" docpart="FD7100E2AD7A422C95759A47AAF738F1" id="-504743887" lang="EN-GB" maptodatetime="t" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">21 August 2020</sdt></span></span></span></span></span></p> <div> <br /> <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /> <div id="ftn1"> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><a href="#_ftnref1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><i><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><b><span style="line-height:107%">[1]</span></b></span></i></span></a><i> ″Article 490 <span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">1. Proceedings for interdiction shall be entered in the Supreme Court and shall be commenced by petition addressed to the Court.</span></span></i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i> </i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">2.         Such proceedings may be entered by ‑</span></span></i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i> </i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">(a)        any relative of the person whose interdiction is sought; or</span></span></i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">(b)        a spouse with regard to the other spouse; or</span></span></i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">(c)        the Attorney‑General.</span></span></i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i> </i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">3.         The petition shall set out briefly the material facts on which the application for interdiction is based.</span></span></i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i> </i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">4.         The person whose interdiction is sought shall be made a respondent in the case, and the petition and such other process as the Court may direct shall be served on him. ″</span></span></i></span></span></span></p> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"> </p> </div> <div id="ftn2"> <p class="estatutes-9-generalheading"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><a href="#_ftnref2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><i><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><b><span style="line-height:107%">[2]</span></b></span></i></span></a><i> </i><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black"><span style="letter-spacing:-.3pt">Conclusions of the Ministère Public</span></span></span></i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-9-generalheading"> </p> <p class="estatutes-1-sectionheading"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">″Matters which must be referred to the Attorney General for conclusions as Ministère Public</span></span></i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-sectionheading"> </p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">151. The following matters shall be referred to the Attorney General for his conclusions as Ministère Public, but there shall henceforth be no obligation upon him to give conclusions as Ministère Public, in any matter referred to him, unless required to do so by the court, and no judgment shall be held to be invalid for want of such conclusions whenever such matter shall have been referred to him according to law:</span></span></i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"> </p> <ol style="list-style-type:lower-alpha"> <li class="estatutes-3-paragraph" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">matters relating to the guardianship of minors;</span></span></i></span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="estatutes-3-paragraph" style="margin-left:25px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.25in"> </p> <ol start="2" style="list-style-type:lower-alpha"> <li class="estatutes-3-paragraph" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">matters in which one of the parties is represented by a curator;</span></span></i></span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="estatutes-3-paragraph" style="margin-left:25px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.25in"> </p> <ol start="3" style="list-style-type:lower-alpha"> <li class="estatutes-3-paragraph" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">matters concerning presumed absentees or matters in which such absentees are interested;</span></span></i></span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="estatutes-3-paragraph" style="margin-left:25px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.25in"> </p> <p class="estatutes-3-paragraph" style="margin-left:25px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.25in"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><b><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">(d) matters relating to the interdiction of persons</span></span></i></b><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black"> or the appointment of advisers(conseils judiciaires).″ Emphasis </span></span></i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">supplied</span></span></span></span></span></p> </div> </div> <div> <div id="ftn2"> <p class="estatutes-3-paragraph" style="margin-left:25px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.25in"> </p> </div> </div> <div> <div id="ftn2"> <p class="estatutes-3-paragraph" style="margin-left:25px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.25in"> </p> </div> </div> <div> <div id="ftn2"> <p class="estatutes-3-paragraph" style="margin-left:25px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.25in"> </p> </div> </div> <div> <div id="ftn2"> <p class="estatutes-3-paragraph" style="margin-left:25px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.25in"> </p> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"> </p> </div> </div> <p><span style="display: none;"> </span> </p> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-c44576b4cf6f5b9d90cdb4ceb003459e4efc5eba116440cb504232d21aadccc7"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><div class="WordSection1"> <p align="center" style="border:none; text-align:center; padding:0in"><span style="display: none;"> </span><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="line-height:115%"><b><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:115%">ORDER</span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="border:none; text-align:justify; padding:0in"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="line-height:115%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:115%">The appeal is allowed. The orders of the learned trial judge are set aside. The appointment of Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont as joint guardians of the Respondent is set aside, substituting therefor the Appellant, Karine Belmont as sole guardian and</span></span> <span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:115%">to administer and manage the Respondent's affairs and property. No order is made as to costs. </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p align="center" style="text-align:center; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="line-height:107%"><b><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%">JUDGMENT</span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="line-height:200%"><b><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%">ROBINSON JA</span></span></b></span></span></span></p> </div> <div class="WordSection1"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><sdt docpart="612AC9AC918F41B198F099A7A1862DF7" id="-5060379"><br /> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p></p></sdt></span></div> <p><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><sdt docpart="612AC9AC918F41B198F099A7A1862DF7" id="-5060379"></sdt></span></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><sdtpr></sdtpr></span></span></span></p> <ol> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">This appeal proceeded on the premise that two guardians could be appointed to an interdicted person, and the two guardians appointed would discharge their duties jointly. I have proceeded on the same premise, without expressing any views as to its correctness. I mention that this Court requested additional submissions per letter of the Assistant Registrar, dated the 15 July 2020. One of the questions posed by this Court was whether or not two guardians could be appointed to an interdicted person, as in the present case. This Court obtained additional submissions from Counsel for the Appellant, and is grateful to Counsel for his views concerning this very pertinent point. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="2"> <li style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Miss Karine Belmont, the Appellant, is the daughter of the Respondent, Mr Joseph Belmont, who at the time of the commencement of these proceedings in 2017, was 69 years old. Mrs Christianne Belmont, the spouse of the Respondent, is the stepmother of the Appellant. Mr Antoine Belmont is the elder brother of the Respondent. </span></span></span></li> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">The Appellant entered proceedings in the Supreme Court for the interdiction of the Respondent by a petition addressed to the Supreme Court under Article 490</span></span><a href="#_ftn1" title=""><sup><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><sup><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%">[1]</span></span></sup></span></span></sup></a><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"> <i>alinéa</i> 1 of the Civil Code of Seychelles. The petition was supported by an affidavit. The Respondent filed a written answer in which he resisted the application under Article 492 of the Civil Code of Seychelles.</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="4"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">The Appellant and the Respondent testified in the case at first instance on the 11 December 2017. An essential aspect of this case is that Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont neither cross - petitioned nor gave evidence at the trial.</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="5"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">The learned trial Judge made the following orders at paragraph 8 of the judgment, dated 11 December 2017 ―</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:145px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">″1.       I make an order of interdiction in respect of Mr Joseph Belmont.</span></i></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:145px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">2.         I find that Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont are able and willing to be appointed as guardian and to carry out the duties of a guardian to the Respondent and that they are both not subject to any legal incapacity to be appointed as such.</span></i></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:145px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.5in"> </p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:145px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">In this respect I appoint as guardian of Mr Belmont the Respondent in this matter.″ </span></i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">Verbatim</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="6"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Given order 2 of the orders contained in paragraph 8 of the judgment, referred to at paragraph 5 hereof, I read the order: ″<i>In this respect I appoint as guardian of Mr Belmont the Respondent in this matter″ </i>to mean that Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont had been appointed as the guardians of the Respondent. The appeal proceeded on this basis.</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="7"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">The learned trial Judge did not appoint the Appellant as the guardian of the Respondent as she was <i>″not satisfied that she </i>[was]<i> best placed to be appointed legal guardian given the fact that there was an obvious friction between herself and the Respondent's wife Mrs Christianne Belmont″. </i></span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="8"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">The learned trial Judge<i> </i>was also <i>″not persuaded by the evidence that the other two guardians proposed will not act in the best interest of the Respondent″. </i>She held the view that Mrs Christianne Belmont, who lives with the Respondent ″<i>is in the circumstances the best person to be appointed as his guardian and that there is no evidence that she will not act in his best interest</i>″. She went on to appoint Mr Antoine Belmont as co-guardian of the Respondent<i> ″out of an abundance of caution to protect the rights and interest of the Respondent″.</i> </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="9"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">The Appellant appealed against the learned trial Judge’s failure to appoint her as the guardian of the Respondent on two grounds, which read as follows ―</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:145px"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">″Following her correct interdiction of the Respondent at the instance of the Appellant, the Learned Chief Justice erred in failing to consider ―</span></i></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:145px"> </p> <ol> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:128px"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">That she was not appointing a physical carer for the Respondent but also a guardian to ensure the proper management of his financial affairs;</span></i></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:168px"> </p> <ol start="2"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:128px"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">That the Respondent alone, or in conjunction with the Respondent's wife, would have been the more suitable guardian or combination of guardians for the Respondent″.</span></i></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:168px"> </p> <ol start="10"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">By way of relief, the Appellant sought the following order ―</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">″An order allowing the appeal, cancelling the appointments of Mrs Christianne Belmont and Antione Belmont as guardians of the Respondent and substituting therefore the Appellant as sole guardian, or the Appellant and Mrs Christianne Belmont as joint guardians, for the Respondent″</span></i></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="11"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">The Attorney General as <i>Ministère Public</i> submitted that Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont should not have been appointed as joint guardians because they were never before the Court, and, therefore, not examined about their willingness and fitness to be appointed as joint guardians. The Attorney General as <i>Ministère Public</i> urged us to remit the case to the Supreme Court for Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont to be appropriately examined concerning their willingness and fitness to act in the best interest of the Respondent.  </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p> </p> <ol start="12"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Counsel for the Appellant argued both grounds of appeal together. He submitted in his Heads of Argument and oral submissions that the learned trial Judge approached the Appellant's application on incorrect grounds. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="13"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Firstly, he submitted that the learned trial Judge placed a burden on the Appellant to satisfy her as to why the two persons eventually appointed could not be guardians. He was of the view that this was not a duty to be placed on the Appellant, who had made it clear in her petition that she wanted to be appointed guardian. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px"> </p> <ol start="14"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Secondly, he argued that the learned trial Judge improperly conflated the duties of carer with those of guardian. Counsel referred to the bottom of page 34 of the brief, where he stated the learned trial Judge clearly demonstrated this error in her thinking with the question, <i>″So, how do you propose to be his guardian and give him care if you do not live with him?″. </i>He stated that the duty of a guardian includes care of the person, certainly, but also, and especially, representation in all legal acts and administration of the property of the person. He added that there would have been no issue at all with the legal affairs of the Respondent being vested in another person. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="15"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">He went on further to submit that the learned trial Judge never once addressed her mind to the possibility of appointing Mrs Christianne Belmont and the Appellant as joint guardians. She simply dismissed the possibility with two statements: <i>(i) </i>at paragraph 4 of her Order, that there was <i>obvious friction</i> between the appellant and Mrs Christianne Belmont, which precluded the Appellant's appointment as sole guardian and <i>(ii)</i> that she was not persuaded that Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont would not act in the Respondent's best interests.</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="16"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Before I consider the questions in issue, I rehearse the salient facts of this case.</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="17"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">On the 11 December 2017, before the hearing of the case at first instance started, the Respondent through Counsel informed the learned trial Judge that he was desirous of Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont being appointed as his joint guardians. The evidence revealed that the Respondent has a mild cognitive impairment, but he was still in a position to make some decisions. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p> </p> <ol start="18"> <li class="CxSpLast" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">A close reading of the whole record of proceedings showed that the learned trial Judge did not address her mind to the possibility of appointing the Appellant as the guardian of the Respondent. It appears that, because Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont were not before the Court, the learned trial Judge placed a burden on the Appellant to satisfy her as to why they would not be good guardians: <i>″<u>COURT TO WITNESS</u>  Q. </i> […]<i> You need to be able to demonstrate to the Court why</i> [Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p style="margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p class="CxSpFirst" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Antoine Belmont] <i>would not be good guardians</i>″ and ″<i><u>COURT TO WITNESS</u></i> <i>Q. […] The question that is being put to you is very specific, can you demonstrate to the Court why the 2 persons suggested should not be appointed legal guardians? <u>That is the only question</u>. Is there a reason why you do not think they can be guardians</i>″. </span></span></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="19"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">The Appellant testified that: <i>″I do not understand why I am not also included as the person to be able to be his guardian because I am also his child</i>″. She also testified that she would leave her current employment to care for the Respondent if she were to be appointed as his guardian. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="20"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">According to the testimony of the Respondent, Mrs Christianne Belmont takes care of his affairs, including looking after his money and signing cheques, and takes care of him. When asked whether or not he had any objection to the Appellant being appointed as his guardian to take care of his affairs, his response was: ″<i>A: No because my wife and me we are still capable of doing our house so I do not see why she would come there when we can do it now. So I do not see this no. She has a place where she is living</i>″. The Respondent also testified that the Appellant is a good daughter to him, and that he has no reason to believe that she was trying to take his property. He testified that he would visit her regularly at her house, which he had given to her and his son, one Karl Belmont. According to the evidence of the Respondent, Mr Antoine Belmont does not live with him but he [the Respondent] would meet him occasionally at the church and during the week. He testified that Mr Antoine Belmont would assist if something <i>grave</i> were to happen. It appears that the learned trial Judge had relied on this evidence to appoint Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont as joint guardians and persuade herself that they would act in the best interest of the Respondent. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="21"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">With respect to the finding made that there was <i>obvious friction</i> between Mrs Christianne Belmont and the Appellant, it appears from a reading of the brief that the <i>friction</i> has to do with the Appellant and Karl Belmont being reserved heirs. The application by the Appellant <i>inter alia</i> revealed a suspicion of the reserved heirs that they were being side-lined and might lose out in the succession of the Respondent in favour of the spouse, Mrs Christianne Belmont. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="22"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">A guardian's duties are set out in Article 450 of the Civil Code of Seychelles by reference thereto in Article 509 of the said Code. Articles 509 and 450 of the Civil Code of Seychelles provide ―</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="background:white"><span style="line-height:normal"><i>″<span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">Article 509</span></span></i></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="background:white"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">The interdicted person is assimilated to a minor, both in regard to his person and to his property; the laws relating to the guardianship of minors shall apply to the guardianship of interdicted persons″.</span></span></i></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="background:white"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black"> and</span></span></i></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">″Article 450     </span></i></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="background:white"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">1. The guardian shall have the care of the person of the minor and shall represent him in all legal acts.</span></span></i></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="background:white"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">He shall administer his property showing in this respect, reasonable care, and shall be liable for damages which may arise from his mal-administration. </span></span></i></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="background:white"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">He shall neither buy the property of the minor nor take it on lease, nor shall he consent to the assignment of a right belonging to the pupil or bind the minor's property to the payment of any sum.</span></span></i></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="background:white"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">2. Except when authorised by a Judge in chambers, the guardian shall only invest the minor's funds in such stocks and securities as are mentioned in laws enacted from time to time.</span></span></i></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="background:white"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">Pending investment, the guardian shall deposit into a Savings Bank or the Treasury or a Bank approved by a Judge all the funds which are not required for the yearly expenses of a minor and for the administration of the minor's property, and he shall owe interest on all funds not so deposited. He shall not withdraw the funds deposited, or any part thereof, without the authorisation of a Judge in chambers.</span></span></i></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="background:white"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">3. Provided that nothing in this article shall be construed as preventing a guardian from setting up a fiduciary fund. However, in that case, the safeguards of the minor's property contained in this Code shall be read into the notarial setting up such fund″.</span></span></i></span></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="23"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Under Article 490 <i>alinéa</i> 1 of the Civil Code of Seychelles proceedings for interdiction shall be entered in the Supreme Court and shall be commenced by petition. Article 490 <i> alinéa </i>4 stipulates that: <i>″the person whose interdiction is sought shall be made a respondent in the case, and the petition and such other process as the Court may direct shall be served on him</i>″.  </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="24"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">It is fundamental under Article 491 of the Civil Code of Seychelles that: <i>″</i>[w]<i>hen the application for interdiction is not made at the instance of the Attorney-General, a copy of the petition shall be served on him and the matters shall be referred to him in accordance with the provisions of section 151</i></span></span><a href="#_ftn2" title=""><i><sup><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><b><sup><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%">[2]</span></span></sup></b></span></span></sup></i></a><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"> of the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure (Cap 213)″. </span></span></i></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="25"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Under section 151 of the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure matters relating to the interdiction of persons shall be referred to the Attorney General for his conclusions as <i>Ministère Public</i>. Nonetheless, section 151 of the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure provides that: <i>″henceforth there shall be no obligation upon him to give conclusions as Ministère Public, in any matter referred to him, unless required to do by the court, and no judgment shall be held to be invalid for want of such conclusions″. </i></span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="26"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Article 495 of the Civil Code of Seychelles provides ―</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">″No judgment shall be vitiated or rendered invalid on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the proceedings arising from or depending upon the provisions of the <b>three preceding articles</b> unless such error, omission or irregularity has in fact occasioned a miscarriage of justice″. </span></i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">Emphasis supplied.</span></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">I observe that Article 495 of the Civil Code of Seychelles does not concern Articles 490 and 491 of the said Code. </span></span></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="27"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">A careful reading of Article 490 of the Civil Code of Seychelles has led me to conclude that it gives an exhaustive list of persons, who may enter proceedings for interdiction in the Supreme Court. I mention in passing that the Civil Code of Seychelles does not contain an article similar to that as obtained in the <i>Code Civil Mauricien</i>: <i>″504 L’époux est tuteur de son conjoint, à moins que la communauté de vie n’ait cessé entre eux ou que le juge en Chambre n’estime qu’une cause interdit  de lui confier la tutelle″.</i> </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="28"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Further, a close reading of Articles 490 and 491 of the Civil Code of Seychelles has led me to conclude that the said provisions of the Civil Code of Seychelles have the <i>caractère d’ordre public</i>. </span></span><span lang="FR" xml:lang="FR" xml:lang="FR"><span style="line-height:150%">In <i>Civ. 1er, 23 juin 1987, 85-17126, </i>the Cour de Cassation held: <i>″<span style="background:white"><span style="color:black">Mais attendu que les dispositions de l'article 493, alinéa 1<sup>er</sup>, du Code civil, qui énumèrent limitativement les personnes qui ont qualité pour requérir l'ouverture de la tutelle, <b>édictées dans un souci de protection de la liberté, ont un caractère d'ordre public</b> ; que le juge doit relever d'office les fins de non-recevoir fondées sur ce texte;″. </span></span></i></span></span><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="background:white"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="color:black">Emphasis supplied<i>.</i></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="29"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">In the present appeal, the Appellant, the daughter of the Respondent, entered proceedings, before the Supreme Court, for the interdiction of the Respondent, who was made a Respondent. Her petition was also styled: ″<i>In the presence of: the Attorney General</i>″. In that regard, Article 491 of the Civil Code of Seychelles was correctly complied with. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p> </p> <ol start="30"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">As mentioned above, the fundamental issue with respect to this case is that Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont neither cross-petitioned nor were before the Court. Both of them had not asked to be appointed as the guardians of the Respondent. The Appellate Court stated in the case of<b> Jourdanne Guy v Dianna Sedgwick and Anor </b><i>SCA54/2011</i>, (delivered on 11 April 2014), at paragraph 21, that: <i>″We not only have to do justice but have to do justice according to the law″</i>.  </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="31"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">Although prayer (3) had asked the Court to ″<i>3. make such other orders that this Honourable Court shall deem fit in the circumstances of this case″</i>, I find that the pleadings, including prayer (3), were not sufficiently wide to permit the learned trial Judge to make the findings and grant the relief she did. The petition stated, <i>inter alia</i> ―</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">″7. The Petitioner proposes that the Petitioner be appointed as the Guardian of the Respondent.</span></i></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">8. The Petitioner is able and willing to be appointed guardian of the Respondent  and to carry out duties of guardian of the Respondent.</span></i></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">9. The petitioner is not subject to any legal incapacity to be appointed as guardian of the Respondent.</span></i></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px; margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">10. That it is, therefore, urgent and necessary that the Respondent be interdicted  and the Petitioner be appointed as Guardian for the Respondent and to administer and manage the Respondent's affairs and property.″</span></i></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">The Appellant had not asked in her petition for Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont to be appointed as guardians. There were no indications that Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont were able and willing, and that they were not subject to any legal incapacity as found by the learned trial Judge. In addition, I accept the contention of Counsel for the Appellant that the learned trial Judge was not correct to place a burden on the Appellant to satisfy her as to why Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont should not be guardians.</span></span></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="32"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">The Respondent in his answer stated that: ″<i>he is in good mental health and that the Petitioner is unfit to act as his guardian and that she should be examined to certify her fitness</i>″. The Respondent also alleged in his answer that the Petitioner had filed this petition because she wanted to have total control of his property. None of those allegations were proved at the hearing of the application. As mentioned above, the Respondent testified to the effect that the Appellant was a good daughter to him, and that he had no reason to believe that the Appellant was after his property.  </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="33"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">There was no evidence to show that the Appellant was not a fit and proper person to be appointed as the guardian of the Respondent. The evidence also did not reveal any factor disqualifying her from appointment as guardian. It was not alleged that the conduct of the Appellant was notorious, nor was it established. Further, whether or not the learned trial Judge was correct to conflate the duties of carer with those of guardian does not arise for my consideration in view of the statement made at paragraph 1 hereof. The Appellant testified to the effect that she was able and willing to be appointed as a guardian and to carry out the duties of a guardian to the Respondent and would be ready to leave her job to take care of the Respondent as his carer if she were to be appointed. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="34"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">For the reasons stated above, I hold the view that the learned trial Judge erred in finding that Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont were able and willing to be appointed as guardians and to carry out the duties of guardians to the Respondent, and that they are both not subject to any legal incapacity to be appointed as such. I make this finding paying due regard to the view of the Attorney General as the <i>Ministère Public</i>, who was not in favour of Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont being appointed as joint guardians of the Respondent, two people who were never before the Court. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="35"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"> Thus, I accept the contention of the Appellant that the learned trial Judge denied the Appellant the relief she sought, namely to be appointed as guardian of the Respondent after she had successfully petitioned to have him interdicted and sought her appointment as guardian over his affairs.</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="36"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">I make orders allowing the appeal, setting aside the appointment of Mrs Christianne Belmont and Mr Antoine Belmont as joint guardians of the Respondent and substituting therefor the Appellant, Miss Karine Belmont as sole guardian for the Respondent and to administer and manage the Respondent's affairs and property.</span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <ol start="37"> <li class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:8px; text-align:justify"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%">I make no order as to costs. </span></span></span></li> </ol> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <div style="page-break-after: always"><span style="display: none;"> </span></div> <p style="margin-top:8px"> </p> <p style="margin-top:8px"> </p> <p style="margin-top:8px"> </p> <p style="margin-top:8px"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="line-height:200%"><b><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><sdt combobox="t" docpart="A5DA3DA95E9D4112942859207A1DB27F" id="1342433808"><br /> <listitem datavalue="F. MacGregor (PCA)" listvalue="F. MacGregor (PCA)"></listitem> <listitem datavalue="A.Fernando (President)" listvalue="A.Fernando (President)"></listitem> <listitem datavalue="M. Twomey (J.A)" listvalue="M. Twomey (J.A)"></listitem> <listitem datavalue="B. Renaud (J.A)" listvalue="B. Renaud (J.A)"></listitem> <listitem datavalue="F. Robinson (J.A)" listvalue="F. Robinson (J.A)"></listitem> F. Robinson (J.A)</sdt></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p> </p> <p style="margin-top:25px; margin-bottom:16px"> </p> <p> </p> <p style="margin-top:25px; margin-bottom:16px"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="line-height:200%"><b><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><sdtpr></sdtpr><sdt contentlocked="t" docpart="E13ABC822BDC4F5FAC609B34284800E8" id="570630719" text="t">I concur:.</sdt></span></span></b><b><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%">                                ………………….                               </span></span></b><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><sdt combobox="t" docpart="A2239E41731648439628DBE6EE7FA357" id="550192873"><br /> <listitem datavalue="F. MacGregor (PCA)" listvalue="F. MacGregor (PCA)"></listitem> <listitem datavalue="A.Fernando (President)" listvalue="A.Fernando (President)"></listitem> <listitem datavalue="M. Twomey (J.A)" listvalue="M. Twomey (J.A)"></listitem> <listitem datavalue="L. Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza (J.A)" listvalue="L. Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza (J.A)"></listitem> <listitem datavalue="F. Robinson (J.A)" listvalue="F. Robinson (J.A)"></listitem> A.Fernando (President)</sdt></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-top:25px; margin-bottom:16px"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="line-height:200%"><b><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%">I concur:.                                ………………….                               </span></span></b><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%">M. Burhan (J.A)</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-top:25px; margin-bottom:16px"> </p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px"> </p> <p style="margin-bottom:16px"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="line-height:150%"><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:150%"><sdt contentlocked="t" docpart="670358A5D09B4B839F16355D9A0550C8" docparttype="Quick Parts" id="-1131636047" sdtdocpartlist="t">Signed, dated and delivered at Palais de Justice, Ile du Port on</sdt><sdt calendar="t" calendartype="Gregorian" date="2020-08-21T00:00:00Z" dateformat="dd MMMM yyyy" docpart="FD7100E2AD7A422C95759A47AAF738F1" id="-504743887" lang="EN-GB" maptodatetime="t" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB">21 August 2020</sdt></span></span></span></span></span></p> <div> <br /> <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /> <div id="ftn1"> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><a href="#_ftnref1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><i><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><b><span style="line-height:107%">[1]</span></b></span></i></span></a><i> ″Article 490 <span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">1. Proceedings for interdiction shall be entered in the Supreme Court and shall be commenced by petition addressed to the Court.</span></span></i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i> </i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">2.         Such proceedings may be entered by ‑</span></span></i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i> </i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">(a)        any relative of the person whose interdiction is sought; or</span></span></i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">(b)        a spouse with regard to the other spouse; or</span></span></i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">(c)        the Attorney‑General.</span></span></i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i> </i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">3.         The petition shall set out briefly the material facts on which the application for interdiction is based.</span></span></i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i> </i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">4.         The person whose interdiction is sought shall be made a respondent in the case, and the petition and such other process as the Court may direct shall be served on him. ″</span></span></i></span></span></span></p> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"> </p> </div> <div id="ftn2"> <p class="estatutes-9-generalheading"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><a href="#_ftnref2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><i><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><b><span style="line-height:107%">[2]</span></b></span></i></span></a><i> </i><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black"><span style="letter-spacing:-.3pt">Conclusions of the Ministère Public</span></span></span></i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-9-generalheading"> </p> <p class="estatutes-1-sectionheading"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">″Matters which must be referred to the Attorney General for conclusions as Ministère Public</span></span></i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-sectionheading"> </p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">151. The following matters shall be referred to the Attorney General for his conclusions as Ministère Public, but there shall henceforth be no obligation upon him to give conclusions as Ministère Public, in any matter referred to him, unless required to do so by the court, and no judgment shall be held to be invalid for want of such conclusions whenever such matter shall have been referred to him according to law:</span></span></i></span></span></span></p> <p class="estatutes-1-section" style="text-align:justify"> </p> <ol style="list-style-type:lower-alpha"> <li class="estatutes-3-paragraph" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">matters relating to the guardianship of minors;</span></span></i></span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="estatutes-3-paragraph" style="margin-left:25px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.25in"> </p> <ol start="2" style="list-style-type:lower-alpha"> <li class="estatutes-3-paragraph" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">matters in which one of the parties is represented by a curator;</span></span></i></span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="estatutes-3-paragraph" style="margin-left:25px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.25in"> </p> <ol start="3" style="list-style-type:lower-alpha"> <li class="estatutes-3-paragraph" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">matters concerning presumed absentees or matters in which such absentees are interested;</span></span></i></span></span></span></li> </ol> <p class="estatutes-3-paragraph" style="margin-left:25px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.25in"> </p> <p class="estatutes-3-paragraph" style="margin-left:25px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.25in"><span style="font-family:Tahoma,Geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size:14px;"><span style="background:white"><b><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">(d) matters relating to the interdiction of persons</span></span></i></b><i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black"> or the appointment of advisers(conseils judiciaires).″ Emphasis </span></span></i><span lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="color:black">supplied</span></span></span></span></span></p> </div> </div> <div> <div id="ftn2"> <p class="estatutes-3-paragraph" style="margin-left:25px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.25in"> </p> </div> </div> <div> <div id="ftn2"> <p class="estatutes-3-paragraph" style="margin-left:25px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.25in"> </p> </div> </div> <div> <div id="ftn2"> <p class="estatutes-3-paragraph" style="margin-left:25px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.25in"> </p> </div> </div> <div> <div id="ftn2"> <p class="estatutes-3-paragraph" style="margin-left:25px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-.25in"> </p> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"> </p> </div> </div> <p><span style="display: none;"> </span> </p></span></div></div> </div> </div> Thu, 04 Mar 2021 05:56:25 +0000 Anonymous 2621 at http://old2.seylii.org Mende v Payet & Anor (CS 52 of 2018) [2019] SCSC 291 (04 April 2019); http://old2.seylii.org/sc/judgment/supreme-court/2019/291 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">Mende v Payet &amp; Anor (CS 52 of 2018) [2019] SCSC 291 (04 April 2019);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/159" hreflang="x-default">Family Law</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/125" hreflang="x-default">Property Law</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/127" hreflang="x-default">HR</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Anonymous (not verified)</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Wed, 03/03/2021 - 13:11</span> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-field-headnote-and-holding field--type-text-long field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Headnote and holding</div> <div class="field__item"><p>Matrimonial home- share of the parties-Court has discretion in the absence of documentary evidence.           </p> </div> </div> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.seylii.org/files/judgments/scsc/2019/291/2019-scsc-291.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=26223">2019-scsc-291.docx</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><p class="rtejustify"><strong>NUNKOO JUDGE</strong></p> <p class="rtejustify">[1]        By plaint dated 18 April 2018, the Plaintiff is praying the court to make the following orders:</p> <p class="rteindent1 rtejustify">1.   Declaring that the Plaintiff has been impoverished and that the first Defendant has been unjustly enriched in enjoying his name on the Purchase Agreement with the 2nd Defendant in regard to the property</p> <p class="rteindent1 rtejustify">2.   Declare that the second Defendant has also been enriched and the Plaintiff impoverished in having paid the full consideration price for the property which to this remain in ownership of the second Defendant.</p> <p class="rteindent1 rtejustify">3.   Declare that the Plaintiff has 100 per cent share in the property</p> <p class="rteindent1 rtejustify">4.   To make an order directing the 2<sup>nd</sup> Defendant to transfer the sole ownership and title of the property onto the sole name of the Plaintiff</p> <p class="rteindent1 rtejustify">5.   To make any other orders that the court shall deem fit in circumstances of the matter.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[2]        Plaintiff’s version is that in April 1999, as she and the first Defendant were in a relationship, they entered into a lease agreement with the Seychelles Housing Development Corporation, for a two bedroom house, at Roche Caiman, for a monthly rent of Rs 696.00.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[3]        Plaintiff avers that it was she who was paying the rent throughout.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[4]        In July 2001 both Plaintiff and Defendant started living together in Canada.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[5]        In the year 2005, the second Defendant invited them that is herself and the first Defendant to buy the said house. Plaintiff avers that she secured a loan of Rs 695, 000 from Property Management Company (PMC) and paid for the house. The House purchase agreement was signed in 2007.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[6]        Plaintiff and Defendant started living separately at some stage in Canada and are still living separately. Plaintiff has averred that ever since the loan was obtained it is she who is paying the monthly instalments and finally in the year she cleared the final payment due that is a balance of Rs 35,000.00 and the second Defendant, as per her version, then acknowledged the payment and also undertook to transfer the house in the name of the Plaintiff.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[7]        The Plaintiff states that because of the facts as alleged by her she has been impoverished as she has been deprived of the use and enjoyment of the house and that the Defendant has been unjustly enriched.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[8]        The Defendant has averred that the Plaintiff was employed at the Seychelles Savings Bank at the time of the purchase of the house and both their salaries were taken into consideration for the purposes of the loan by the Bank. That it was agreed that the Plaintiff would pay for the loan and he would take care of all the household expenses and for the maintenance of the child.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[9]        Defendant has also  avers that by letter dated 5 October 2005, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Defendant invited the parties to purchase the house under the House Ownership Scheme and they were informed that the purchase price would be reduced from SR 227,304 to SR 28,377.15 and monthly repayment was to reduced from SR 696.00 to SR 487.20.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[10]      Defendant No. 1 maintains that the house is in both their names and that he is entitled to a share in the property.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[11]      The Defendant has further made a counterclaim to the effect that he is entitled to half share in the property and that the 2nd Defendant should register the property in title V11018 in their joint names or alternatively the Defendant offers for sale his share in the property for SR 400,000.00.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[12]      He has asked the Court for the following orders: that the 2nd Defendant be ordered to register the land title V11018 in the joint names of the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant, alternatively to order the Plaintiff to buy out the first Defendant’s share and lastly order the Plaintiff to pay the interests and cost of the suit.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[13]      I have gone through the evidence which  can be  summarised  as follows:</p> <p class="rtejustify"><strong>PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY</strong></p> <p class="rtejustify">The plaintiff stated that when they that is herself and the defendant were living together she took all the steps to obtain a house from the Seychelles Housing Development Company (SHDC) and the Housing Finance Company (HDC). She was the first to go to the HFC. When a house was allocated to them through a tenancy agreement it was she who was paying the monthly rental of SCR 695.00 from her account at the Seychelles Savings Bank. The house was found at Roche Caiman at Eden Island. She had obtained the support of a lady one Zelia and also that of her Member of National Assembly, Madame Charles. They were allocated the house in 1999 and later in 2001 they both moved to Canada. During their stay in Canada it was her brother one Danny Marie and her girlfriend occupied the house and they also paid the rental.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[14]      Later in 2005 an offer to sell the house was made to them by the SHDC. They had to pay the balance on the price. She stated that as her brother was still staying there she did not pay for the house. But in 2009 she had to come back as she was informed by her sister that the SHDC was searching for her in regard to the house. That is when she came back alone; the defendant was allegedly not interested in the acquisition of the house. She deponed to the effect that she paid the total amount of SCR 34 850.00 in three instalments, of SCR 19000.00, 15000.00 and 850.00 in December 2009.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[15]      The plaintiff stated that she informed the Defendant that she was going to pay for the house and wanted to know from him if he was interested in buying it but then the defendant had flatly indicated that he was not interested and allegedly said that he was not going to buy a guinea pig’s house. She denied any agreement as to the payment of the loan by herself and the defendant making the family expenses. She stated that the Defendant could not have contributed towards expenses for their child as she did not have with him during that time and later whilst still in Canada they separated. She maintained that she had spent money on renovations after the acquisition of the house that is around the year 2010.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[16]      In cross examination she admitted that some renovations were initially made by the Defendant, like laying of the tile or the furnishing of the kitchen. She also stated that her brother who had been staying in the house had stopped paying the rental and that was after she had signed the purchase agreement in 2007. She also stated that the Defendant is contributing about SCR 6000 for the upkeep of their daughter. To a question that she benefitted from the rental she maintained that she did not benefit from any rental that was paid by her brother. She stated that it was who had benefitted from the rental paid by her sister when the latter had rented the house.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[17]      The sister gave evidence to the effect that she had initially rented the house for SCR 2000.00 but later reduced to SCR 1000.00 upon Defendant’s intervention.</p> <p class="rtejustify"><strong>TESTIMONY OF MR NELSON AUGUSTIN FROM PMC.</strong></p> <p class="rtejustify">This witness confirmed that there was a tenancy agreement signed between the PMC and the plaintiff as well as the Defendant in April 1999. Later in 2007 an offer was made to sell the house to the parties abovenamed at a discount price of SCR 28377.15. Until 2009 no payment was made. By December 2009 the price along with interests had accumulated to SCR 35569.34. This sum was paid in three sums as follows: SCR 19000.00 in December; then cash payment of SCR in the sum of SCR 15000.00 and SCR 738.38. in January 2010.</p> <p class="rtejustify">He confirmed that the receipt was issued in the joint names and that as there is a dispute between the parties relating to ownership the PMC has not been able to transfer the property.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[18]      He confirmed that the payments were made by the plaintiff.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[19]      The Defendant deponed and stated that he had been living with the plaintiff for 7 years in Seychelles since 1995 and 7 years in Canada. They were not civilly married. He stated that when in Seychelles he used to work on a tuna fishing boat but that his work was not regular and when not on the boat he would work in the garage of the Plaintiff’s brother as panel beater. He could earn about SCR 2000.00 and spent that money on household expenses. He testified that he and the plaintiff entered into a tenancy agreement for the lease of a house at Roche Caimans from the SHDC and moved into it in 1999.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[20]      Now I come to the issue of unjust enrichment. I am of the view that the circumstances do not show that there has been any unjust enrichment and the conditions set out in law have not been met.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[21]      The question I have to determine is whether the Plaintiff is solely entitled to the ownership of the house or both jointly? I am satisfied that the plaintiff put in a lot of effort  in to get the house and also that payments were made to a large extent from her salaries and later a loan obtained by her to settle the final balance of R 35000??</p> <p class="rtejustify">[22]      It is relevant to note that the loan was obtained by her and she paid for the house at a time when she had already separated from the Defendant.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[23]      What about the contributions of the Defendant? Did he contribute towards improving the house and making it more inhabitable and comfortable. The evidence points towards this. The court cannot ignore the fact that a significant amount of money was paid to the SHDC between 2001 and 2006 from rent when both parties were living together in Canada. This amount can be quantified. And there is no reason to doubt that throughout whether in Seychelles or in Canada the Plaintiff was supported by the Defendant; the fact that he is also paying the sum of SCR 6000.00 for their daughter cannot be overlooked though I would haste to add that this entitles him to claim a share in the property but it has relieved the plaintiff from a significant financial burden.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[24]      In the absence of documentary evidence to show who has paid for what and the extent of monetary contribution made by the Defendant or how the loan obtained in Canada was used it becomes difficult for the court to reach precise conclusions. I am therefore going to use my discretion under  sections 5 and 6 of the Courts Act, which reads as follows:</p> <p class="rteindent1 rtejustify"><em>“ The Supreme Court shall continue to have, and is hereby invested with full original jurisdiction to hear and determine all suits, actions, causes, and matters under all laws for the time being in force in Seychelles relating to wills and execution of wills, interdiction or appointment of a Curator, guardianship of minors, adoption, insolvency, bankruptcy, matrimonial causes and generally to hear and determine all civil suits, actions, causes and matters that may be the nature of such suits, actions, causes or matters, and, in exercising such jurisdiction, the Supreme Court shall have, and is hereby invested with, all the powers, privileges, authority, and jurisdiction which is vested in, or capable of being exercised by the High Court of Justice in England.</em></p> <p class="rteindent1 rtejustify"><em>The Supreme Court shall continue to be a Court of Equity and is hereby invested with powers, authority, and jurisdiction to administer justice and to do all acts for the due execution of such equitable jurisdiction in all cases where no sufficient legal remedy is provided by the law of Seychelles.”</em></p> <p class="rtejustify">[25]      In the absence of document regarding the valuation of the property I am using my discretion to decide the share of the parties in the light of the evidence adduced and the visit locus in quo.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[26]      I therefore order the Plaintiff to pay the sum of SR 50,000.00 to the Defendant within six months from date; I order the PMC to transfer the property in the name of the Plaintiff after document of payment is produced by the Plaintiff.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[27]      I make no order as to costs.</p> <p class="rtejustify">Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 5<sup>th</sup> April 2019.</p> <p class="rtejustify"><strong>____________            </strong></p> <p class="rtejustify"><strong>Nunkoo J</strong></p> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-dc2459fc78bada167f65075163694b47d309c0a7d2d7875462d22927a3435b3e"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><p class="rtejustify"><strong>NUNKOO JUDGE</strong></p> <p class="rtejustify">[1]        By plaint dated 18 April 2018, the Plaintiff is praying the court to make the following orders:</p> <p class="rteindent1 rtejustify">1.   Declaring that the Plaintiff has been impoverished and that the first Defendant has been unjustly enriched in enjoying his name on the Purchase Agreement with the 2nd Defendant in regard to the property</p> <p class="rteindent1 rtejustify">2.   Declare that the second Defendant has also been enriched and the Plaintiff impoverished in having paid the full consideration price for the property which to this remain in ownership of the second Defendant.</p> <p class="rteindent1 rtejustify">3.   Declare that the Plaintiff has 100 per cent share in the property</p> <p class="rteindent1 rtejustify">4.   To make an order directing the 2<sup>nd</sup> Defendant to transfer the sole ownership and title of the property onto the sole name of the Plaintiff</p> <p class="rteindent1 rtejustify">5.   To make any other orders that the court shall deem fit in circumstances of the matter.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[2]        Plaintiff’s version is that in April 1999, as she and the first Defendant were in a relationship, they entered into a lease agreement with the Seychelles Housing Development Corporation, for a two bedroom house, at Roche Caiman, for a monthly rent of Rs 696.00.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[3]        Plaintiff avers that it was she who was paying the rent throughout.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[4]        In July 2001 both Plaintiff and Defendant started living together in Canada.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[5]        In the year 2005, the second Defendant invited them that is herself and the first Defendant to buy the said house. Plaintiff avers that she secured a loan of Rs 695, 000 from Property Management Company (PMC) and paid for the house. The House purchase agreement was signed in 2007.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[6]        Plaintiff and Defendant started living separately at some stage in Canada and are still living separately. Plaintiff has averred that ever since the loan was obtained it is she who is paying the monthly instalments and finally in the year she cleared the final payment due that is a balance of Rs 35,000.00 and the second Defendant, as per her version, then acknowledged the payment and also undertook to transfer the house in the name of the Plaintiff.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[7]        The Plaintiff states that because of the facts as alleged by her she has been impoverished as she has been deprived of the use and enjoyment of the house and that the Defendant has been unjustly enriched.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[8]        The Defendant has averred that the Plaintiff was employed at the Seychelles Savings Bank at the time of the purchase of the house and both their salaries were taken into consideration for the purposes of the loan by the Bank. That it was agreed that the Plaintiff would pay for the loan and he would take care of all the household expenses and for the maintenance of the child.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[9]        Defendant has also  avers that by letter dated 5 October 2005, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Defendant invited the parties to purchase the house under the House Ownership Scheme and they were informed that the purchase price would be reduced from SR 227,304 to SR 28,377.15 and monthly repayment was to reduced from SR 696.00 to SR 487.20.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[10]      Defendant No. 1 maintains that the house is in both their names and that he is entitled to a share in the property.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[11]      The Defendant has further made a counterclaim to the effect that he is entitled to half share in the property and that the 2nd Defendant should register the property in title V11018 in their joint names or alternatively the Defendant offers for sale his share in the property for SR 400,000.00.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[12]      He has asked the Court for the following orders: that the 2nd Defendant be ordered to register the land title V11018 in the joint names of the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant, alternatively to order the Plaintiff to buy out the first Defendant’s share and lastly order the Plaintiff to pay the interests and cost of the suit.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[13]      I have gone through the evidence which  can be  summarised  as follows:</p> <p class="rtejustify"><strong>PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY</strong></p> <p class="rtejustify">The plaintiff stated that when they that is herself and the defendant were living together she took all the steps to obtain a house from the Seychelles Housing Development Company (SHDC) and the Housing Finance Company (HDC). She was the first to go to the HFC. When a house was allocated to them through a tenancy agreement it was she who was paying the monthly rental of SCR 695.00 from her account at the Seychelles Savings Bank. The house was found at Roche Caiman at Eden Island. She had obtained the support of a lady one Zelia and also that of her Member of National Assembly, Madame Charles. They were allocated the house in 1999 and later in 2001 they both moved to Canada. During their stay in Canada it was her brother one Danny Marie and her girlfriend occupied the house and they also paid the rental.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[14]      Later in 2005 an offer to sell the house was made to them by the SHDC. They had to pay the balance on the price. She stated that as her brother was still staying there she did not pay for the house. But in 2009 she had to come back as she was informed by her sister that the SHDC was searching for her in regard to the house. That is when she came back alone; the defendant was allegedly not interested in the acquisition of the house. She deponed to the effect that she paid the total amount of SCR 34 850.00 in three instalments, of SCR 19000.00, 15000.00 and 850.00 in December 2009.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[15]      The plaintiff stated that she informed the Defendant that she was going to pay for the house and wanted to know from him if he was interested in buying it but then the defendant had flatly indicated that he was not interested and allegedly said that he was not going to buy a guinea pig’s house. She denied any agreement as to the payment of the loan by herself and the defendant making the family expenses. She stated that the Defendant could not have contributed towards expenses for their child as she did not have with him during that time and later whilst still in Canada they separated. She maintained that she had spent money on renovations after the acquisition of the house that is around the year 2010.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[16]      In cross examination she admitted that some renovations were initially made by the Defendant, like laying of the tile or the furnishing of the kitchen. She also stated that her brother who had been staying in the house had stopped paying the rental and that was after she had signed the purchase agreement in 2007. She also stated that the Defendant is contributing about SCR 6000 for the upkeep of their daughter. To a question that she benefitted from the rental she maintained that she did not benefit from any rental that was paid by her brother. She stated that it was who had benefitted from the rental paid by her sister when the latter had rented the house.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[17]      The sister gave evidence to the effect that she had initially rented the house for SCR 2000.00 but later reduced to SCR 1000.00 upon Defendant’s intervention.</p> <p class="rtejustify"><strong>TESTIMONY OF MR NELSON AUGUSTIN FROM PMC.</strong></p> <p class="rtejustify">This witness confirmed that there was a tenancy agreement signed between the PMC and the plaintiff as well as the Defendant in April 1999. Later in 2007 an offer was made to sell the house to the parties abovenamed at a discount price of SCR 28377.15. Until 2009 no payment was made. By December 2009 the price along with interests had accumulated to SCR 35569.34. This sum was paid in three sums as follows: SCR 19000.00 in December; then cash payment of SCR in the sum of SCR 15000.00 and SCR 738.38. in January 2010.</p> <p class="rtejustify">He confirmed that the receipt was issued in the joint names and that as there is a dispute between the parties relating to ownership the PMC has not been able to transfer the property.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[18]      He confirmed that the payments were made by the plaintiff.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[19]      The Defendant deponed and stated that he had been living with the plaintiff for 7 years in Seychelles since 1995 and 7 years in Canada. They were not civilly married. He stated that when in Seychelles he used to work on a tuna fishing boat but that his work was not regular and when not on the boat he would work in the garage of the Plaintiff’s brother as panel beater. He could earn about SCR 2000.00 and spent that money on household expenses. He testified that he and the plaintiff entered into a tenancy agreement for the lease of a house at Roche Caimans from the SHDC and moved into it in 1999.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[20]      Now I come to the issue of unjust enrichment. I am of the view that the circumstances do not show that there has been any unjust enrichment and the conditions set out in law have not been met.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[21]      The question I have to determine is whether the Plaintiff is solely entitled to the ownership of the house or both jointly? I am satisfied that the plaintiff put in a lot of effort  in to get the house and also that payments were made to a large extent from her salaries and later a loan obtained by her to settle the final balance of R 35000??</p> <p class="rtejustify">[22]      It is relevant to note that the loan was obtained by her and she paid for the house at a time when she had already separated from the Defendant.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[23]      What about the contributions of the Defendant? Did he contribute towards improving the house and making it more inhabitable and comfortable. The evidence points towards this. The court cannot ignore the fact that a significant amount of money was paid to the SHDC between 2001 and 2006 from rent when both parties were living together in Canada. This amount can be quantified. And there is no reason to doubt that throughout whether in Seychelles or in Canada the Plaintiff was supported by the Defendant; the fact that he is also paying the sum of SCR 6000.00 for their daughter cannot be overlooked though I would haste to add that this entitles him to claim a share in the property but it has relieved the plaintiff from a significant financial burden.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[24]      In the absence of documentary evidence to show who has paid for what and the extent of monetary contribution made by the Defendant or how the loan obtained in Canada was used it becomes difficult for the court to reach precise conclusions. I am therefore going to use my discretion under  sections 5 and 6 of the Courts Act, which reads as follows:</p> <p class="rteindent1 rtejustify"><em>“ The Supreme Court shall continue to have, and is hereby invested with full original jurisdiction to hear and determine all suits, actions, causes, and matters under all laws for the time being in force in Seychelles relating to wills and execution of wills, interdiction or appointment of a Curator, guardianship of minors, adoption, insolvency, bankruptcy, matrimonial causes and generally to hear and determine all civil suits, actions, causes and matters that may be the nature of such suits, actions, causes or matters, and, in exercising such jurisdiction, the Supreme Court shall have, and is hereby invested with, all the powers, privileges, authority, and jurisdiction which is vested in, or capable of being exercised by the High Court of Justice in England.</em></p> <p class="rteindent1 rtejustify"><em>The Supreme Court shall continue to be a Court of Equity and is hereby invested with powers, authority, and jurisdiction to administer justice and to do all acts for the due execution of such equitable jurisdiction in all cases where no sufficient legal remedy is provided by the law of Seychelles.”</em></p> <p class="rtejustify">[25]      In the absence of document regarding the valuation of the property I am using my discretion to decide the share of the parties in the light of the evidence adduced and the visit locus in quo.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[26]      I therefore order the Plaintiff to pay the sum of SR 50,000.00 to the Defendant within six months from date; I order the PMC to transfer the property in the name of the Plaintiff after document of payment is produced by the Plaintiff.</p> <p class="rtejustify">[27]      I make no order as to costs.</p> <p class="rtejustify">Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 5<sup>th</sup> April 2019.</p> <p class="rtejustify"><strong>____________            </strong></p> <p class="rtejustify"><strong>Nunkoo J</strong></p></span></div></div> </div> </div> Wed, 03 Mar 2021 13:11:14 +0000 Anonymous 518 at http://old2.seylii.org